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This dissertation examines the relationship between the Arkadian city of Megalopolis 
and the Achaian koinon in the Hellenistic period. By arguing that Megalopolis was a 
polis which used its own local identity to carve out a prominent position for itself within 
the Achaian federation, this thesis is able to provide new insights into the study of the 
wider topic of the relationship between federations and their member states. To support 
this argument, the thesis is divided into three parts. In part one of the dissertation, the 
Megalopolitan identity is clearly established by identifying its basic components, which 
were the result of the city’s foundation by the Arkadian koinon around 368 BC as well 
as its Achaian membership of 235 BC. The Megalopolitan identity was marked by a 
complex structure; it was characterised by a deep and traditional hatred for Sparta, 
longstanding relations with the Macedonian kings, a clear understanding of the 
mechanisms of a federal state and multi-ethnic politics, and, by Polybius’ time, a 
connection to both Arkadia as well as Achaia.  
The second part examines the influence of this local identity on the koinon 
through the direct relationship of Megalopolis with the federal government via its 
Achaian membership. Within the Achaian League, Megalopolis was an active member, 
taking part in the federal institutions and minting coins. However, through its 
interactions with other members of the federal state, Megalopolis used its relationship 
with the federal state to its own advantage.  
Finally, the last part of the thesis explores the role of Megalopolis and its local 
interests in Achaian foreign politics. The polis seems to have influenced these through 
the emergence of a series of influential statesmen (such as Philopoimen and Lykortas) 
as well as several new policies pursued by the Achaians after Megalopolis’ membership. 
Examples of these new policies are the Achaian alliance with Macedon of 225 BC and 
the increased focus of the koinon on Sparta in the second century BC, something that 
also shaped Achaian interactions with Rome. Throughout the thesis particular attention 
is paid to the narrative of the historian Polybius and the problems his writings pose, since 
he was an important source for the history of the Achaian koinon and who, as a 
Megalopolitan, was an excellent example of this distinct Megalopolitan identity. By 
shedding light on the various ways in which Megalopolis affected the Achaian koinon 
and its politics, this thesis shows that Megalopolis merits more attention than it has 
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received in the past, as it was more than just an Arkadian city that was a member of the 
Achaian koinon. Furthermore, the intricate analysis of the distinct Megalopolitan 
identity makes a novel contribution to the wider study on the interaction between the 





Today, federal states are a popular form of government throughout the world. Some 
examples include the European Union or countries like Belgium, Canada, Germany 
and the United States. Within a federal state, different governments (federal and 
regional/local) interact with one another to ensure an optimal working of the federation. 
However, it is not always easy for these different levels to co-operate as their interests 
may be different at times. Moreover, as the troubles within the European Union have 
shown, sometimes the members of these federal states do not get along.  
This thesis examines the relationship between federal states and their members 
in Ancient Greece. More specifically, it explores the case study of the Greek city of 
Megalopolis and the federal state that it was a part of, the Achaian koinon. The core 
argument of the thesis is that Megalopolis was a city which used its own local identity to 
carve out a prominent position for itself within the Achaian federation. Therefore, 
Megalopolis was able to influence Achaian foreign politics and use its relationship with 
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Note on Abbreviations and References 
Throughout this thesis, I have employed the Harvard system for referencing. The 
abbreviations for the Greek and Latin authors are listed below. All literary quotations in 
Greek and Latin are from the Perseus Digital Library, while the epigraphic Greek text 
has been taken from the PHI Inscriptions Database, except for the text from the 
Messene-Megalopolis inscription which can be found in the online database of the SEG 
(58 370). While the translations of the literary sources are my own, they are loosely 
based on those of the Loeb Classical Library. For the epigraphic evidence, I have 
likewise drawn on previous translations of the inscriptions done by Kaja Harter-
Uibopuu, Emily Mackil and Nino Luraghi and Anna Magnetto.  
 Concerning the spelling of Greek names, I have tried to consistently use the 
Greek form in the dissertation (Aratos, Philopoimen, Achaia, Arkadia, etc.). However, 
I have used the Latinised names in cases in which I felt it was more appropriate like the 
names of the ancient authors (Polybius, Phylarchus, Livy, etc.) or when they are easier 
to recognise (Macedon, Philip, Alexander, etc.). I have italicised Greek political terms 
with a lower case to denote a general concept such as koinon and stategos; or with a 
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When in 1991, after about a century, excavations resumed on the archaeological site of 
Megalopolis in Arkadia, archaeologists noticed that there were signs of two major 
catastrophes in the material evidence. One was an earthquake in AD 200 that happened 
not long after Pausanias’ visit to the city, while the other was the result of the destruction 
of the city in 222 BC by the Spartan king Kleomenes III. An attack so severe, that it 
took several years to rebuild (Pol. 2. 55. 7.) as is evidenced by the extensive remodelling 
and rebuilding of the public buildings on the archaeological site.
1
 The attack occurred 
during the Kleomenean War (227-222 BC), which pitted the federation of cities known 
as the Achaian koinon against the Spartan king Kleomenes. As a new member of this 
federal state – it had joined the koinon in 235 BC, Megalopolis played an important part 
in the conflict, in part due to its geographical proximity to Sparta. However, this specific 
attack was not only connected to Megalopolis’ Achaian membership as it was just one 
example in a series of attacks, sieges and raids between the two poleis. These were the 
results of a longstanding antagonism between the two states and were a crucial part of 
the Megalopolitan identity. 
Just like any other Greek polis, Megalopolis had its own local identity that was 
formed through a long and open-ended process. It hated Sparta with a burning passion 
because of Sparta’s dominant position and conquests in the Peloponnese and Arkadia, 
it also had a political preference for Macedon and was proud to be an Arkadian city. 
However, because of its foundation by the Arkadian koinon around 368 BC and its later 
membership of the Achaian koinon from 235 to 146 BC, Megalopolis had a particular, 
defining awareness of what it meant to be part of a federal state, which distinguished it 
from other cities in the late Classical or Hellenistic period. Since federal states or koina 
as they are referred to in Greek
2
, had become a popular form of governance in mainland 
Greece from the end of the fourth century BC as the ultimate example of cooperation 
between city-states
3
, Megalopolis could use this element to carve out a position of 
influence within the Achaian koinon. This federation was first formed in the fifth century 
BC by the poleis that were part of the region of Achaia in the northwest of the 
                                                          
1
 Lauter (2005), 237. 
2
 Other popular Greek terms for these federations are ethnos, sympoliteuma, or systema. For more on 
this see the Methodology section below.  
3
 Beck and Funke (2015), 3. 
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Peloponnese. These cities remained a federal state until they were pitted against one 
another by Alexander’s successors. Polybius tells us Dyme, Patrai, Pharai and Tritaia 
decided to form a second Achaian koinon in the 124
th
 Olympiad (284-280 BC) which 
became one of the most powerful of the Hellenistic states until its defeat by the Romans 
in the Achaian War of 146 BC (Pol. 2. 41. 1). The Achaian League had a democratic 
institution and the institutions associated with Greek poleis and other koina; it was led 
by a strategos, had a federal council, primary assembly and federal magistrates such as 
the damiorgoi; and expected its member states partake in federal political life. However, 
the Achaian koinon was different from other Greek federations because it incorporated 
poleis from the entire Peloponnese and not just those that were ethnically Achaian which 
resulted in a complex and open federal framework where a polis such as Megalopolis 
with its distinct local identity could easily thrive.   
While federalism in antiquity has long been a popular topic among ancient 
historians
4
, the influence of one city’s local interests and identity on the politics and 
internal mechanisms of a federal state has not been the topic of a single work.
5
 In general, 
Megalopolis is either studied within the wider context of its creation by the Arkadians or 
as just another Achaian member state which produced a series of influential federal 
leaders, the most notable of which were Philopoimen and Polybius’ father Lykortas. In 
the end, very little attention has been paid to Megalopolis, as a city with its own local 
interests and desires, within the wider framework that the Achaian federal state could 
offer. This is what the present work aims to change and why it limits itself to those 
periods when the city was part of a federation, i.e. the 360s BC and from 235 until 146 
BC. Furthermore, by studying local Megalopolitan identity in its federal context this 
thesis also shows that Megalopolis was an example of a city with a new kind of Greek 
ethnic identity. It shows that local civic identity was far more complex than previously 
thought and can be seen as a changing process. Therefore, this thesis is relevant to a 
wide range of historians simply because it shows that as one of the youngest cities in the 
Peloponnese Megalopolis embodies a new form of Greek civic life in which the polis 
                                                          
4
For example, for seminal works on federalism in Antiquity, see Freeman 
(1893); Busolt and Swoboda (1920-1926); Ehrenberg (1960); Larsen (1955) and (1968); and Beck 
and Funke (2015).  
5
 Beck and Funke (2015), 3. 
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seems to overstep its traditional boundaries and becomes much more open or federal 
in its nature.   
Historiography 
Research into Megalopolis has mostly been part of larger research topics. This means 
that the history of the city and the development of its local identity and traditions have 
stayed at the periphery of research on topics such as the Arkadian and Achaian koina, 
Greek and Roman relations, inter-state arbitration and interactions and even Polybius 
and his narrative. Therefore, any study like the present one that deals with a specific 
area of the Megalopolitan history, i.e. its interaction and membership of the Achaian 
koinon, has to look at these wider topics and in particular their scholarship to see how 
the polis and its local identity fit into these broader themes.  
One of the most important contexts in which Megalopolis has been extensively 
studied is its foundation by and membership of the Arkadian koinon.
6
 This is not 
surprising since the foundation of Megalopolis was the only lasting achievement of the 
Arkadians whose federation fell apart after a few years. Moreover, it is significant for this 
thesis as the foundation was the basis from which the local identity of Megalopolis could 
develop. In short, it was the start of the process that was the Megalopolitan identity. 
Traditionally, the precarious nature of the primary source material on Megalopolis’ 
foundation – and the Arkadian koinon in general – has spawned several issues that make 
it difficult to establish a precise date and pattern for the foundation. Nonetheless, in a 
series of articles, James Roy has managed to make several convincing arguments for the 
early history of Megalopolis. In his 2007 article on ‘The urban layout of Megalopolis in 
its civic and confederate context’, Roy rightly argues that Megalopolis was not founded 
by the Arkadians as their capital, as has frequently been stated by others
7
, but rather with 
the intention of creating a strong city to counter Spartan power in that part of Arkadia.
8
 
This statement is echoed by Thomas Heine Nielsen in his book chapter on the 
‘Arkadian Confederacy’ from 2015 and his earlier book on Arkadia and its Poleis in the 
Archaic and Classical Periods in which he makes the point that there is no consistent 
                                                          
6
 On Megalopolis’ foundation and membership of the Arkadian koinon, see Dušanić (1970), Roy (1971), 
(2005), (2007); Hansen and Nielsen (2004); and Nielsen (2002) and (2015). 
7
 Among others, Bury (1898), 15; Larsen (1968), 187; Braunert and Pedersen (1972), 73; Verfenstein 
(2002), 9; Donati (2015), 207. 
8
 Roy (2007), 291. 
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evidence for Megalopolis enjoying a special status within the koinon that would equal 
that of a capital as we know the term today.
9
 After all, the term capital is a modern 
construction and the sources do not mention anything of the sort in connection to 
Megalopolis. In her discussion of the sanctuaries and cults of the polis, Madeleine Jost 
does point out that these were clearly meant to connect the Megalopolitan pantheon to 




Megalopolis’ membership of the Achaian koinon is the second topic that is 
essential for this thesis due to the profound change that it had on Megalopolis’ local 
identity. Surprisingly, the city’s Achaian membership – and relationship with the federal 
state - has not been the subject of a single monograph; this despite the recognition of the 
importance of the polis within the federal state by several scholars. For example, James 
O’Neil in his seminal article on ‘The Political Elites of the Achaean and Aetolian 
Leagues’, characterized Megalopolis as the city that produced most of the federal 
leaders. Therefore, through the actions of these Megalopolitans the city had a serious 
impact on the Achaian politics.
11
 Rather than study the dynamic between polis and 
federation, scholars of the Achaian koinon have instead focused on specific areas 
connected to Achaian history and institutions. Surprisingly, there is no single study in 
English that deals with the constitutional composition of the federation and its history. 
Yet a comprehensive review of all known information on and problems around the 
federation is given both by James Roy and Athanassios Rizakis in two recent book 
chapters as well as Emily Mackil’s Creating a Common Polity: Religion, Economy, and 
Politics in the Making of the Greek Koinon.
12
  
While Andre Aymard’s book Les assemblées de la confederation achaienne: 
Étude critique d’institutions et d’histoire gives a good overview of the Achaian 
institutions based on Polybius’ narrative, his research is dated and now needs to be 
supplemented with the epigraphical evidence.
13
 These inscriptions record new and 
additional information not provided by the literary sources such as Polybius who despite 
                                                          
9
 Nielsen (2015), 266-267. 
10
 Jost (1985), 235. 
11
 O’Neil (1984-1986), 38. 
12
 Roy (2003), 81-95; Mackil (2013), 91-146; and Rizakis (2015), 118-131. 
13




his great knowledge of the Achaian institutions is vague at times on their precise nature 
and composition.
 
Even though Rizakis has collected most of these inscriptions in a series 
of three volumes, these are somewhat limited in the fact that they primarily focus on the 
cities that were part of the original Achaian heartland and subsequently ignore newer 
member states outside of this region such as Megalopolis.
14
 His discussion of a pair of 
inscriptions found in Epidauros and Aigion with lists of the Achaian federal 
nomographoi in ‘Le collège de nomographes et le système de répresentation dans le 
koinon Achéen’ offers an interesting insight into the composition of this group of federal 
magistrates and potentially of the other assemblies.
15
 He argues that the number of 
nomographoi coming from a specific city depended on its size and influence, indicating 
that the bigger cities would send three representatives, the medium sized cities two and 
the smaller poleis one. However, there are problems with these inscriptions as they 
supposedly do not list all of the cities of the Achaian koinon. This idea has also been 
supported by Sergey Sizov who attempts to solve some of the problems of these lists.
16
 
Regardless of their issues, these inscriptions have some interesting consequences for the 
interactions between the members of the Achaian koinon and the federal state. Despite 
Rizakis’ interesting contributions on this theme, as he has written other pieces on local 
and federal citizenship
17
, his focus still tends to be on Achaia and the traditionally 
Achaian cities, with little attention for Megalopolis and the rest of the Southern 
Peloponnese.  
Additional interactions between the local and federal level within the Achaian 
koinon is discussed by Kaja Harter-Uibopuu in her Das zwischenstaatliche 
Schiedsverfahren im Achäischen Koinon. Zur friedlichen Streitbeilegung nach den 
epigraphischen Quellen.
18
 In this book, she analyses the relationship between the federal 
state and its poleis through boundary disputes between the Achaian members. One of 
her most interesting conclusions shows that there was no standardized arbitration 
process within the federation and that Achaia was as little involved as possible. However, 
she does note that all disputes with members had to be settled before a city could join 
the Achaians and poleis could appeal to the federal states if they thought it was necessary. 
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Both Sheila Ager and Emily Mackil review several of these boundary disputes, but their 
discussions of these is less detailed than that of Harter-Uibopuu as they are part of wider 
themes such as inter-state arbitration and the development of koina in the Hellenistic 
period.
19
 While innovative, Harter-Uibopuu’s analysis of twelve boundary disputes 
between the members of the koinon has overlooked Megalopolis’ tendency to call in 
Achaian magistrates in case of a dispute with another state.  
The discovery of an inscription in Messene in 2008 which details a boundary 
dispute between the city and Megalopolis has yielded valuable new information on the 
internal mechanics of the Achaian federation and the relationship between the federal 
government and its members. So far, only part of the inscription, i.e. 100 lines, has been 
published by Petros Themelis, but there are two articles that provide essential 
discussions on the wider context of the inscription: there is one by Ilias Arnaoutoglou 
which re-examines new evidence on internal arbitration within the koinon as well as 
additional functions of the Achaian damiorgoi (i.e. federal magistrates with a variety of 
responsibilities).
20
 The second article, ‘The Controversy between Megalopolis and 
Messene in a New Inscription from Messene’, written by Nino Luraghi and Anna 
Magnetto, provides a deeper discussion of the impact that the dispute between the two 
cities had on their relationship with one another and the koinon.
21
 Moreover, the article 
is one of the only works that specifically deals with Megalopolis’ position in the federal 
Achaian framework; showing that despite their habit of using the knowledge of federal 
mechanics to their own advantage, the city did not always get its way.  
Research done by Jennifer Warren on the silver and bronze coinage of the 
Achaian koinon further highlights another way in which member poleis connected with 
the federal state. In her The Bronze Coinage of the Achaian Koinon: The Currency of 
a Federal Ideal, she diligently gives a complete numismatic overview of the bronze 
federal coinage, while making some interesting hypotheses. She is convinced that these 
coins were produced in one continuous minting period by the majority of the Achaian 
member states after 200 BC, most likely even after the Third Macedonian War (172-
168 BC). Two of her conclusions are of particular interest for the theme of Megalopolis 
and the Achaian koinon: the fact that Megalopolis was one of the first cities to start 
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minting bronze federal Achaian coins and the wider notion that this minting was done 
as an expression of federal pride.
 22
 While Warren’s book gives a clear and concise 
overview of the bronze coins, scholarship on the silver ones has proven to be a bit more 
problematic due to a disagreement on whether or not there is a possibility that some of 
these coins were minted during the Roman period.
23
 
Thus, as far as Megalopolis’ position within the Achaian koinon is concerned, 
the scholarship has primarily treated the polis as just another Achaian member state 
albeit with a few notable exceptions. A lot of the works on Achaian foreign politics deals 
with the koinon’s relationship with Rome in which it is often treated as one of the Greek 
allies of Rome.
24
 Although there are many theories and ways of looking at the Greek and 
Roman politics in the later Hellenistic period, an interesting one is found in chapters 
four and five of Erich Gruen’s The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome. In 
these two chapters, the author argues that the interactions of the Greeks on the mainland 
with Rome were influenced by local rivalries and interests of the Greek leaders.
25
 A very 
compelling argument which is often ignored by other scholars and is further echoed in 
his article ‘Aratus and the Achaean Alliance with Macedon’ in which Gruen re-evaluates 
Aratos’ role in the establishment the alliance with Macedon.
26
  
Even when scholars have focussed on the individual leaders from Megalopolis, 
like Malcolm Errington has done with Philopoimen in the eponymous book, 
Megalopolis as a city has not come to the forefront of scholarly attention. While the 
Philopoemen is a very useful – if not somewhat dated – analysis of the man’s life, the 
author does not draw any conclusions on how Philopoimen’s actions are to be looked 
at in their Megalopolitan context.
27
 Moreover, other important statesmen like Lydiades 
and even Lykortas have not specifically been studied. Where Polybius and his narrative 
are concerned, a lot of useful and very detailed analyses have been produced – of which 
Walbank’s commentary is by far the most exhaustive - about different aspects of the 
author’s work and yet his words have rarely been considered in connection to his 
                                                          
22
 Warren (2007), 174-179. 
23
 Thompson (1939) and (1968); Warren (1999), 99-109. 
24
 Deininger (1971); Gruen (1984); Bastini (1987); Errington (1990); Nottmeyer (1995); Eckstein (2008); 
Rosenstein (2012); Waterfield (2014). 
25
 Gruen (1984), chapter four and five. 
26
 Gruen (1972), 625. 
27
 Errington (1969), 3; 72; 74; 90. 
9 
 
background as a Megalopolitan citizen.
28
 Although Craig Champion has looked at 
Polybius’ views on the Achaian koinon and their virtues, Megalopolis is omittedfrom 
the analysis.
29
 However, Polybius’ bias towards his native city and his obvious disdain for 
certain Spartan figures such as Kleomenes and Nabis, is a direct result of his origins. 
Arthur Eckstein clearly states this in articles from 1987 and 2013
30
; yet in his book Moral 
Vision in the Histories of Polybius, he only needs the first four pages to see how growing 
up in Megalopolis influenced Polybius’ views of the world and how these manifested 
itself in the development in his aristocratic ethos.
31
 
Thus, two recurring problems emerge with previous scholarship surrounding 
Megalopolis. The first and most important one, i.e. the fact that Megalopolis has 
primarily been studied as a part of a wider research agenda, has been mentioned at the 
start of this Historiography section. This is illustrated by the fact that there is no existing 
monograph that covers the entire history of the city like that of Nino Luraghi for 
Messene. Clearly, Megalopolis was much more than an Arkadian city that was part of 
two different federal states or the hometown of a few influential individuals: it was a 
unique city with its own local identity and plans which chose to be a part of the Achaian 
koinon and played a role in forming the ideals and actions of those individuals growing 
up amongst its elites. Furthermore, the relationship between a federal state and its 
members, and particularly the case of the Achaian koinon, merits more attention as it is 
an integral part of the mechanics of a federation both in antiquity as well as today. 
Although scholars have always connected the origins of the Greek federal states to an 
ethnicity shared by a group of people with a common past and homeland, when a polis 
joined a koinon outside of their ethnic circle as was the case with Megalopolis and 
Achaia, the results are often ignored.
32
 Instead, the ethnic boundaries of these 
federations seem to fade away as they have to be overcome in order to create vast and 
powerful federal states.
33
 The interactions between the local and federal level and the 
ways that these two influence one another has not been studied enough, as scholars 
preferred to use Polybius and other literary sources as their main point of information. 
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The problem with this is that their research tends to ignore the poleis as political actors 
with their own interests and desires. While, as we have seen, there are some notable 
exceptions to this due to the publications of new inscriptions such as the one found in 
Messene, additional research is needed on the relationship of the Achaian federation 
and its members that combines the inscriptions and coins issued by these members with 
the literary tradition to develop a more nuanced image of what it was like for a city like 
Megalopolis to be a member of the koinon.  
Methodology  
At the start of this methodology section it is important to state clearly that this thesis is 
not intended to be a narrative of the entire history of Megalopolis. While there is a 
definitely need for such an endeavour, the present thesis is only concerned with 
Megalopolis and its development within the wider federal framework offered by the 
koina of which it was a member. This means that I will limit my discussion of 
Megalopolitan history to the years of its connection to the Arkadian koinon, i.e. the 
middle of the fourth century BC, and its Achaian membership between 235 and 146 
BC. The city’s foundation by and membership of the Arkadian federation needs to be 
discussed since it formed the origins of key characteristics of the Megalopolitan identity, 
i.e. the city’s understanding of federalism and its antagonism towards Sparta.
34
 On the 
other hand, the city’s decision to join the Achaian koinon in 235 BC transformed this 
process by adding an Achaian element to the Megalopolitan identity that would gradually 
replace their traditional loyalty to Macedon after 198 BC.  
While the main subject of this thesis is the relationship between Megalopolis and 
the Achaian koinon as well as the influence of the city’s local identity on the federal state, 
the dissertation also relates it to the wider topic of federal states in Antiquity and the way 
in which their poleis interacted with them and each other. However, there is always the 
danger of being anachronistic when using modern concepts and ideas such as identity, 
nation and state. This is certainly the case for Greek federal states and their modern 
counterparts which are rather different despite the fact that their most basic definition 
has remained the same throughout history. The political scientist Jan Erk has given this 
basic definition of a federal state as ‘a political structure where authority is divided among 
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two or more levels of government’.
35
 As Mackil has pointed out, an important difference 
between the Greek federations and federal states such as the ones that exist in Belgium, 
Germany or even the European Union, is that we do not know much about the precise 
nature of these koina. This is due to a lack of information from the primary sources 
which compels us to use the word federal with caution.
36
 The Greeks had their own 
words to indicate these kind of political unions such as ethnos, sympoliteuma, systema, 
or simply the plural notion of the citizens, i.e. ‘the Achaians’.
37
 Rightly, Mackil herself 
has chosen to use the term koinon – which means ‘common thing’ - in lieu of some 
more modern constructs such as federation, federal state or league, which she only 
applies if the institutions function in the same way as those we know today.
38
 However, 
as there is a widely established tradition in which the modern terminology is used 
interchangeably with one another to refer to these koina, I will also employ these terms 
since they can all be defined by the definition mentioned above.
39
 
Moreover, there is a connection between the formation of these koina and the 
shared identity and kinship by groups of people who lived in geographical proximity to 
one another, since these factors were the basis for their formation in the first place.
40
 
When dealing with the local identity of a polis such as Megalopolis, it is important to 
note the differences between its Arkadian and Achaian membership. While the 
Arkadian koinon only had Arkadian members and thus had a clear ethnic and 
geographical boundary, the situation of the Achaians was entirely different, even though 
its origins were similar to that of the other federal states. The sanctuary of Zeus 
Homarios at Aigion or that of Poseidon in Helike before it, united the Achaians into 
their koinon. However, the vast expansion of the federal state outside of its ethnic and 
geographical boundaries meant that it soon incorporated cities that were not ethnically 
Achaian.
41
 As already mentioned, this specific feature of the Achaian koinon has not 
received a lot of scholarly attention which is particularly problematic for a discussion 
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about the relationship between the Achaian federal state and one of its non-Achaian 
members.  
The local identity of a city is strongly connected to its ethnicity, and this is no 
different for Megalopolis. The complex and changing nature of this identity as 
exemplified by Megalopolis is addressed by Kostas Vlassopoulos and Jonathan Hall.
42
 
For the purposes of the present study, I wish to note Vlassopoulos’ argument about the 
benefits of looking at Greek ethnic identity as a process that undergoes changes 
overtime.
43
 Moreover, Hall’s arguments that the polis itself should rightly be seen as a 
civic entity that could also subscribe to a broader identity and could be ethnically diverse, 
needs to be stressed in the context of the Arkadian and Achaian characteristics of the 
Megalopolitan identity.
44
 All of this meant that the Greek ethnic identity was much more 
fluid than previously thought.
45
 
 Therefore, I have chosen to start this dissertation by clearly establishing 
Megalopolis’ local identity before the city joined the Achaian koinon and identifying the 
components that were connected to its wider Arkadian ethnic identity. This is necessary 
to see what the impact was of the city’s Achaian membership on its local identity, which 
changed after 235 BC by adding a distinct Achaian/federal characteristic. Additionally, 
it seems that the federal state did not favour one group over another and the poleis 
interacted without any problems, when multiple cities with a different ethnos were part 
of a single federal state as was the case with Megalopolis and the Achaian League. The 
local and federal levels could therefore operate separately and have their own distinct 
identities, but typical group characteristics such as the Arkadian opposition to Sparta 
could still find their way to the federal level and influence federal politics. This ultimately 
created a rather complex identity within Megalopolis that was more than just simply 
Achaian or Arkadian. Pausanias has called Megalopolis the youngest city of Greece 
(Paus. 8. 27. 1.), and it is clear that the city was an example of a new kind of stage in 
Greek civic life, one in which the local identity of a polis became less constrained and 
more open. 
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Because of the focus on Megalopolis within the Achaian koinon, Polybius and his 
Histories are of vital importance for this thesis. On the one hand, since Polybius himself 
came from Megalopolis, he provides us with an interesting insight into the identity of an 
individual Megalopolitan within the koinon via his views on the city, the wider region of 
Arkadia and the Achaian federation. Therefore, his work will be analysed to explore 
what these views were and how they were expressed. While Kerkidas of Megalopolis is 
the only other author from the polis whose work has survived to this day, his work is far 
too fragmented to allow us to draw any general conclusions about Megalopolis and its 
relationship with the Achaian koinon.
46
 On the other hand, Polybius’ familiarity with 
Achaian politics and procedures means that his work is invaluable for anyone studying 
any aspect of Achaian federal history.
47
 Additionally, his narrative is the only 
contemporary literary source for the events of the third and second century BC.  
Clearly, the Histories of Polybius lie at the core of this study because of the 
information it provides, but there are quite a few problems that are connected to it that 
the reader needs to be aware of. Firstly, it has to be stressed that Polybius’ personal 
experiences and opinions coloured his narrative throughout. Of course, this happens to 
most historians as it is sometimes difficult to objectively record historical events, 
especially when it concerns matters in which one was personally involved. Therefore, 
Polybius’ depiction of his political opponent Kallikrates of Sikyon, i.e. a demagogue who 
was responsible for the deportation of a thousand Achaians to Rome and moreover who 
was universally hated by the Achaian people, needs to be taken with the metaphorical 
pinch of salt.
48
 This also applies to his obvious disdain towards Kleomenes and Nabis of 
Sparta as well as the historian Phylarchus, all of whom Polybius describes as the worst 
individuals possible (Pol. 38. 12). The reason for the hostilities towards these Spartans 
and the pro-Spartan historian have to be found in his background as a Megalopolitan 
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 The second problem with using Polybius as a source is his tendency to focus on 
important individuals when writing history. A very good example for this is his account 
of the Achaian War with Kleomenes (229-222 BC) in which he – mistakenly – puts 
Aratos at the forefront of the creation of the Achaian-Macedonian alliance (Pol. 2. 40. 
2). Polybius tends to make his feelings about these individuals clear, as he uses them as 
the ideal role models for his audience to instruct them on the right ways to use history 
in daily life. According to Champion, Polybius used both Philopoimen and Scipio 
Africanus as the personifications of Roman and Achaian virtues.
50
 Because of this, 
Polybius’ history of the Achaian koinon has primarily become the history of its 
influential elites, while completely ignoring the local ambitions of the member states and 
the internal dynamics of the federation.
51
 This is further exemplified by the fact that 
Polybius is rather vague on the exact composition and nature of the Achaian institutions, 




 Finally, Polybius’ work has not survived integrally and only the first five books of 
the Histories are still complete today. This means that a lot of the information is now 
lost, leaving a considerable gap in our knowledge of the later years of the Achaian 
koinon, i.e. the period between the Third Macedonian War and the Achaian War of 
146 BC. While the fragments that do exist allow some speculations as they are quite 
lengthy, it is still rather difficult to get a complete picture of the Achaian history and 
interactions in the years leading up to the Achaian War, based solely on Polybius. 
Therefore, other literary sources are used in addition to Polybius’ narrative – some of 
which rely heavily on Polybius’ narrative – as well as the epigraphical, numismatic and 
archaeological evidence. To ensure that this thesis covers the biggest aspects of the 
relationship between Megalopolis and its identity and the federal state, these different 
sources will be combined to create a complete overview of the problem.  
 In addition to Polybius, there are several authors that are of importance when 
discussing the development of Megalopolis within the federal states, i.e. Pausanias, 
Plutarch, Livy, Diodorus Siculus, Xenophon and Demosthenes. In his Description of 
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Greece, Pausanias gives an entire overview of the layout of the city (8. 30. 1-33. 1). This 
has been used as a guide during excavations because plenty of the buildings described 
by Pausanias, have been identified by the archaeologists.
53
 However, as Daniel Stewart 
has illustrated, it is important to note that Pausanias himself was writing in a certain 
context and through his text creates the representations of the past that he wanted his 
audience to see.
54
 Therefore, while some of Pausanias’ comments on the layout of the 
city have been corroborated by the archaeological evidence like the presence of clay roof 
tiles referring to Philip in the Philippeion, I remain cautious about the Megalopolis that 
we find in his narrative. However, Pausanias does briefly recount the most important 
events of Megalopolitan history and since he is the only primary source that discusses 
the foundation of the city in so much detail, his account is invaluable to the present thesis 
(8. 27. 1-16). 
 The only other author to say anything at all about the synoecism is Diodorus 
Siculus who mentions this event very briefly in the Bibliotheka Historika (15. 72. 4). 
One of the biggest problems is that there are so many differences between these two 
versions making it very difficult to say anything with certainty about the date and scope 
of the synoecism of Megalopolis.
55
 This is made even more difficult by the fact that 
Xenophon, the only contemporary historian, does not mention the creation of the city. 
However, his Hellenika is a very useful source for the history and politics of the 
Arkadian koinon during the years of its short existence. Other information on the early 
history of the polis is provided by Demosthenes in a speech, entitled For the 
Megalopolitans, to the Athenian ekklesia in which he urged the Athenian citizens to 
send troops to Megalopolis as the city now found itself under Spartan threat. The gaps 
caused by the fragmentary status of Polybius’ narrative, are in part filled by Livy’s Ab 
Urbe Condita and Plutarch’s lives of Aratos, Kleomenes, Philopoimen and Flamininus. 
While these were heavily influenced by Polybius’ work, they do contain additional 
information not found in the Histories. Livy’s work in particular is interesting as he looks 
at the events of the second century BC from a Roman perspective, thereby highlighting 
different aspects than Polybius. Plutarch on the other hand, gives more detailed 
information concerning several of the events that the protagonists of his lives are involved 
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in. The best example of this is the overview of the federal career of Lydiades of 
Megalopolis and his actions at Mount Lykaion during the Kleomenean War (Plut. Ar. 
30, 35-37; Kleo. 6). However, one must also keep in mind that Plutarch’s lives were part 




In addition to the literary sources, there are several inscriptions that provide an 
interesting insight as to how the polis of Megalopolis acted as a political unit, in particular 
within the Achaian koinon, something that the literary sources tend to ignore altogether. 
The majority of the inscriptions discussed in the thesis are boundary disputes between 
the city and other members of the Achaian federation, none of which have been found 
in Megalopolis itself. Most of these have been collected and discussed by Sheila Ager, 
Kaja Harter-Uibopuu or Emily Mackil as part of their work on wider themes. The only 
exception to this is the boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Messene which has 
been thoroughly discussed by Nino Luraghi and Anna Magnetto.
57
 Yet no one has 
treated the boundary disputes centred solely on Megalopolis as one collective and 
analysed what they could tell us about the specific nature of the relationship between 
Megalopolis and the Achaian koinon. Moreover, most of these boundary disputes have 
all been dated to the second century BC and so inform us about a period for which the 
literary sources are rather scarce.  
There are two other kind of inscriptions that are used throughout this thesis. 
The first one are the inscriptions connected to the institutions and magistrates of the 
Achaian koinon such as the Achaian nomographoi lists (IG IV.I2 73; Achaïe III 116); 
or those of the Arkadian koinon such as a list with the fifty Arkadian damiorgoi (IG V 
2.1). These provide us with essential background information on the mechanics of these 
federal states and more importantly, they allow us to draw some novel conclusions about 
Megalopolis’ role in these institutions.
58
 The second category concerns decrees from 





 These decrees corroborate the literary sources and allow 
us to examine them in another context than just their Achaian federal careers as well as 
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what their actions meant to their native city. Thus, we can further analyse the relationship 
between prominent Megalopolitans and their polis. 
 In addition to these written sources, the numismatic evidence from Megalopolis 
also tells us that the city was actively taking part in Achaian federal life as the polis 
produced both civic and federal coinage during its time as part of the federal state.
60
 A 
wider analysis of the Achaian federal coinage shows that the city was even one of the first 
cities to start minting the bronze federal coins.
61
 Furthermore, the iconography on civic 
coins from Megalopolis indicate that the city still felt connected to its Arkadian past as 
they adopted typical Arkadian symbols like Zeus Lykaios and Pan on their civic coins, 
even after the city became part of the Achaian koinon which changed the way in which 
Megalopolis and its inhabitants viewed their own identity
62
. As previously mentioned, 
these coins – and the inscriptions - shed light on an aspect often ignored by the literary 
tradition in relation to the polis and the federal state, i.e. the fact that these cities were 
political units which interacted with the federal state and had their own interests.  
Archaeology  
The distict local identity of Megalopolis is also reflected through its urban planning and 
layout. Several of the monumental buildings in the agora of Megalopolis highlight the 
political connections and aspirations of the polis that allowed it become an important 
part of the Achaian and Arkadian koina.
63
 The most important of these will be used 
throughout the thesis to demonstrate these aspirations, such as the Megalopolitan 
connection to Macedon which was established in the years after Philip II made his 
expedition against Sparta and gave part of the Spartan territory to Megalopolis resulting 
in the citizens naming a stoa on their agora after him, the Philippeion. Additionally, the 
size of the city walls as well as the seating capacity of the theatre indicate that Megalopolis 
was a big city. However, the most important feature of the Megalopolitan identity 
exemplified by the material culture was its innovative and anticipating nature, since the 
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buildings in the city seem to precede trends that were typical for the Hellenistic period.
64
 
Therefore, I have chosen to give an overview of the city’s archaeology in the 
introduction.  
The first excavations at Megalopolis were carried out at the end of the nineteenth 
century by the British School at Athens (in 1890-1891).
 65
 Aside from a small survey on 
the Zeus Soter sanctuary by Peter Knoblauch in 1940
66
, it was not until 1991 that another 
team of archaeologists would dig at the site. These excavations, which lasted until 2002 
and were led by Hans Lauter and Theodoros Spyropoulos, were a joint effort of German 
and Greeks and had the primary goal of re-examining the late Classical and Hellenistic 
buildings.
67
 In general, even though Megalopolis was one of the biggest poleis in Greece 
(Pol. 2. 55. 2.) with its city walls spanning a distance of nine kilometres
68
, the excavations 
of the city have been focussed around the ancient agora in the north of the city and the 
theatre and Thersilion in the south. In Megalopolis, Pausanias’ Description of Greece 
(8. 30-32) has been used by the archaeologists to identify most of the buildings at the site 
and some of his narrative has indeed been corroborated by epigraphic finds. However, 
as remarked in the previous section, we have to remain cautious when basing the 
identification of the material record solely on Pausanias’ word.
69
 Nonetheless, it is still 
useful to see how Pausanias saw the city and so a short overview of his description of 
Megalopolis will be given in the next paragraph before discussing the buildings that are 
important for this thesis.  
 The river Helisson divided the city in two. In the northern section of the city, 
the Megalopolitans had built their agora which was flanked by several buildings including 
a stone enclosure dedicated to Zeus Lykaios with several altars and important statues of 
deities from the region, including a statue of Pan and a bronze image of Apollo in front 
of the enclosure. On the right of the Apollo statue was the temple of the Mother, in 
front of which an inscription could be found for a statue dedicated to Diophanes of 
Megalopolis. The agora also had two stoas: the Philippeion, named after Philip II of 
Macedon by the Megalopolitans, and a smaller one which housed the public magistrates 
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of the city, counting six rooms including the council chamber. This smaller stoa, called 
Aristandreion after its dedicator, adjoined the Stoa of Philip. Near the council chamber, 
an image of Polybius was carved onto a slab accompanied by an overview of his 
accomplishments. Behind Aristander’s stoa lay the temple to Fortune. There was a third 
stoa on the agora which was called the Myropolis and was thought to have been made 
by the Megalopolitan tyrant Aristodemos with spoils from a victory against the Spartans. 
Close to the agora was the sanctuary of Zeus Soter with several important statues made 
by Damophon of Messene. Finally, across from the sanctuary of Zeus Soter, was another 
sacred enclosure, this time for the Great Goddesses which housed several temples. In 
the southern section of the city were ruins of several sanctuaries or temples, as well as 
the biggest theatre in Greece and the foundation stones of a building called the 
Thersilion. This building was named after the man who built it – a private citizen – and 
supposedly had functioned as the council room for the Myrioi or the Ten Thousand, 
the assembly of the Arkadian koinon. Near the Thersilion was an image of Ammon and 
the house of Alexander, which was owned by a private citizen but connected to Alxander 
the Great.
70
 At one end of the theatre, the citizens had built a stadium and the other the 
ruins of another temple were found. There were hills in both parts of the city on which 
several cults and sanctuaries were located.
71
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1. City walls 
The choice to incorporate the river Helisson into the city’s urban plan is an interesting 
one, as it no doubt provided the polis with two weaknesses in its fortification. Moreover, 
the Megalopolitans must have been aware of the Spartan siege on Mantinea in 385 BC 
when they used the river flowing through the city to break the fortifications and take 
control (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 3; Paus. 8. 8. 8-9); unsurprisingly the Mantineians chose to 
move the river around the fortification walls after this. This would indicate that the active 
use of the river in the urban planning of Megalopolis was a deliberate decision which 
definitely had an impact on the city walls of Megalopolis but left the city with a constant 
water supply. Only a little bit of the city walls still remains today, but we know from a 
passage in Polybius that they were vast in size and that this caused a problem between 
two factions in the city as one party wanted to reduce their length against the wishes of 
the other, i.e. the rich land-owners (Pol. 5. 93. 5-10.). At the time of Kleomenes’ attack 
on the polis the walls were fifty stades, twelve of which still remain today (Pol. 2. 55.).
72
  
Megalopolis’ size has sometimes been seen as a weakness, since it was difficult 
to defend: even Polybius himself has noted this (Pol. 5. 93. 5). However, it seems as 
though the polis was intentionally created to be that big by the urban planners of 
Megalopolis, just as they had planned all other facets of the urban layout of the city: city 
walls were part of the city early on.
73
 Moreover, Kleomenes’ destruction of the city in 
223/2 BC had nothing do to with its size, but was the result of a group of Messenian 
exiles that had given him access to the polis. Interestingly, in the dispute mentioned by 
Polybius, the rich landowners wanted to keep the long-walled circuit, indicating that part 
of the unoccupied areas may have functioned as fields for live-stock in case of these 
attacks which could have been used normally by these rich land-owners.
74
 It was 
paramount that Megalopolis was able to defend itself and its citizens in case of attacks, 
something that was easier to do with a steady supply of water and food within the polis. 
Even with the Helisson river running through the city, the Megalopolitans successfully 
defended themselves many times against the Spartan attacks of Agis III, Kleomenes and 
Nabis. So, while the city’s size has been perceived as a hindrance by some, it was one of 
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the factors that allowed it to become an important player within the federal states it was 
a member of. 
2. Meeting Places for the Masses? The Theatre and Thersilion 
The seize of the Megalopolis is also reflected in two of the city’s structures, the theatre 
and the Thersilion, which are situated in the southern part of the polis and are both 
mentioned by Pausanias. The excavations have indeed uncovered the remains of the 
theatre and a building believed to be the Thersilion. Both of these could accommodate 
large amounts of people, something that was necessary for a city the size of Megalopolis. 
Since he indicated that this building was intended for the meetings of the Arkadian 
federal assembly, also known as the Myrioi, some scholars have posed the theory that 
the city was founded by the Arkadian koinon as their capital; potentially with a double 
structure: the polis of Megalopolis would be situated in the north, while the southern 
part functioned as the Arkadian ocapital.
75
 Even though this theory still has some 
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supporters, there is no proof for the existence of something like a capital in antiquity 
and this was certainly not the case for Megalopolis, as will be discussed in chapter one.
76
 
Moreover, there is a clear link between the two buildings which suggest that they were 
built in relation to one another; if they were not planned together, then they were 
constructed as complementary buildings.
77
  
2.1. The Theatre 
Pausanias said that the theatre of the city was the biggest one in the Peloponnese, which 
would have been the case when it was first built (Paus. 8. 32. 1.). According to estimates 
done by the British archaeologists, the theatre had a capacity between 20,000 and 21,000 
seats, making it bigger than the theatre of Epidauros.
78
 The theatre had a natural cavea 
surrounding its orchestra, which was composed out of nine kerkides with diazoma 
dividing the two sections from the theatre from one another. The front row of the seats 
has survived and bears an inscription dedicated to an individual called Antiochos (IG V
2 
450). The letters of this inscription date the construction of these seats to the middle of 
the fourth century and as these seats were most likely not part of the original plan of the 
structure, it is highly probable that the theatre was built soon after the foundation of the 
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city: i.e. between 370 and 350 BC.
79
 Other parts of the theatre may have included a skene 
and skenotheke as the latter was mentioned on stamped tiles found during excavations. 
 The size of the theatre is rather curious, even if one argued that Megalopolis was 
a big polis with a large group of inhabitants who wanted to watch the dramatic and festival 
performances. However, as already will be discussed in more detail in chapter one, 
Caitlin Verfenstein has proposed an interesting theory that the theatre of Megalopolis 
was an example of the theatre of a polis being used for more than just religious or 
dramatic activities, as it also functioned as a meeting places for civic and administrative 
bodies, something that is also attested outside of Megalopolis.
80
 On the back of the 
proedria, names of the Arkadian phylai were inscribed, possibly indicating further 
connections between the theatre and the political organisation of the city.
81
 
2.2. The Thersilion 
North of the theatre, another structure was discovered. It was a large and rectangular 
building in which an auditorium with sixty-five columns that declined towards a speaker’s 
platform.
82
 It has been estimated that the building could seat around 8700 people, most 
likely on wooden benches, and possibly even more if everyone was standing.
83
 There 
were three doors in the southern wall of the building which opened onto a colonnaded 
porch, leading out to the orchestra of the theatre. From the remains of the building, it is 
clear that it was a unique and monumental structure that was well thought out and built 
with considerable skill. In fact, there are almost no other buildings like it aside from the 
Telesterion in Eleusis, its structure may have been derived from the traditional Greek 
theatre.
84
 Because of the massive amount of roof tiles found, the building clearly had a 
roof. Due to its close connection to the theatre, this building was identified as the 
Thersilion and was most likely constructed at the same time as the theatre. Both of these 
structures were clearly part of the early history of the polis.  
As Pausanias has told us the Thersilion was the meeting place for the Arkadian 
Myrioi (Paus. 8. 32. 1.) and looking at the plan of the building drawn by Benson, the 
building was obviously meant to host some sort of public meetings. However, 
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considering the size of the building (66.64 x 52.42 m), the only way that these Arkadians 
could get inside the Thersilion – if the Myrioi may have actually been an assembly with 
ten thousand members, was if everyone would stand during these meetings. As this was 
rather inconvenient, it is unlikely that the Myrioi did indeed meet in the building on a 
regular basis. In fact, their only known meeting in Megalopolis took place in 348/7 BC, 
long after the Arkadian koinon fell apart (Dem. Meg. 19. 10-11.; Aisch. 2. 79. and 157.). 
Moreover, the fact that Pausanias calls the building the Thersilion after its dedicator also 
indicates that the building was constructed by a private citizen and not the Arkadians. 
Verfenstein’s thesis that a meeting of the Achaian koinon in Megalopolis could only 
have taken place in the Thersilion as this was the only building large enough for the 
Achaian assembly, is quite unconvincing, as there must have been cities within the 
federal state which were much smaller than Megalopolis - thus with much smaller public 
buildings – which still managed to host the Achaian assembly.
85
 Moreover, as Verfenstein 
has argued herself, the theatre could also have housed the large meeting of the assembly. 
3. The Megalopolitan agora 
So, while the Theatre and the Thersilion clearly have connections to the political, 
cultural and civic life of the polis, the Megalopolitan agora was the heart of the polis. In 
itself, the Megalopolitan agora is interesting because in it civic and public structures are 
placed side by side with monumental buildings through which the city expressed their 
political loyalties for Macedon (the Philippeion) or its antagonism against Sparta (the 
Myropolis), and the religious sanctuaries like the one of Zeus Soter.
86
 The importance 
of the agora within Megalopolis is also illustrated by the fact that most of the structures 
surrounding the agora bear signs of extreme remodelling as a result of the Spartan attack 
on the city which could signify that Kleomenes deliberately targeted the Megalopolitan 
agora. Moreover, the extensive also makes dating some of these rather difficult.
87
 
Situated to the north of the Helisson river the agora is an open space surrounded 
by other structures.
88
 Once again, Pausanias gives a detailed description of the buildings 
surrounding it; the remains of some of these are also present in the archaeogical record 
of Megalopolis today: the monumental stoa identified as the Philippeion and a 
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neighbouring building that could have functioned as the archive building on the northern 
side of the agora. To the east remains have suggested the presence of another 
monumental stoa that archaeologists have called the Myrolopolis after the monumental 
stoa mentioned by Pausanias which the Megalopolitan tyrant Aristodamos dedicated 
with spoils from Sparta (Paus. 8. 30. 7). On the western side, the agora is flanked by a 
series of buildings that had obvious public functions such as the Bouleuterion and the 
Prytaneion. Finally, the most important sanctuary of the city, that of Zeus Soter was 
situated to the south, almost the only structure that remains untouched by the river’s 
position today.  
Not all of the buildings on the agora will be described in great detail as the 
archaeology of the city is yet another way through which the Megalopolitan identity was 
expressed. Therefore, I have limited my discussion of the agora to those buildings that 
are relevant to my overall arguments and which are discussed in other chapters of the 
thesis, i.e. the Philippeion, the Bouleuterion and the Prytaneion, due to their connection 
to Megalopolis’ political relationships (with Macedon) and the polis’ constitution and 
institutions. 
 




3.1. The Philippeion  
This stoa was a gigantic building as it is about 160 meters long, making it one of the 
longest stoas in the Peloponnese - and possibly even in Greece as the Stoa of Attalos 
stands at 113 meters. Even its design was elaborate as it boasted among other things, a 
Doric façade with internal courtyards in Ionian facades and it was clear that the building 
was meant to impress visitors of the city. The building was dedicated by the 
Megalopolitans to Philip of Macedon, as is indicated by Pausanias’ statement (Paus. 8. 
30. 6.) as well as the stamped tiles found in the building that bear the inscription 
Philippeion (IG V
2 
469 6a and 6b).
89
 This monumental building was physical evidence 
of the connection between Megalopolis and Macedon, something the intricate design 
and construction of the building was supposed to express.
90
 There has been some 
confusion about the dating of the building and its implications in the wider development 
of Greek architecture. The Greek-German excavators have dated the building between 
340 and 330 BC, based on architectural similarities with other Megalopolitan buildings.
91
 
Moreover, if the stoa was indeed dedicated to Philip II – and not Philip V – as will be 
argued in chapter four, then this dating is also logical as the dedication and creation of 
the building would been connected to the king’s death in 336 BC. However, this dating 
is not accepted by everyone as this would indicate that the Philippeion was one of the 
earliest examples of such a monumental stoa. However, if dated just by its overall 
tradition and style, the stoa is a perfect example of a Hellenistic stoa from the third or 
second century BC. In the end, firmly dating the building is difficult and the stoa is either 
an early or a typical example of a Hellenistic stoa.
92
  
3.2. Civic and Public Buildings on the agora  
3.2.1. Bouleuterion 
The Bouleuterion is in essence a hypostyle hall in which a colonnaded façade that 
connected the building to the agora.
93
 As Pausanias tells us, the structure was situated 
closely to the statue of Polybius himself, which has not been recovered. There is a 
notable layer of fire damage and destruction present in the archaeological remains as the 
some of architectural features have been reused, indicating that once again this building 
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has undergone repairs as the result of a severe attack.
94
 Moreover, even though this 
structure has been called the Bouleuterion, there is no archaeological evidence that the 
Megalopolitan boule ever met there. In fact, the identification of the building as the 
Bouleuterion is entirely based on the building’s design and size, but with an estimated 




Even though almost nothing remains of the original structure, which was a peristyle 
building complex with several rooms, a hearth and an altar, there are indications that 
this was another public building which could have been used as a Prytaneion based on 
the presence of the hearth.
96
 This is proven by a great number of dedicated roof tiles that 
were found and which list the names of the benefactors who helped rebuilt the complex 
after its destruction. These names included some of the more famous citizens of the 
polis such as Philopoimen and Polybius as well as some that were dedicated by the 
people directly.
97
 Yet, the precise use of the building is contestable as the presence of the 
altar and a dedication of one of the roof tiles from Philopoimen to Zeus (SEG 52 451), 
indicate that the building might have also housed a sanctuary to Zeus.  
3.3. The Sanctuary of Zeus Soter98 
The sanctuary of Zeus Soter was situated on the southern side of the agora, close to the 
Hellison, and it is in fact the only thing that remains untouched by the river. It was an 
important sanctuary for the Megalopolitans which had two temples.
99
 The entrance of 
the sanctuary was a ramp which gave access to the largest temple, i.e. a square temenos 
temple with two porticos surrounding an altar. Inside the temenos, built into the back 
wall, was the second temple: a small, hexastyle-prostyle temple with a pronaos and a 
Doric façade running on the inside of the naos and which was situated on the western 
side of the complex.
100
 Interestingly, the precision of the plan of the sanctuary would 
imply that it was built in the Hellenistic period, yet clay stamps have been found inside 
the complex that date it to fourth century BC instead.
101
 Pausanias mentions the presence 
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of a statue group of Zeus, Artemis and the personification of Megalopolis in the Zeus 
Soter complex that was created by Cephisodotus and Xenophon, dating the statues as 
perhaps the building to the fourth or early third century (Paus. 8. 30. 10.).
102
 This would 
indicate that yet another building in Megalopolis was stylistically and architecturally 
innovative and therefore making it possible that the city was a trendsetter when it came 
to Greek architecture and urban planning.  
Thesis outline  
This thesis is divided into three parts. First, these establish the Megalopolitan identity 
both before and after its Achaian membership; then the way the city employed this 
identity to form its relationship with the Achaian federal government, as well as use that 
relationship in its interactions with other members; and finally, explain how the 
Megalopolitans influenced the Achaian foreign politics. Section one consists of two 
chapters, the first of which outlines the basic components of what it meant to be 
Megalopolitan before 235 BC. Several key characteristics are identified such as the 
typical animosity towards Sparta, a traditional preference for the Macedonian kings, a 
connection to the rest of Arkadia and the realisation of the benefits of federalism. These 
were the result of the city’s foundation by the Arkadians and were completely in line 
with the politics of the koinon, which focussed on keeping Sparta at bay and upholding 
democratic ideals in the Peloponnese. While this first chapter thus deals with the 
synoecism and early history of Megalopolis and the problems surrounding this 
foundation, it also analyses the interactions of the city with the other Arkadians to 
indicate that the Megalopolitans wanted to make it clear to the other Greeks that it was 
more than just an Arkadian polis. Finally, this first chapter ends with a comparison 
between Megalopolis and Messene. As another city that was re-established in the wake 
of the anti-Spartan sentiment of the 370s and 360s BC, these two had a similar formation 
process but ended up pursuing two very different political courses. 
Chapter two discusses the further development of the Megalopolitan identity, 
which changed profoundly because of the decision of the polis - and its tyrant Lydiades 
- to join the Achaian koinon in 235 BC. It analyses the motives behind this decision and 
looks at the consequences it had for the parties involved, i.e. Lydiades, the 
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Megalopolitans and the federation. For one, Lydiades embarked upon a successful 
political career, the Megalopolitans now had access to a wider network of poleis in their 
quest against Sparta and the Achaians benefited from further expansion in the 
Peloponnese. A second part of this chapter looks at the practical implementation of the 
change in the Megalopolitan identity brought about by its Achaian membership and 
answers the question: did Megalopolis consider itself Arkadian or Achaian? By using 
Polybius as an example of a Megalopolitan in the Achaian koinon and juxtaposing his 
views against the material evidence from Megalopolis, it is clear that by the middle of 
the second century BC a Megalopolitan was both Arkadian and Achaian. Obviously, a 
distinct Achaian element had been added to the other ‘Arkadian’ characteristics of its 
own identity.   
The second section of the thesis comprises of only one chapter, which deals with 
Megalopolis as a member of the Achaian koinon. This third chapter starts with a general 
overview of the structure of the federal state, the ways in which the Achaian members 
could partake in federal life and the interactions between the federation and its member 
states. The relationship between the koinon and its poleis was distinguished by a high 
degree of autonomy: the cities could conduct their affairs in any way they wished as long 
as outside contacts were regulated via the federal government. The available evidence 
discussed in this chapter suggests that Megalopolis was just like any other Achaian 
member state; it contributed money and troops to the federal treasury, minted federal 
coins and participated actively in the federal institutions. However, it is through the study 
of Megalopolis’ interactions with its fellow members, and in particular via boundary 
disputes that another picture emerges. In most of these boundary disputes there is a 
reference to the federal state and most of them were won by Megalopolis, indicating that 
the polis generally had the habit of involving the federal government or federal 
magistrates in disputes with other Achaian poleis. This was rather unusual as the koinon 
normally stayed out of these kinds of disputes, which meant that Megalopolis did not 
shy away from using its relationship with the federal government for their own personal 
gain. However, as the new inscription found in Messene in 2008 proves, this did not 
always work.  
The last section will discuss the city's role in Achaian foreign politics, an area in 
which its influence was most noticeable, and is divided into two chapters. Chapter four 
discusses Megalopolis’ role in Achaian politics during the third century BC by focusing 
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on the Achaian-Macedonian relations which happened as a result of the Megalopolitan 
embassy to Antigonos during the Kleomenean War. The chapter starts with a re-
examination of the Achaian War with Kleomenes and Aratos’ role in the creation of the 
Achaian alliance with Macedon. Polybius’ account of the Kleomenean War is highly 
problematic due to his emphasis on Aratos, and his criticism of the Pro-Spartan historian 
Phylarchus, one of his main sources for the event. Therefore, if one looks past these 
problems and the focus on Aratos, Plutarch’s statement that Megalopolis was the 
responsible party for the alliance with Macedon makes more sense. The second part of 
this fourth chapter examines the reason why Megalopolis would have to send out an 
embassy to Antigono, i.e. because of the plethora of Spartan attacks on the city during 
the War. Finally, it gives an overview of Megalopolitan connections to Macedon found 
in the polis, in addition to the traditional loyalty established in the wake of Philip II’s 
territorial gifts in the fourth century BC. In the end, it was Megalopolis who was 
responsible for the first contacts between Macedon and the Achaians and not Aratos. 
Finally, chapter five takes a look at the way in which Megalopolis’ traditional 
hatred for Sparta shaped Achaian foreign policy in the second century BC and in 
particular their relationship with Rome. The chapter starts by giving a detailed analysis 
of the Achaian synodos at Sikyon in 198 BC in which the koinon decided to terminate 
their alliance with the Macedonian king Philip V in favour of Rome, something that 
Megalopolis opposed because of their traditional loyalty to Macedon. In order to 
understand how this decision came to be and how much it divided the Achaians, the 
deteriorating relationship between Achaia and Macedon between 222 and 198 BC is 
discussed as well as the rise to prominence of several influential Megalopolitan 
statesmen such as Philopoimen in federal politics. Furthermore, a closer examination 
of the hometown of Aristainos, the federal strategos for 199/198 BC, suggests that within 
Megalopolis there was a group which was slowly moving away from this traditional loyalty 
to Macedon, having replaced it with an Achaian patriotism. This shift in Megalopolitan 
identity is further evidenced in the last part of this chapter which looks at the actions of 
these Megalopolitan leaders in relation to Achaian foreign politics. Two things become 
clear: for one, these men were still driven by the traditional hatred for Sparta as well as 
their newfound loyalty to the Achaian koinon. Secondly, these local interests caused 
trouble between Achaia and Rome and would eventually cause the Achaian War. 
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Moreover, there is still evidence of Megalopolis acting as a political unit throughout this 













As argued in the introduction, the development of the Megalopolitan identity was a long 
process which started with the polis’ foundation by the Arkadians and their koinon in 
the period around 370 BC. Throughout the next decades, Megalopolis would exemplify 
several of the typical Arkadian traits such as an intense hatred for Sparta and a strong 
connection to the democratic ideals on which the Arkadian koinon was founded. While 
the Arkadian federal state was a short-lived experiment and the koinon disintegrated 
after only a brief existence, the Megalopolitan identity kept developing. Soon after Philip 
II’s gift of certain Spartan territories after the battle at Chaironea in 338 BC, the city 
established a long tradition of relationships with and loyalty to the Macedonian kings. 
All of these Megalopolitan characteristics persisted even after the city joined the Achaian 
koinon in 235 BC. By this point the Achaians had become a genuine threat to 
Megalopolis and the tyrant Lydiades as well as the citizens most likely thought that 
joining the koinon was a good course of action. This decision proved beneficial, as the 
polis quickly rose to a prominent position within the federation and also responsible for 
the addition of an Achaian component to the Megalopolitan identity by the middle of 
the second century BC.  
 In this first section of the thesis, which is divided into two chapters, I will discuss 
the foundation and early history of the city and ascertain what impact these events had 
on the formation of the local identity of the polis and how the city fitted in the wider 
Arkadian region. This is done in chapter one, while chapter two focuses on the decision 
to join the Achaians and the subsequent results this had for Megalopolis, its inhabitants 
and tyrants and the generations of Megalopolitans that came after 235, which are best 
illustrated by Polybius and his narrative.   
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Chapter 1: Megalopolis before Achaia 
In 235 BC, the city of Megalopolis became the first Arkadian polis to join the Achaian 
koinon. The decision to join the federal state located primarily in the northernmost 
region of the Peloponnese may have been a surprise for some, since Megalopolis as the 
biggest Arkadian polis had a very strong connection to its Arkadian identity because of 
the manner in which the polis was founded. However, the Megalopolitans were not the 
first to join the federation from outside the old Achaian heartland, as this process had 
already started in 251 BC with the membership of Sikyon. Slowly but steadily, an 
increasing amount of non-Achaian poleis became members of the koinon and by the 
time of Polybius’ writing, the entire Peloponnese was part of the Achaian koinon (Pol. 
2. 37. 10-11). The combination of all of these different ethnic groups within one big 
federation was new in the Peloponnese and Megalopolis soon succeeded in establishing 
a specific position for itself within the koinon.  
The reason why the polis was able to do so can be found in its own local identity, 
which consisted of several specific elements, i.e. a deep reverence for and understanding 
of federal states and collaboration across narrow civic or ethnic boundaries, a vehement 
hatred of Sparta, a tradition of relations with Macedon and a close connection to the 
Arkadian people. These specific elements can be distinguished throughout Achaian 
politics in the third and second centuries BC. Moreover, for a Megalopolitan, these 
things were the basis of his local identity. After all, these traits had developed from the 
time of the city’s foundation around 370 BC and will therefore be the focus of this first 
chapter that deals with Megalopolis before it joined the Achaian federation.  
Due to the important role that the Arkadian koinon played in Megalopolis’ 
foundation, I believe it is beneficial to start this chapter with a short discussion of the 
Arkadian koinon and its political history, especially since some of the most important 
characteristics of the federation were passed on to Megalopolis after its foundation. This 
is followed by an analysis of the synoecism of Megalopolis and the way in which the new 
city dealt with the vastly different groups that would now identify themselves as 
Megalopolitan. As part of this argument, I will pay particular attention to Megalopolis’ 
prior experience of federalism as I believe this is a crucial element of the local identity 
that set the polis apart from other leading Peloponnesian cities with the same tendency 
36 
 
to hate Sparta, and allowed it to accrue its influential position within the Achaian 
federation.  
After this analysis of the Arkadian-Megalopolitan interactions, I will end the 
chapter with a comparison of Megalopolis and its neighbour Messene to illustrate how 
two poleis that were (re)founded in the same geographic and historical sphere could end 
up developing their identity and politics in very different ways. The comparison between 
these two poleis also shows the contrasting ways in which these two poleis approached 
their ethnic identity: Messene looks back at its own local myths and cults to establish the 
Messenian identity, while Megalopolis goes through a more complex process in which 
several different elements are combined into a fluid and cosmopolitan identity. 
1. Megalopolis and the Arkadian koinon 
1.1. The Arkadian koinon  
When the Arkadians founded their koinon around 370 BC, they could never have 
realised that their experiment with federalism would prove to be very short-lived. For 
after an existence of a mere seven years, the federation split in two because of an internal 
conflict that would ultimately result in the battle of Mantinea in 362 BC with the two 
parties fighting on opposite sides. Even though the official creation of the koinon 
following Xenophon’s information is dated to the fourth century, the existence of several 
coins with the head of Zeus Lykaios bearing the inscription AΡKAΔIKON (in full or 
abbreviated) from the fifth century BC point to earlier Arkadian attempts to organise 
themselves.
103
 While it is difficult to say much about the precise dating of the coins, it has 
been established that they were minted in three separate mints operating at different 
stages.
104
 Roy makes a strong case against the existence of one federation that united all 
Arkadians due to the different mints and minting periods of the coins.
105
 Additionally, 
there are signs that several of the individual Arkadian poleis were acting according to 
their own interests, as is clear from Mantinea’s absence in the battle at Diphaia (Hdt. 9. 
35) or the Tegean conduct in 479 BC (Hdt. 9. 26-28). Yet these coins do not necessarily 
have to be seen as definite proof that a federal state did indeed exist, after all Megalopolis 
was known to have minted coins with the same legend long after the Arkadian koinon 
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had ceased to exist.
106
 Even though there was not one united Arkadia, it seems more 
likely that several of the cities organised themselves in bigger often rivalling groups with 
the coins being an expression of an ethnic Arkadian feeling.
107
 Therefore, there was a 
developed Arkadian identity in the fifth century BC, which allowed an organisation of 
some kind to produce coins in the name ‘of the Arkadians’.
108
  
So, while there was a clear awareness of a national Arkadian identity in the fifth 
century, it would take the two most influential Arkadian poleis – until the foundation of 
Megalopolis – Tegea and Mantinea coming together to create an Arkadian koinon that 
united (almost) all of the Arkadians. According to Xenophon (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 6), 
‘τῶν δὲ Τεγεατῶν οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Καλλίβιον καὶ Πρόξενον ἐνῆγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιέναι 
τε πᾶν τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν, καὶ ὅ τι νικῴη ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν 
πόλεων: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Στάσιππον ἔπραττον ἐᾶν τε κατὰ χώραν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῖς 
πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι.’  
(‘Of the Tegeans the followers of Kallibios and Proxenos were calling for the 
unification of all the Arkadians, and whatever option was victorious in the common 
assembly, should be binding for all of the cities. The followers of Stasippos wanted 
to leave the city undisturbed and live according to the laws of their fathers’).  
This passage should be read in accordance with its historical context: as a result of the 
Spartan defeat at Leuktra in 371 BC, the other Peloponnesian states slowly started to 
regain control over the region. Therefore, in 370 Mantinea peacefully re-established its 
democracy because of the autonomia guaranteed by the Common Peace of 371.
109
 
However, in Tegea there were two parties fighting for the control of the city with one of 
them edging towards a new goal, i. e. the creation of a pan-Arkadian organisation with 
common rules for all poleis (Xen. Hel. 6. 5. 3-10). Clearly, for Xenophon the creation 
of the Arkadian koinon lies here, in the stasis at Tegea (Xen. Hel. 6. 5. 10). In his own 
account of the events, Diodorus mentions Lykomedes of Mantinea as the architect of 
this idea implying that there was a definite Mantinean involvement in the foundation. 
Despite Diodorus calling him a Tegean by mistake (Diod. 15. 59. 1: Λυκομήδης ὁ 
Τεγεάτης) the fact that the Tegean stasis was only resolved after likeminded individuals 
from Mantinea came to the aid of the confederalists support the view that the foundation 
of the koinon was a joint effort. Furthermore, Lykomedes goes on to play an important 
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role in the newly established federation, serving as its general and inspiring a feeling of 
ethnic pride among the Arkadians in 369 BC (Xen. Hel. 7. 1. 23-24).
 110
 Interestingly, 
this rise of Arkadian pride created problems in the Arkadian foreign relations with their 
allies; Elis for example had lost several of its former territories as these poleis now joined 
the Arkadian koinon, while the Boiotian ambitions were curbed in the Peloponnese to 
the emergence of a new political unity.
111
 
Upon its creation, the political orientation of the newly formed federation was 
directed against Spartan as is evidenced by Pausanias’ comments (Paus. 8. 27. 1) that the 
Arkadians united as 
‘Ἀργείους ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ μὲν ἔτι παλαιότερα μόνον οὐ κατὰ μίαν ἡμέραν 
ἑκάστην κινδυνεύοντας ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων παραστῆναι τῷ πολέμῳ’  
(‘they knew that the Argives in earlier times were also almost each day in danger 
of being subjected to war by the Lakedaemonians’). 
For the Arkadian political union had occurred as the result of the establishment of a 
new and independent regime in Mantinea that had overthrown a previous one installed 
by Sparta in 385 BC (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 9-12), as well as the victory of the anti-Spartan 
faction in Tegea (Xen. Hel. 6. 5. 1-11).
112
 The unification of the Arkadians, and 
especially the reversal of the Spartan measures at Mantinea, was met with opposition 
from the Spartans. The Spartan king Agesilaos invaded Arkadia but his efforts were 
rebuffed by the majority of the Arkadian cities – excluding Orchomenos which fought 
on the Spartan side due to their hatred for Mantinea - with the support of allies such as 
the Boiotians, Elis and Argos (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 12-40; Diod. 15. 59; Paus. 8. 27. 2). 
In an inscription dating between 368 and 361 BC, in which the Arkadian koinon 
grants proxeny to a certain Phylarchus of Athens, ten Arkadian poleis are attested as 
members of the federation (IG V 2.1).
113
 Additionally, this man was to be ‘εὐεργέτην 
[…] Ἀρκάδων πάντων’ (l. 6-7: ‘benefactor […] of all the Arkadians’), this picture was 
also painted by Diodorus who says that Lykomedes managed to persuade ‘τοὺς 
Ἀρκάδας εἰς μίαν συντέλειαν ταχθῆναι’ (Diod. 15. 59. 1: ‘the Arkadians to unite into 
one union’).
 
Although it is surprising that some prominent Arkadian cities like Phigaleia 
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were not featured in this inscription – prompting the suggestion that this inscription may 
not have included all of the members
114
-, there were several communities such as 
Orchomenos and Heraia that had to be forced into the federation.
115
 Nonetheless, it 
seems as though most of Arkadia was part of the koinon soon after its creation. 
Alongside these Arkadian members, there are a few poleis attested as a part of the 
koinon that were not ethnically Arkadian and had previously belonged to Elis (Xen. 
Hell. 3. 2. 3). The loss of these territories to Arkadia seems to have been yet another 
reason why Elis abandoned its alliance with Arkadia.  
The Arkadian koinon had a boule and an assembly that was known as the Myrioi 
(IG V 2.1, l. 2-4). Despite its name, it is highly unlikely that the Arkadian assembly 
actually numbered ten thousand as there had to be more than ten thousand Arkadian 
citizens, most of whom probably did not regularly attend these meetings.
116
 Therefore, it 
was more likely an expression of an ideal number or general expression in connection 
to the size of the assembly which was open to all citizens.
 117
 Moreover, the use of such 
an number is also attested in several other cases like the quorum of 6000 for the 
Athenian citizen assembly. As Philippe Gauthier has shown, this number appears early 
on in the sources and does not change throughout the Classical period, thus proving that 
this is an idealised number.
118
 Additionally, Gauthier also argues that the Athenian 
quorum is different to the modern one because it does not indicate the minimum 
number of citizens required to be present in the assembly so that any legal proceedings 
that took place in the assembly were binding. In reality, the number of the quorum was 
meant to symbolise the entirety of the citizen body when important decisions were made 
in the assembly.
119
   
Among the many responsibilities of the assembly was the appointment and 
administration of magistrates, the awarding of honours such as a proxeny to individuals, 
and the conduct and development of the federation’s foreign policy through embassies 
to and alliances with other foreign powers (Xen. Hell. 7.4. 2-3; 33-34; IG V 2.1). In 
addition to the institutions, there were several Arkadian magistrates including a general 
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group of magistrates called archontes by Xenophon (Hell. 7. 4. 33), as many as fifty 
federal damiorgoi and a federal strategos who led the koinon and seems to have been 
an influential person from the more important Arkadian poleis.
120
 The strategos also led 
the federal army, which like the Achaian federal army consisted of contributions made 
by its members and had a special military unit called the eparitoi (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 11; 7. 
4. 22). Due to the constant warfare in which the Arkadian koinon was involved, a good 
working relationship between the strategos and the federal army was of paramount 
importance. 
  Due to the nature of the koinon’s creation by Tegean and Mantinean democrats, 
the federation seems to have been a democracy in which all of its members were 
considered equal. This stress on democracy was one of the defining characteristics of 
the Arkadian federation and its politics. It can be seen in several of its political actions, 
since the federation made it a principle to support other democracies in the 
Peloponnese.
121
 Between 369 and 364 BC, the Arkadians supported the establishment 
of democracies in Plious and Pellene (Xen. Hell. 7. 2. 5-9; 7. 3. 1). In other instances, 
the koinon remained friendly to democratic factions in the Peloponnese such as their 
good diplomatic relations with the Eleian democrats after the disintegration of the Elian-
Arkadian alliance in 365 or the Arkadian failure to intervene on behalf of the Achaian 
democrats when the oligarchs were to gain control over the region with the support of 
Epaminondas. In Sikyon, the Arkadians at first supported Euphron in his democratic 
endeavour, but soon the koinon had to intervene when he became a tyrant and 
overthrew Euphron’s regime, even though this was against the wishes of the general 
public (Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 1-3).
122
 The Arkadian loyalty to the democratic ideal also caused 
troubles between the koinon, Elis and the Boiotians under Epaminondas who frequently 
supported the oligarchical factions in the Peloponnese.
123
  
There is another element connected to the Arkadian koinon’s leniency towards 
democracy, which is a vehement antagonism towards Sparta. This animosity can in part 
be explained by Sparta’s tendency to support oligarchic regimes in the Peloponnese.
124
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This was a policy that the polis was actively pursuing in the years after the Peloponnesian 
War: for example, in the middle of the 360’s BC oligarchs assumed control in several 
Achaians cities that soon became Spartan allies, this to the annoyance of the Arkadians 
and their democratic allies within these cities.
125
  
 The Arkadian opposition to Sparta seems to have exerted a constant influence 
on the interactions of the koinon with other states. Because this was only possible after 
Spartan power was curbed by Boiotia, the koinon would implement this policy by its 
perpetual warfare against Sparta and sustaining an alliance with Boiotia as well as Elis, 
Argos, Messene and Athens.
126
 However, one last element of the Arkadian foreign policy 
can be deduced from a speech to the Arkadians in 369 which Xenophon attributed to 
Lykomedes in which Lykomedes reportedly said the following (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 24): 
‘ἐὰν οὖν σωφρονῆτε, τοῦ ἀκολουθεῖν ὅποι ἄν τις παρακαλῇ φείσεσθε: ὡς πρότερόν 
τε Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀκολουθοῦντες ἐκείνους ηὐξήσατε, νῦν δὲ ἂν Θηβαίοις εἰκῇ 
ἀκολουθῆτε καὶ μὴ κατὰ μέρος ἡγεῖσθαι ἀξιῶτε, ἴσως τάχα τούτους ἄλλους 
Λακεδαιμονίους εὑρήσετε.’  
(‘so if you are of sound mind, you will stop following wherever anyone calls you; as 
earlier by following the Lakedaimonians you increased their power, and now if you 
mindlessly follow the Thebans and do not deem it worthy to partly lead with them, 
perhaps you will soon find that these are the Lakedaimonians all over again’).  
The leader of the Arkadians seemingly warns them about the dangers of blindly 
entrusting themselves to the protection of yet another powerful ally, such as Thebes. If 
they were to succeed, the Arkadians needed to become self-reliant - they were after all 
strong fighters and the only autochthonous people of the Peloponnese (Xen. Hell.  7. 
1. 23). Therefore, even though these are ultimately Xenophon’s words, it is a very good 
example of the key pillars of the Arkadian polity and so the speech attributed to 
Lykomedes sums up the Arkadian foreign policy quite well: in order to succeed in their 
goal of keeping Sparta from controlling the Peloponnese, the koinon needed to work 
together with its allies but above all make sure that they remained independent enough 
from them to stay an important player on the international stage.
127
  
For the first few years of its existence, the koinon operated without major 
problems and seemed to be in a continued state of combat.
128
 The federation carried out 
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attacks on Sparta with its new allies Boiotia and Elis until 368 BC, after which the allies 
turned on each other and Arkadia found itself entangled in a war with Elis over some 
territories that had now become Arkadian. In 364 the Olympic Games were celebrated 
in Olympia, now under Arkadian control, and soon afterwards an internal conflict arose 
within the Arkadian koinon about the financing of the eparitoi through Olympic funds 
instead of member contributions (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 33). This conflict would lead to a 
schism between the Arkadian democrats and the oligarchs who had slowly been 
replacing the eparitoi (and potentially the assembly as well). Both sides concluded 
alliances with outside states: the oligarchs based in Mantinea now found an ally in Sparta, 
while the democrats centred in Megalopolis, which at this time was gradually becoming 
more and more important in Arkadia, and Tegea sent envoys to Thebes for help (Xen. 
Hell. 7. 4. 34; 7. 5. 3). The permanent divide among the Arkadians eventually led to the 
battle of Mantinea in 362 BC.
129
 While the reason for the internal conflict clearly lay in 
financial matters or perhaps in the lack of federal funds, I would argue that bigger, 
underlying problems were the real reason for this escalation. Even though Lykomedes 
had urged the Arkadians to work as one, the poleis could not set aside their own interests 
which is why it was so easy for Mantinea and Tegea to revert back to their old opposition 
of one another when Sparta no longer seemed a threat.
130
 The ideological opposition 
between the two faactions could only have contributed to this regression to their old 
ways. In the end, the success of the Arkadian koinon depended on its anti-Spartan policy 
and its implementation by one of its strongest proponents Lykomedes.  
1.2.  The synoecism of Megalopolis 
The synoecism of Megalopolis was the only lasting achievement realised by the Arkadian 
koinon during its short existence. While the exact foundation date is unknown we can 
say with certainty that Megalopolis was founded at some point in the period 371-367 BC 
and that by 362 the polis had extisted for several years (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 5). The ancient 
authors put the origins of the foundation in the feelings of anti-Spartanism that had been 
developing in the Peloponnese after the Spartan defeat at Leuktra (Paus. 8. 27. 1-2; 
Diod. 15. 72). It has generally been argued that the polis was founded by the koinon as 
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 This is wrong and I will argue that the city was founded solely by the 
Arkadian koinon and that the city was created with some federal considerations in mind 
but not as the capital of the federation: its sole purpose was the organisation and control 
of the area so as to strengthen Arkadian opposition to Sparta.
132
 The Arkadians managed 
to achieve this by convincing or forcing the inhabitants of the surrounding communities 
to take part in the synoicism of Megalopolis. Integrating these different groups into a 
new polis with Megalopolis’ size proved to be difficult. Therefore, in the search for a 
solution the leading men of the city seem to have drawn inspiration from the internal 
organisation of the federal states it was so familiar with. So, in an attempt to create their 
own new Megalopolitan identity, I will argue that the new citizens mimicked the way in 
which the Arkadian koinon had brought together all of the Arkadians, albeit on a smaller 
scale.  
By using those unifying characteristics of the Arkadian koinon, i.e. a hatred for 
Sparta and a fierce need for independence, the inhabitants became citizens of a new city 
that was connected to federalism in more ways than one, understanding the trappings of 
a federation better than any other polis. This is what made Megalopolis unique and why 
the polis was able to thrive as part of both the Arkadian and Achaian koina. 
1.2.1. Sources and problems of the synoecism 
Both Pausanias and Diodorus tell us about the foundation of Megalopolis. However, 
due to the differences in their accounts several problems have arisen concerning the 
exact date of the foundation, the involvement of Epaminondas and the extent of the 
synoecism. The passages in Pausanias are part of his description of Arkadia (book 8), 
but for some reason the author chose to separate the history of the polis (Paus. 8. 27. 1-
16) from its archaeological overview (Paus. 8. 30- 33). According to Pausanias, ‘ἡ δὲ 
Μεγάλη πόλις νεωτάτη πόλεών ἐστιν οὐ τῶν Ἀρκαδικῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν 
Ἕλλησι’ (Paus. 8. 27. 1: ‘Megalopolis was the youngest city, not of Arkadia alone, but 
of Greece’). Additionally, he tells us that Megalopolis was founded at the same time 
when ‘τὸ πταῖσμα ἐγένετο Λακεδαιμονίων τὸ ἐν Λεύκτροις,’ (Paus. 8. 27. 8: ‘the 
embarrassment of the Spartans occurred at Leuktra,’) and it had ten oikistai appointed 
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by the Arkadians with respectively two representing the most influential poleis within the 
koinon, i.e. Tegea, Mantinea and Kleitor, as well as four from the communities that 
were to be part of the new city, the Mainalians and Parrhesians. On Epaminondas’ role 
in the synoicism Pausanias says the following: ‘τῆς πόλεως δὲ οἰκιστὴς Ἐπαμινώνδας ὁ 
Θηβαῖος σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ καλοῖτο ἄν’ (Paus. 8. 27. 2: ‘the Theban Epaminondas could 
fairly be considered as the founder of the city’). Furthermore, the Arkadians managed 
to convince the inhabitants of thirty-nine communities to live in the μεγάλη πόλη (Paus. 
8. 27. 3-6). Diodorus’ account of the matter is a bit more concise as he is describing the 
events in the wider Mediterranean at the time (Diod. 15. 72. 4). All he says about the 
foundation of Megalopolis is this:  
‘μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην οἱ Ἀρκαδες, φοβηθέντες τὰς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων εἰσβολάς, 
ἔκτισαν ἐπί τινος ἐπικαίρου τόπου τὴν ὀνομαζομένην Μεγάλην πόλιν, 
συρρίψαντες εἰς αὐτὴν κώμας εἴκοσι τῶν ὀνομαζομένων Μαιναλίων καὶ 
Παρρασίων Ἀρκάδων’  
(‘after the battle, the Arkadians, fearing the Spartan invasions, founded in a fitting 
place thr city they named the Great, combining in it twenty villages of the 
Arkadians named Mainalians and Parrhasians’).
 
 
The battle referred to here is not Leuktra but the Tearless battle of 368 BC in which the 
Spartans defeated the Arkadians.
133
 Likewise, according to Diodorus here, the synoecism 
counted only twenty komai or communities and not thirty-nine.  
Due to these discrepancies, it seems to be the norm to choose one account over 
the other as though the two accounts are incompatible.
134
 Yet as James Roy rightly points 
out neither of the authors is more reliable than the other, which inevitably leaves us with 
several issues.
 135
 For example, when was Megalopolis founded? As discussed, Diodorus 
puts the date at 368, while Pausanias says 371 BC. Xenophon does not mention the 
creation of Megalopolis at all, referring to the polis only as one of the Arkadian cities 
under the leadership of Epaminondas at the battle of Mantinea (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 5). 
Furthermore, the casual mention of the polis amid other Arkadian cities clearly gives 
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the impression that at this point the polis was a fully functioning member of the Arkadian 
koinon and would have been in existence for a few years. However, there is another 
document that mentions the Megalopolitan synoecism, i.e. the Parian Marble, which 
covers Greek history between 1582 and 264/3 BC and is now in the Ashmolean 
Museum at Oxford. According to this inscription Megalopolis was founded in 370/69 
BC (FGrHist 239 F 73). It is beneficial to note that its author chooses to mention the 
event alongside more well-known events such as the Persian or Peloponnesian Wars, all 
of which have been correctly dated in the Parian Marble. Surely, this must point to the 
significance of Megalopolis in later Greek history and politics as well as a certain 
reliability for a date around 370 BC.  
In line with our two main sources, scholars traditionally argue for two possible 
dates, i.e. 371/0 BC or 368 BC. The problem of the date of the origin of the synoecsim 
is also connected to the date of the foundation of the Arkadian koinon, since it is widely 
known that the foundation of the polis was an endeavour of the Arkadian koinon and if 
Pausanias’ account is true, then the koinon itself must have existed in 371 as well.
136
 The 
most convincing argument put forward in favour of the earlier dating of Megalopolis and 
the koinon is the identification of one of the ten oikists of Megalopolis, i.e. Proxenos of 
Tegea who is mentioned by Pausanias (7. 27. 2), as the same Proxenos, who died during 
the Tegean stasis of 371/370 BC. A search of the Lexicon of Greek Personal Names 
shows that there were a few instances of men called Proxenos in Arkadia in the same 
period, potentially suggesting that these two Proxenos were two different people.
137
 
While this cannot be completely disproven and due to the reliability of Xenophon’s 
account of the events surrounding the foundation of the Arkadian koinon, it is more 
plausible that the koinon was not founded until 370 BC and the synoecism of 
Megalopolis not carried out until after that. The thesis proposed by Dušanić, that the 
foundation was a decision that happened in several stages is a plausible one and it is in 
line with my own view that the creation of the city was a process that took some time due 
to the scope of the project.
138
 It might thus be possible that the decision to found 
Megalopolis was taken much earlier than its completion around 368 BC. 
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Pausanias’ comment on Epaminondas’ role as the founder of the polis on the 
other hand does not have to be problematic. Besides Pausanias there seems to be no 
argument for any connection between Megalopolis and the Theban.
 139
 As we have seen, 
Pausanias does not actually call him an oikist as the Greek text uses an optative (Paus. 
8. 27. 2: ‘καλοῖτο’), indicating a possibility and not a fact. Later in the passage the author 
goes on to name the ten actual oikistai of the city as ‘ᾑρέθησαν δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν 
Ἀρκάδων’ (Paus. 8. 27. 2: ‘they were chosen by the Arkadians’). So, the Greek text 
makes it very clear that the Arkadians did not consider him to be one of the founders 
of the city, it is purely a comment made by Pausanias on account of Epaminondas’ 
actions to encourage the Arkadians to unite against the Spartans and the fact that he had 
sent troops to help them keep any Spartan opposition at bay (Paus. 8. 27. 2). Even 
though it was not the only time that Epaminondas was involved in the foundation of city 
outside of Boiotia, because he had encouraged the foundation of Messene (Paus. 4. 27. 
5-9; Plut. Ag. 34. 1), it seems as though Epaminondas’ role in the foundation of 
Megalopolis was limited to the encouragement of the Arkadian political union, since 
Epaminondas undertook several political campaigns into the Peloponnese to help his 
allies with their struggle against Sparta in the period 370-362 BC.
140
 Moreover, the ten 
Megalopolitan oikistai actually appointed by the koinon were important Arkadian 
individuals, including Lykomedes of Mantinea (Paus. 8. 27. 2), thus further indicating 
that Epaminondas was almost certainly not involved in the foundation of Megalopolis as 
he would also have been named by Pausanias as one of the oikistes. However, it is 
interesting to mention Polybius’ view on the constitution of Thebes in his book six (Pol. 
6. 44. 9). Here he says:  
‘διὸ καὶ περὶ μὲν ταύτης τε καὶ τῆς τῶν Θηβαίων οὐδὲν δεῖ πλείω λέγειν, ἐν αἷς 
ὄχλος χειρίζει τὰ ὅλα κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ὁρμήν, ὁ μὲν ὀξύτητι καὶ πικρίᾳ διαφέρων, 
ὁ δὲ βίᾳ καὶ θυμῷ συμπεπαιδευμένος,’  
(‘therefore, it is not necessary to say more about this (i.e. the Athenian 
constitution) or the Theban, in which the mob manages all things through its 
own impulse, on the one hand headstrong and bitter, on the other nurtured by 
violence and passion’).  
                                                          
139
 There is a reference to Epaminondas in connection to the foundation of Megalopolis in the scholia 
demosthenica (16.202.1.), but this account is far from convincing.  
140
 Braunert and Pedersen (1972), 68-71; Verfenstein (2002), 13. 
47 
 
Polybius obviously did not hold the polis in high esteem so if Epaminondas had really 
been the architect behind Megalopolis, one could expect a slightly more respectful 
description of the Theban constitution from a Megalopolitan citizen. Furthermore, as a 
founder of the polis one would expect to find more traces of Epaminondas in the 
architectural planning of the polis such as statues of the man for example.
141
 Hence, the 
creation of Megalopolis was an Arkadian endeavour that was started in order to protect 
the area from Spartan invasions.
142  
Since the city-state was a federal creation, some scholars believed that the 
Arkadians created it with the intention of eventually turning it into the Arkadian capital, 
which the propagandistic nature of its name certainly implied.
143
 This is rather unlikely 
especially since it can be quite problematic to apply such a modern concept to the Greek 
federal states and the identification of it.
144
 While it is true that some federations were 
dominated by one or a few of their member states, there is no real indication of one of 
these acting as a capital in the modern sense of the word. Additionally, the fact that 
Megalopolis provided ten of the fifty damiorgoi in the Phylarchos inscription discussed 
instead of a smaller number like the other Arkadian cities does not prove its status as 
the capital of the Arkadian koinon; it could merely indicate that the polis had provided 
this high number due to its size (IG V 2.1 l. 23-33). This would certainly tie in with the 
principle of proportional representation employed in the institutions of other koina. The 
board of nomographoi of the Achaian koinon is a perfect example as Megalopolis was 
one of the few cities with three votes due to its size (IG IV I
2
 73) before being reduced 




Even an analysis of the archaeological site in light of Pausanias’ statement that 
connected one of the buildings in Megalopolis to the assembly of the Arkadians, the 
Myrioi, has not resulted in any conclusive answers (Paus. 8. 32. 1). This building, called 
the Thersilion was supposedly the meeting place of the Myrioi and could be found near 
the theatre in the southern part of the city.
146
 In an attempt to prove that Megalopolis was 
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indeed founded as their capital city by the Arkadians, Caitlyn Downey Verfenstein 
analysed all of the archaeological remains to determine which of these buildings were 
foundation monuments. However, she has only been able to say with certainty that the 
Thersilion and the theatre were built in close proximity to the foundation of Megalopolis 
at some point in the fourth century BC.
147
 Both buildings are unique: the Thersilion has 
a very unusual building plan and architectural features and the theatre was the largest 
theatre in Greece (Paus. 8. 32. 1).
148
 Due to their similarities, they were clearly built in 
relation to one another.
149
 Verfenstein offers an intriguing theory on the reasoning 
behind the size of theatre, namely that Megalopolis was the first polis to utilise the theatre 
for civic and secular purposes in addition to its traditional uses.
150
 This theory fits well 
within the argument I make about Megalopolis’ ability to understand how a federation 
works as is confirmed by the fact that the polis saw the need to have a space where a 
large crowd could gather to discuss important matters. The theatre therefore was an 
important part of the civic life of the polis, as it was one of the only places in Megalopolis 
where these large crowds could gather, which is substantial judging by the number of 
citizens the polis must have had.  However, I do not agree with her conclusion that these 
buildings were built with the Myrioi in mind. Moreover, the sole meeting of the Myrioi 
during the existence of the Arkadian koinon was at Tegea around 363 BC (Xen. Hell. 
7. 4. 36). On the other hand, they only came to Megalopolis once, in 348/7 BC, which 
is also known to be their last meeting (Dem. Meg. 19. 10.-11.; Aeschin. 2. 79 and 157). 
The Great City was definitely founded in a federal atmosphere, but not as the federal 
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capital. Instead, the Arkadians wanted it to be a fully functioning polis of considerable 
size in its own right.  
1.2.2. The organisation of Megalopolis 
Clearly, Megalopolis was a typical Arkadian polis with its own local institutions and 
constitution, which were connected to several public, cultural and religious buildings in 
which the citizens went about their day-to-day life. Although there is little evidence of 
the nature of the city’s constitution, an overview of both the buildings found at 
Megalopolis and the information on the organisation of other Arkadian poleis might 
help to shed some light on the situation in Megalopolis.
151
 It can be said with certainty 
that in the period after the synoecism of Megalopolis, most of the Arkadian cities had 
an organised constitution regulated by laws and magistrates. Due to Megalopolis’ 
foundation at the hand of the Arkadian koinon, there should be no doubt about the 
constitution of the polis being democratic in nature, as this was one of the cornerstones 
of the Arkadian policy.  
For Megalopolis, several magistrates are known to have existed: the office of 
agonothetes is alluded to in an inscription (IG V,2 450). The nomographoi are 
mentioned in a decree of the polis in connection with Magnesia on the Meander
  
(IMagn. 
38 l. 42, 48, 57), they are also attested in another inscription from the polis, a diagramma, 
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which also mentions the existence of a grammatophylax as well as a synedrion as one of 
the civic institutions of the polis (IG V,2 433 l. 2, 8, 9). Another inscription also refers 
to the Megalopolitan damiorgoi (IG V,431). These magistrates are also known to have 
existed for both the Arkadian and Achaian koina. In a boundary dispute between 
Megalopolis en Messene, the federal damiorgoi are seen acting on behalf of the Achaian 
koinon by accepting appeals for these boundary disputes as well as imposing fines on 
members who did not comply with the arbitration.
152
 Even though these inscriptions are 
dated well into the Hellenistic period, they should not be discarded as similar magistrates 
and institutions were in place elsewhere in Arkadia at the time of the synoecism.
153
 
Moreover, archaeologists have found remains of several public buildings which they 
believed to be the bouleuterion, prytaneion and the archeia.
154
 While most of these have 
been named echoing Pausanias’ description of Megalopolis, it is plausible to conclude 
that the city did indeed have a boule as this was common for Greek poleis of the time.   
However, the existence of a synedrion and nomographoi in Megalopolis is 
particularly interesting as it illustrates another link between the internal organisation of 
the polis and that of a federal state. For one, the synedrion is attested in several federal 
contexts such as the Second Athenian Confederacy which is known to have a synedrion 
that decided on membership of this Conferederacy (IG II
2
 43). Even more interesting is 
the attestation to the Megalopolitan nomographoi, a rare magistracy, and which also 
existed in the Achaian koinon, thus drawing an interesting parallel between the polis and 
the federal state of which Megalopolis became an important member. The magistracy 
of the federal nomographoi, known to us because of two inscriptions which will be 
discussed in more detail below, was legislative in nature as they are known to have drown 
up federal laws including a sacred law for Hygeia and the board seems to have travelled 
to member states whenever necessary. According to the inscription (Syll. 3 559), the 
nomographoi of Megalopolis were organised in a board that had two primary functions: 
draught laws in order to get them to the boule or other political institutions of the polis 
as well as record and archive laws that had previously been approved.  
Furthermore, this city-state had to be of considerable size in order to keep 
control of the surrounding area. Geographically, the area on which Megalopolis was 
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founded was crucial to form a buffer between the Arkadian heartland and Sparta.
155
 This 
is evident from the longstanding disputes between Sparta and Megalopolis about the 
connecting regions Skiritis, Aigytis and Belminatis that started after Philip II had given 
these areas back to the Arkadians (Pol. 9. 28. 7-8).
156
 To achieve this, it was important 
for the polis to control several of the major routes in and out of the area to keep Sparta 
at bay.
157
 In theory, the foundation of a big city as protection against Sparta was 
undoubtedly a good idea, but it proved difficult to defend and as a result the polis was 
prone to many Spartan raids.
158
 One of these even had the inhabitants appealing to 
Athens for help in the 350s BC. In response, Demosthenes argues in favour of helping, 
not out of affection or alliance for Megalopolis but in view of the future consequences 
for their ally Messene and the prospect of weakening both Sparta and Thebes where 
possible (Dem. Meg. 16. 8-9). Moreover, Demosthenes also realises that Megalopolis 
might prove a crucial factor in retaining the delicate balance of power within the 
Peloponnese as well as resisting the threat of Sparta overall. Yet, the size of the polis 
may also have been connected to the necessities of its new population who undoubtedly 
contained wealthy landowners that needed extra space within the city.
159
 This is illustrated 
by the situation after the Megalopolitans returned from exile in 222 BC where two 
factions had formed among the citizens that were arguing about the size of the polis (Pol. 
5. 93.). One of these factions included the wealthy landowners who were in favour of 
keeping the large size of the polis since it included part of their estates, while their 
opponents wanted the polis to be smaller at the expense of these estates. Eventually, the 
conflict was resolved by Aratos who managed to reconcile both parties. Thus, though 
geographically it was an important area, its defence came at a certain price considering 
the Arkadians had to use their army in two ways: to protect the traditionally scattered 
villages in the heartland as well as this new metropolis.
160
  
To get the required number of inhabitants for such a big city, the Arkadians 
encouraged the inhabitants of a big group of other Arkadian villages and poleis to leave 
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their native communities and become part of the synoecism of Megalopolis. Once again, 
the number of the poleis that were part of the synoecism is different in our sources. 
According to Diodorus, it involved twenty Mainalian and Parrhasian communities 
(Diod. 15. 72. 4: ‘εἰς αὐτὴν κώμας εἴκοσι τῶν ὀνομαζομένων Μαιναλίων καὶ 
Παρρασίων Ἀρκάδων’ – ‘combining in it twenty villages of the Arkadians named 
Mainalians and Parrhasians’), whereas Pausanias describes a much bigger project with 
thirty-nine different communities that included Mainalians and Parrhesians as well as 
Eutresians, Aegytians, Kynourians and areas under the control of Orchomenos (Paus. 
8. 27. 3-4):  
‘πόλεις δὲ τοσαίδε ἦσαν ὁπόσας ὑπό τε προθυμίας καὶ διὰ τὸ ἔχθος τὸ 
Λακεδαιμονίων πατρίδας σφίσιν οὔσας ἐκλιπεῖν ἐπείθοντο οἱ Ἀρκάδες, Ἀλέα 
Παλλάντιον Εὐταία Σουμάτειον Ἀσέα Περαιθεῖς Ἑλισσὼν Ὀρεσθάσιον 
Δίπαια Λύκαια: ταύτας μὲν ἐκ Μαινάλου: ἐκ δὲ Εὐτρησίων Τρικόλωνοι καὶ 
Ζοίτιον καὶ Χαρισία καὶ Πτολέδερμα καὶ Κναῦσον καὶ Παρώρεια: παρὰ δὲ 
Αἰγυτῶν Αἴγυς καὶ Σκιρτώνιον καὶ Μαλέα καὶ Κρῶμοι καὶ Βλένινα καὶ 
Λεῦκτρον: Παρρασίων δὲ Λυκοσουρεῖς Θωκνεῖς Τραπεζούντιοι Προσεῖς 
Ἀκακήσιον Ἀκόντιον Μακαρία Δασέα: ἐκ δὲ Κυνουραίων τῶν ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ 
Γόρτυς καὶ Θεισόα ἡ πρὸς Λυκαίῳ καὶ Λυκαιᾶται καὶ Ἀλίφηρα: ἐκ δὲ τῶν 
συντελούντων ἐς Ὀρχομενὸν Θεισόα Μεθύδριον Τεῦθις: προσεγένετο δὲ καὶ 
Τρίπολις ὀνομαζομένη, Καλλία καὶ Δίποινα καὶ Νώνακρις’  
(‘These cities were the one which the Arkadians were persuaded to abandon 
through their willingness and because of their hatred of the Lakedaimonians, 
despite that these were the homes of their fathers: Alea, Pallantion, Eutaia, 
Soumateion, Asea, Peraithenses, Helisson, Oresthasion, Dipaia, Lykaia; these 
were cities of Mainalos. Of the Eutresian cities: Trikoloni, Zoition, Charisia, 
Ptolederma, Knauson, Paroreia. From Aigytis: Aigys, Skirtonion, Malea, Kromi, 
Blenina, Leuktron. Of the Parrhasians: Lykosura, Thoknia, Trapezous, 
Prosenses, Akakesion, Akontion, Makaria, Dasea. Of the Kynourians in 
Arkadia: Gortys, Theisoa by Mount Lykaios, Lykaia, Alipheira. Of those 
belonging to Orchomenos: Thisoa, Methydrion, Teuthis. These were joined by 
Tripolis, as it is called, Kallia, Dipoina, Nonakris’). 
These different communities had lived in the so-called Megalopolitan basin, i. e. the 
area in which the new polis was to be established, and their organisation varied from 
poleis to smaller komai or tribes. While these discrepancies are problematic due to the 
sheer difference in the extent of the synoecism – Pausanias lists twice as many 
communities as Diodorus – it is possible that not all of the communities named by 
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Pausanias were part of the original synoecism.
161
 The Mainalians and Parrhesians 
however were clearly meant to be Megalopolitan from the very start since they are 
mentioned in both accounts. Yet the fact that the Mainalians still appear as one of the 
contributing communities on the list of damiorgoi (IG V 2 1 l. 16-19), would indicate 
that not all of these communities were part of Megalopolis from the beginning. Other 
communities involved in the synoecism were some of the Eutresian cities as only one of 
them had successfully been able to resist incorporation (Paus. 8. 27. 5), and several 
poleis under the control of Orchomenos which was hostile to the Arkadian koinon 
because of its loyalty to Sparta (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 10-11).
162
 Because of this, it seems as 
though the individual interests of the members of the Arkadian koinon played a part in 
the synoicism of Megalopolis as well as overall Arkadian needs.
163
 Therefore, weakening 
Orchomenos’ power by taking away six cities under its control, must have been very 
desirable for the Arkadian koinon and Kleitor, which had been at war with the polis a 
decade prior to the synoecism (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 36-37). This is also indicated by the fact 
that the ten oikistai that founded Megalopolis came from the influential Arkadian cities 
of Mantinea, Tegea and Kleitor as well as the surrounding communities the Mainalians 
and Parrhesians. Obviously, local interests such as those of Kleitor, were taken into 
consideration when the polis was founded, while others such as Mantinea may have had 
to relinquish control over other areas.
164
 On the other hand, communities mentioned by 
Pausanias such as the Kynourians did not have to become Megalopolitan until a time 
when they became of strategic importance.  
  With this many communities being incorporated into an entirely new polis, it is 
unsurprising that not all of these wanted to be part of Megalopolis. According to 
Pausanias (Paus. 8. 27. 5-6),  
‘τὸ μὲν δὴ ἄλλο Ἀρκαδικὸν οὔτε τι παρέλυε τοῦ κοινοῦ δόγματος καὶ 
συνελέγοντο ἐς τὴν Μεγάλην πόλιν σπουδῇ: Λυκαιᾶται δὲ καὶ Τρικολωνεῖς 
καὶ Λυκοσουρεῖς τε καὶ Τραπεζούντιοι μετεβάλοντο Ἀρκάδων μόνοι, καὶ - οὐ 
γὰρ συνεχώρουν ἔτι τὰ ἄστη τὰ ἀρχαῖα ἐκλιπεῖν - οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν καὶ ἄκοντες 
ἀνάγκῃ κατήγοντο ἐς τὴν Μεγάλην πόλιν, Τραπεζούντιοι δὲ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου 
τὸ παράπαν ἐξεχώρησαν,’  
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(‘wheras the rest of the Arkadians did not resist the common decree and hastily 
assembled at Megalopolis; the people of Lykaia, Trikoloni, Lykosoura and 
Trapezous changed their mind (as the only Arkadians) and because they were 
not prepared to leave the old cities, they were forced against their will to go to 
Megalopolis, with the exception of the citizens of Trapezous who departed from 
the Peloponnese altogether’).  
The choice was simple if the community was deemed important for the creation of this 
new Arkadian polis: become Megalopolitan or flee the Peloponnese. After the battle of 
Mantinea in 362 BC, there was resistance from several of these communities because of 
an agreement made by the Arkadians that all of the parties had to return to their home 
(Diod. 15. 94. 1-3). Since they were unhappy that they had been forced to leave their 
old homes behind, some of the new inhabitants of Megalopolis used this agreement to 
leave the city. Of course, the other citizens now living in Megalopolis did not agree with 
this and soon another conflict followed, with Mantinea supporting the deserters and the 
Thebans helping Megalopolis. Together with the Thebans under Pammenes, the polis 
managed to stop the rebellion quickly and the communities once again became part of 
Megalopolis. During Megalopolis’ membership of the Achaian koinon, some of these 




 This resistance illustrates one of the biggest problems the new polis faced: how 
could they unite all of these different communities into one collective polis with a distinct 
identity? An analysis of the cults and sanctuaries of Megalopolis indicates that the polis 
tried to unite these vastly different communities by creating a shared religious identity 
that was different from a traditional polis’ religious identity based on simple, unitary 
shared cults and traditions.
 166
 In turn, this deliberate choice of cults and deities facilitated 
the city’s interaction with the wider region of Arkadia as well as promote social and 
political cohesion amongst the different groups within the polis. Religion had always 
been an important factor in the establishment of regional and federal states, since the 
sharing of common cults and sanctuaries facilitated a sense of belonging, shared interests 
and moral values culminating in the creation of one state with a common territory, past 
and identity.
167
 Therefore, by using religion as a basis for the shared Megalopolitan 
identity, Megalopolis could have imitated the federal structure with which it was familiar 
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through its membership of the Arkadian and later on the Achaian koina, since both the 
polis and the koina tried to use religion to create internal unity. Moreover, as we shall 
see in more detail in the last section of this chapter, Megalopolis’ approach to its civic 
identity differed slightly from that of cities that were established in the Archaic and 
Classical periods, as Megalopolis’ creation by a federation fascilitated a polis with a new 
kind of outlook that was much more federal in nature. 
Even though the Arkadian koinon did not have a federal cult, there are 
indications that they were aware of the benefits of religious unity. For example, the 
Arkadikon mentioned on the coins from the fifth century BC was thought to have been 
a religious organisation which united the cities of Arkadia long before their political 
union in a koinon.
168
 Likewise, the sanctuary of Poseidon in Helike and the temple of 
Zeus Homarios in Aigion played an important role in the formation of the Achaian 
koinon. Both cults had long been connected to the Achaian (mythical) history and 
identity: the former in connection to conquests of the region, the latter with the Achaians 
of the Trojan war.
169
 Moreover, the temple of Zeus Homarios was further embedded in 
the institutional side of the koinon, as the meetings of the Achaian assembly took place 
in it until 188 BC, when the federation decided that meetings should rotate equally 
between member states (Livy 38. 30. 1-6). The political role of the god and his cult is 
further evidenced by his appearance on Achaian coinage throughout its history, 
connecting three main incentives, i. e. religious, political and economic - for the 
formation of a federal state.
170
 Furthermore, the importance of local cults could help 
preserve – and even favour – the local identity of the members of a federal state as was 
the case with Aigion and the cult of Zeus Homarios, and within a polis such as 
Megalopolis this could help the integration of these different communities into one.  
Of course, this could also happen at a much smaller scale, i.e. within a single 
polis. For example, in the city of Patrai which was created just like Megalopolis through 
synoecism, the existence of a single ritual proves that through religion these different 
groups could come together as citizens of Patrai. After all, this ritual incorporated 
important elements of the different communities and connected two cults, the rural cult 
of Artemis Triklaria and the cult of Dionysos Aisymnetes in the city (Paus. 7. 18-20). 
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Even though in Patrai it was just a single ritual that incorporated all of these distinct 
elements, the Megalopolitans used this practice to create an entire civic religion. No 
doubt, they purposefully employed this tactic with the creation of a shared 
Megalopolitan identity in mind.  
In general, the Arkadians did not abandon their rural shrines, when a new urban 
centre was created such as Megalopolis, instead opting to incorporate similar versions of 
those shrines, sanctuaries and festivals within this new civic centre so as to create a 
continued link between the polis and countryside.
171
 In her analysis of the polis’ 
pantheon which is primarily based on Pausanias’ description of the many sanctuaries – 
it is important to note that this is Pausanias’ version of the polis at his time
172
 - Madeleine 
Jost identified three ways in which the polis wanted make this connection between the 
chora of Megalopolis and the polis to unite its inhabitants: firstly, by replicating local and 
rural sanctuaries or important pan-Arkadian cults.
173
 Two of the many cults worshipped 
in Megalopolis, those of Pan and Zeus Lykaios, were of great importance to the citizens 
as the protective gods of the polis, which also benefited from the general worship of their 
cults by the other Arkadians in sanctuaries on Mount Lykaion, a sacred place for the 
entire region (Paus. 8. 36). Just as with the cult of Zeus Homarios in Achaia, these deities 
had been connected to the historical and mythical past of the region and together with a 
third goddess called Despoina they were the only gods to be worshipped throughout 
Arkadia (Paus. 8. 36-38).
174
 In fact, the sanctuary of Zeus Lykaios on Mount Lykaion had 
already promoted Arkadian interaction in the fifth century BC
175
 and both gods appear 
on the coins of the Arkadian koinon which displayed the head of Zeus Lykaios on the 
obverse and a seated Pan on the reverse. Another example of such a duplication was the 
import of the local cult of Hermes Akakesios which was originaly worshipped in 
Akakesion by the Parrhesians, but had later been appropriated in Megalopolis as well 
to create a link to this rural sanctuary.
176
  
                                                          
171
 Jost (1994), 122. 
172
 Stewart (2013), 241. 
173
 Jost (1985), 235. 
174
 Jost (2007), 264-269. Even though there is no proof for the existence of a federal Arkadian cult, it has 
been suggested that as Megalopolis functioned as the capital of the Arkadian koinon, the cult of Zeus 
Lykaios, now under control of Megalopolis acted as the federal cult. However, this is highly unlikely and 
there does not seem to be any direct proof, particularly since the cult was not subjected to increased 
political activity.  
175
 Roy (2007), 291; Jost (1985), 179-185 and 221-222. 
176
 Jost (2007), 274. 
57 
 
Secondly, instead of duplicating entire sancturaries into the polis, local deities 
were given their own places of worship within the city like Pan Skoleitas. This version of 
Pan was originally worshipped in Trapezous and after the synoecism his cult was also 
brought into the city to create a connection between the city and the area of Trapezous.
177
 
Pan was also worshipped in another version, i.e. Sinoeis, through a statue brought by the 
Phigaleians as their contribution to the new polis (Paus. 8. 30.3.). Thirdly, new cults were 
created through syncretism of several deities, modernising these cults and adapting them 
to the new reality within the city by creating new versions of the gods. Important 
examples of Megalopolitan sanctuaries are that of Zeus Soter and the Great Goddesses, 
both of which were situated near the agora and were connected to political life in the 
polis. The temple of Zeus Soter in particular seems to have functioned as the place 
where decrees were published.
178
 Jost has even posed the theory that the cult of the Great 
Goddesses was created particularly in connection with the foundation of Megalopolis.
179
 
Additionally, a trio of statues found in the temple of Zeus sitting on the throne, Artemis 
and Megalopolis has been thought to represent the foundation of the polis.
180
  
Remarkably, all of the cults, except for that of Apollo Epikurios, that were part 
of the Megalopolitan pantheon originated from the same region, Parrhesia, which was 
geographically closest to the site on which the new polis was founded.
181
 Moreover, this 
region had connections to the oldest and most important cult of the Arkadians, i.e. that 
of Zeus Lykaios on Mt Lykaion, which indicated that the polis wanted to securely 
establish its role in the southern part of the region as well as in the whole of Arkadia. 
Furthermore, as we have seen from the accounts of Pausanias and Diodorus concerning 
the synoecism of the polis, the Parrhesians were among the new citizens of the polis.
182
 
Clearly, the best way to make sure that the communities felt at home, was to incorporate 
the typical Arkadian deities like Pan, Zeus Lykaios and others that were known in 
different variations throughout the region into the religious life of the polis. 
Although most of the deities of the Megalopolitan pantheon also had duplicate 
sanctuaries or their own places of worship in the wider region that now belonged to 
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Megalopolis, Pausanias does mention a few rural cult sites in the Megalopolitan chora 
(Paus 8. 30. 1-35. 5). For example, close to the city was a temple to Poseidon Epoptos. 
Between Messene and Megalopolis, a sanctuary to several goddesses called the Maniae 
could be found and close to that sanctuary was another sanctuary dedicated to the 
Eumenides and a mound of earth that was called the Tomb of the Finger that was 
connected to the myth of Orestes. Furthermore, the historian mentions several Heraions 
on the boundary between the two cities. On the road from Megalopolis to Methydrion, 
Pausanias found the ruins of a sanctuary to Artemis Skiatis, rumoured to have been built 
by Aristodamos the tyrant. Another rural site not mentioned by Pausanias was that of 
Glanitsa, which only consisted of an altar flanked by several temenos wall on a hill in the 
northern borders of the Megalopolitan area.
183
 Several of these religious sites seem to 
have been located near the boundaries of Megalopolis and neighbouring poleis such as 
Messene or on the roads between these cities. Due to the lack of information about 
these religious sites the question remains if they had any specific connection to 
Megalopolis and the establishment of the Megalopolitan identity. What is certain is that 
upon their foundation, the Megalopolitans deliberately copied many of these rural 
shrines and sanctuaries to maintain the link between the religion of the new city and the 
traditional worship of the region. 
184
 
The creation of a very distinct Megalopolitan pantheon was employed on 
purpose as by doing this the polis hoped to find an incentive for the many communities 
now finding themselves forced to live in the polis, to come together as one city. This is 
further indicated by the placement of the sanctuaries within the polis connecting them 
to different aspects of the everyday life in the polis: be it political, cultural or social, 
religion was vital to the concerns of the polis as a whole.
185
 Undoubtedly, the magistrates 
would have drawn their inspiration from the way in which the bigger organisations that 
the polis had interacted with like the Arkadian and Boiotian koina, dealt with the same 
problem. Therefore, we can draw the conclusion that at least in terms of its religion, 
Megalopolis seems to imitate the federal framework it was familiar with in an attempt to 
unite the different communities into a bigger communal organisation.  
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Unfortunately, this theory can only be attested in terms of the polis’ religion since 
we have little to no evidence for the economic or political structure of the polis. What 
little evidence we do have, points to a normal polis structure with institutions you would 
find elsewhere.
186
 Yet, through its pantheon Megalopolis proved that it knew which 
benefits federalism could bring even when it was applied on a smaller scale. After all, 
this is what a city born from synoecism had to do: in order to create a common identity, 
a way had to be found for all of these communities to interact with one another without 
having to give up their own individual identity.  
This use of federal elements in the religious pantheon is exactly what 
distinguished Megalopolis from other Arkadian poleis and made it so easy to attain such 
a prominent position in both the Arkadian and Achaian koina. Moreover, this 
understanding and use of federalism forms the cornerstone of the Megalopolitan 
identity. Together with the other characteristics identified in this thesis, i.e. the hatred 
for Sparta, the deep connection to the democratic ideals of the Arkadian koinon and 
the traditional connections to Macedon, this is what set Megalopolis apart from other 
cities in the Peloponnese.   
1.3.  Megalopolis and the rest of Arkadia 
Megalopolis was thus established in the period after the Spartan defeat of Leuktra by 
the Arkadian koinon through a synoecism of several different communities. The polis 
had a deep reverence for democracy and hatred for Sparta, courtesy of the Arkadian 
koinon, but unlike the other Arkadians, Megalopolis had used the ideals behind 
federalism to unite the different communities via the creation of a complete pantheon. 
Yet the polis was in other respects still an Arkadian city with similar laws, constitution, 
institutions, religion and culture found elsewhere. So how did the polis interact with 
other Arkadian poleis?  
 As a member of the Arkadian koinon, there is only one indication that 
Megalopolis received special treatment: the fact that the city provided ten of the fifty 
federal damiorgoi (IG V 2 1). As discussed above, we cannot say with certainty why this 
was the case, the size of the polis and the area it controlled must have been the reason.
187
 
What is more interesting is the fact that both Tegea and Mantinea, as founding members 
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of the koinon, contributed the same amount, i.e. five, to the board of damiorgoi as 
others, giving the impression that the members of the federation, just as in Achaia, were 
equal to one another.
188
 However, this did not exclude these bigger poleis from taking 
up an important position within the federation as Megalopolis was able to do due to its 
size in the board of damiorgoi. Additionally, the reason for Megalopolis’ higher number 
of damiorgoi might also be propagandistic in nature, just as its name was meant to be.
189
 
In a similar fashion, Tegea and Mantinea had the opportunity – along with Kleitor – to 
exert their importance through the appointment of four of the ten founding oikistai of 
Megalopolis, illustrating that these two cities were influential in the Arkadian politics 
(Paus. 7. 27. 2). Moreover, it is most likely that these two poleis played a significant role 
in the foundation of Megalopolis, due to their prominent position within the Arkadian 
koinon. All in all, it seems as though the federation, while egalitarian in nature, was 
heavily influenced by the larger poleis like Megalopolis, Tegea and Mantinea.
190
 No 
doubt, their position would impact the way that they interacted both with each other and 
with the smaller poleis as is evidenced from the way those communities that did not want 
to be part of the synoecism of Megalopolis were treated (Paus. 8. 27. 5; Diod. 15. 94. 1-
3). 
 However, after the rupture of the federation in 363 BC, the Arkadian poleis did 
not stop interacting with one another, although there is considerably less evidence for 
this. It seems as though the division of the koinon into (two) political units persisted for 
a long time with Mantinea at the centre of one and Megalopolis of a potential other.
191
 
There is a whole series of evidence for this statement, conveniently collected by Thomas 
Heine Nielsen.
192
 However, I will limit myself to cite the few examples that are most 
relevant to describe Megalopolitan relations with the rest of Arkadia in this period.
193
 In 
the sources that discuss events of the year after the battle of Mantinea in 362 BC, there 
is a clear distinction between the Arkadians led by Mantinea and Megalopolis which was 
acting as an individual unit. The polis was consistently asking for help from parties 
outside the region against other Arkadians (Pol. 4. 33. 8; Diod. 15. 94. 1-3) or Sparta 
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(Dem. Meg. 16; Diod. 16. 39. 1-3); interacting with these outsiders through the 
establishment of treaties (with Argos, Sikyon, Messene, Thebes and Orneai: Diod. 16. 
39. 1-4); receiving ambassadors (both from Athens: Dem. Meg. 19. 10; Aeschin. 2. 157); 





 While Nielsen may be right in suggesting that the Arkadian koinon could 
have continued under Mantinean leadership, it seems to me as though Megalopolis 
distanced itself from the rest of the Arkadians - as is illustrated by the fact that it was the 
only one of the Arkadian poleis not to support Agis III in his campaign against Macedon 
in 331 BC, potentially precisely because it was a Spartan expedition against Macedon 
(Aeschin. 3. 165) - in order to make clear that it was very much a polis in its own right. 
The evidence cited by Nielsen suggesting Megalopolis was at the head of a second 
federation is far from convincing: Demosthenes’ use for example of both the term 
Megalopolitans and Arkadian to denote the inhabitants of the polis can simply be 
explained by the fact that the inhabitants of the polis were Arkadians (Dem. Meg. 16).
195
 
On the other hand, the fact that Aeschines as an Athenian ambassador delivered a 
speech to the Myrioi in 348/7 BC implies a connection to federalism since the federal 
nature of the Arkadian assembly is well known. However, due to the scarcity of the 
evidence we cannot say for certain exactly what this connection was.
196
 Obviously, 
Megalopolis was eager to make it clear to the other Arkadians as well as potential states 
outside of the region that it was a polis that could very much act as an individual unit. 
While the polis seems to have been keen to stress its individuality in this period, there 
is evidence that there was still a degree of interaction between the cities of Arkadia, and 
Megalopolis was no exception to this. While the tribal states that had been a defining 
character of the region during the Archaic and Classical periods became less prominent 
most likely due to the synoecism of Megalopolis poleis still created decrees for 
cooperation with one another or granted proxenia to citizens from other poleis, as 
Orchomenos did for men from Megalopolis (BCH 38).
197
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 In the decades after the dissolution of the Arkadian koinon, there was a clear 
change in the political landscape of Arkadia. One of the two most important Arkadian 
poleis, Tegea, seems to have vanished from our sources with Megalopolis taking its spot 
at the forefront of Arkadian politics, while Mantinea on the other hand seems to have 
gathered a lot of Arkadians around itself. The different cities of Arkadia still interacted 
with each other locally, yet slowly Megalopolis seems to have profiled itself as an 
individual actor in the Peloponnese and the wider Greek world with its own distinct local 
identity. By the time the polis made the decision to join the Achaian koinon, the 
influence of Mantinea seems to have faded and Megalopolis was the best example of an 
Arkadian polis. 
2. Messene and Megalopolis: two sides of the same coin? 
In 183/2 BC, the city of Messene waged war against the Achaian koinon. Forced to 
become an Achaian member in 191 BC after a failed war against the federation, the 
polis rebelled in the hopes of regaining their freedom. However, this attempt was 
knocked down quickly by the leaders of the federation, but not before Philopoimen of 
Megalopolis, the strategos of that year, was killed at Messene (Livy 39. 49). This whole 
affair seems to have prompted the Megalopolitans to start a quarrel with Messene about 
the ownership and boundaries of several regions between the two states (SEG 58 370 l. 
2-11). After several attempts the Megalopolitans seem to have been unsuccessful.
198
 
However, their determination to win these boundary disputes can in part be explained 
by the necessity to retaliate for the death of Philopoimen. Judging from the fact that the 
Achaian statesmen that were responsible for Messene’s induction into the koinon were 
Megalopolitan (Plut. Phil. 16. 1-3; Pol. 22. 10. 4-6), it seems that the close relationship 
once enjoyed by the two cities was, now that Megalopolis had successfully integrated 
itself in the Achaian koinon and felt Achaian as well as Arkadian, a thing of the past. 
Messenian opposition to the Achaian koinon can only have made this worse. In the last 
part of this chapter I will discuss the past interactions between Megalopolis and Messene 
to show that despite being founded at the same time and for a similar reason, both cities 
seemingly progressed in two different directions. Through this analysis, I want to further 
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highlight what it meant to be Megalopolitan and how the polis attempted to express a 
novel approach to their ethnic and civic identity.  
 Unlike Megalopolis which the Arkadians founded as a new city, Messene already 
had an established place in the Greek world before the polis that became to be known 
as Messene was founded in 369 BC. As Nino Luraghi points out, it is important to note 
that at the time of the foundation of this city there was a difference between the region 
Messene and the polis Messene which was originally called Ithome after the mountain 
that was in close proximity to the city.
 199
 By Pausanias’ time, however, the city had taken 
the name Messene and the wider region around it was now called Messenia, indicating 
that the polis had established itself as the centre of the region and bastion of local 
Messenian identity.  
Just as with the foundation of Megalopolis, the reason for the creation of 
Messene (or Ithome) lies in the changing political reality of the Peloponnese after the 
Spartan defeat at Leuktra.
200
 Up until that point the people living in the region had 
primarily been united as Helots and periokoi under Spartan control but after the 
Theban defeat of Sparta, they believed the time was right to curb Spartan power even 
further by uniting in a political state (Paus. 4. 26. 6; 4. 28. 1).
201
 Whereas, as discussed 
above, there is no real case to indicate that Epaminondas was involved in the synoecism 
of Megalopolis, there is no denying that the Theban general was the one responsible for 
the foundation of the city of Messene.
202
 He is credited with this achievement by several 
authors: Plutarch (Ages. 34. 1), Diodorus (15. 66. 1), Nepos (Ep. 8. 4) and of course, 
Pausanias who states that both the Messenians and the Thebans considered him to be 
the founder of the polis (Paus. 4. 31. 10; 9. 15. 6).  
However, the close relationship between Messene and the Arkadians in the 
decades before the (re)foundation of the polis, could suggest Arkadian involvement in 
the foundation as well.
203
 Considering the close geographical proximity of the two regions 
and their shared antagonism towards Sparta, this seems very plausible idea. For example, 
in the first few years after the foundation, the Arkadians were responsible for both the 
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expansion and protection of the Messenian territory, while the Messenians helped the 
Arkadians against Spartan invasions (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 25-29; Diod. 15. 77. 4). Elsewhere, 
in a Polybian passage connected to the Messenian loss of their lands in the Second 
Messenian War (685-668 BC) the Arkadians are seen acting as their protectors and 
friends (Pol. 4. 32. 4), so much so that Arkadia seemed like their second fatherland (Pol. 
4. 33. 4).  
So, the polis had a history of Arkadian cooperation, yet there is also evidence of 
a close relationship between Messene and Megalopolis which was not surprising 
considering the similarities in the history and identity of both poleis. After all, they were 
created as a result of the same changing political reality, for the same reason, by more 
or less the same parties roughly at the same time. Undoubtedly, the geographical 
proximity of these cities to Sparta had something to do with the matter as well, as both 
of them were regularly confronted by Spartan invasions during the following centuries, 
like the invasion by the Spartan king Kleomenes in 223 BC which left Megalopolis 
destroyed and had its inhabitants fleeing to Messene for help.
204
 The Messenians also 
acted as faithful allies of Megalopolis during the city’s war with Sparta in 352 (Diod. 16. 
39. 2), while Megalopolis came to Messenian aid when the polis was attacked by Nabis 
(Plut. Phil. 12. 4-5). Moreover, the emergence of Philip of Macedon was greeted by both 
poleis with open arms, establishing a history of close cooperation between the 
Macedonian kings and the two cities.
205
 Both Megalopolis and Messene were 
Macedonian allies in several of the big conflicts such as the battle of Chaironea and the 
Chremonidean War, for which they were highly rewarded as they gained control of areas 
previously belonging to Sparta.
206
  
Despite the many similarities between Megalopolis and Messene, I believe it is 
the Messenian policy of advocating neutrality that was responsible for the Megalopolitan 
animosity that is visible in the boundary dispute. While Messene abstained from actively 
taking part in conflicts unless they were forced to take action and refused to join the 
Achaian federation, Megalopolis had chosen to become a member of the Achaian 
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koinon since it had seen the benefits of being part of a federal state. Therefore, it is 
natural that Megalopolis did not agree with the Messenian insubordination against the 
federal government and this may have been another motivation behind the boundary 
dispute. Moreover, while political connection to Macedon was another element that 
Megalopolis and Messene had in common, it seems as though the Megalopolitans would 
continue to maintain this relationship throughout the next decades to the point it became 
part of the Megalopolitan polity, eventually using it to secure an alliance between the 
Achaians and Antigonos Doson during the Kleomenean War, while Messene slowly 
moved towards a new policy: one of splendid isolation.
207
 
A smaller difference between the two cities can be seen in the way they chose to 
use religion to shape their local identiyt. As we have seen Megalopolis chose to create a 
common identity with the help of a deliberately designed pantheon. The function of this 
pantheon was twofold: unite the communities now under the control of the territory and  
highlight that the gods of the region were also connected to the new city, a tactic also 
employed by federations from time to time.
208
 In the beginning of its history, Messene 
applied the same technique through the duplication of the cults of Athena Kyparissia 
and Artemis Limnatis and the newly established temple for the goddess Messene in the 
polis which through a series of paintings of mythical Pan-Messenian heroes linked the 
new polis to the wider region.
209
 However, the creation of the Asklepeion at Messene 
later on in the Hellenistic period ensured that the polis became the new religious centre 
of the region. At the same time rural religious sites in Messenia such as the sanctuary of 
Apollo Korythos in the Messenian Gulf as well as the traditional tomb cult worship 
underwent some changes.
210
 On the one hand, archaeological surveys of the region have 
found an increase in the number of sites with tomb cult worship in rural Messenia.
211
 On 
the other hand, more complex religious structures are also appearing throughout the 
region, although these seem to mostly be connected to the civic centres of the Hellenistic 
and Roman poleis. Apparently, in Messenia religion and ritual action still continued on 
a smaller scale at the rural level, it seems to have also played an important part in the 
establishment of the Messenian identity within the poleis of the region. The continued 
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connection that extisted between the religion in Megalopolis and its countryside could 
also be found in Messenia although in a slightly different manner. In Messenia, elaborate 
religious structures in the countryside indicated that the different communities wanted 
to mark the area as their own.  
This difference in the approach of both Megalopolis and Messene to their 
ethnicity and identity best illustrates the change that was slowly taking place in Greek 
civic life. Because Messene was essentially the rebirth of an older city that had a long 
line of myths and traditions to fall back on, the city chose to use those myths and 
traditions in its earlier history to rediscover its own identity just as the Greek poleis had 
done throughout the Archaic and Classical period. Megalopolis could not employ this 
tactic since the Arkadians had created a city that had no connections to a mythical past 
or the region. Therefore, the polis found an entirely new approach in which the civic 
and political identity was based on the unification of several different elements into one. 
In essence, while Messene was looking back at the Archaic and Classical period by 
recalling those elements that had been part of the older city, Megalopolis was looking 
forward to a more cosmopolitan, federal and wider identity which became a key feature 
of the later Hellenistic period with the emergence of the koina in Greece and Asia 
Minor. This foreshadowing of the Hellenistic period is also very apparent in the 
archaeology of the polis, as a few of the buildings such as the Thersilion, the Philippeion 
and the temple of Zeus Soter have some architectural elements that became typical in 
buildings of the Hellenistic period despite the fact that they are dated to the period just 
after the city’s foundation.
212
 It is important to understand the development of 
Megalopolis and the open and federal nature of Megalopolitan identity and the new step 
it formed in Greek civic life since it helps us understand how the polis develops in the 
late Classical and early Hellenistic world.  
 
***** 
Megalopolis was very much an Arkadian polis which was founded in 368 BC by the 
Arkadian koinon to protect the southern part of the region against Spartan invasions. As 
a result of its creation by a federal state, the polis knew from the very beginning what 
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being part of a federation meant and what benefits this could bring. This would be the 
reason why the polis would make the decision to join the Achaian koinon in 235 BC 
and how it managed to unite the different communities of that had become part of the 
new city. Moreover, the Arkadian koinon provided Megalopolis with another one of its 
typically Megalopolitan characteristics: hatred of Sparta. Of course, this was a sentiment 
shared by plenty other poleis in the region, yet due to the close proximity of the polis to 
Lakedaimon, it seems as though Megalopolis seems to have gone the extra mile, refusing 
to cooperate with Sparta even when other Arkadians did do so on multiple occasions. 
While Megalopolis was clearly an Arkadian city, the fact that it had not existed during 
the Archaic and early Classical periods, meant that the city was eager to show other states 
that it was a state with its own identity and it could function without the other Arkadians. 
This need for independence from the other Arkadians can be seen from the polis’ 
interactions following its establishment and it is clearest from the close relationship it 
formed with the Macedonian kings. All of these elements formed the core of the 
Megalopolitan identity. Even though there are several poleis with similar histories or 
attitudes, it is the combination of these things and the city’s connection to federalism in 
particular that made Megalopolis unique. Yet it is important to note that the formation 
of this identity was a long process which started with the foundation of the polis in 368 
BC and continued to develop even under the city’s membership of the Achaian koinon 
as it added a distinct Achaian element to its identity and made Megalopolis both an 




Chapter 2: Megalopolis and Achaia 
The foundation of Megalopolis shortly after the Spartan defeat at Leuktra in 371 BC by 
members of the newly formed Arkadian koinon marked a permanent change in the 
affairs of the Peloponnese for the following two centuries. Since it was conceived as a 
defence point against Sparta, a local Megalopolitan identity soon formed with a distinct 
anti-Spartan element.
213
 Of course, this was not unusual for the region as it was an 
important part of the Arkadian foreign policy.
214
 However, the creation of Megalopolis 
by the Arkadian koinon also instilled into the polis a deep understanding of federal 
institutions and ideals – in addition to the benefits that the membership of such a 
federation entailed. The Megalopolitans understood that there is a sense of idealism 
behind the creation of a federal state that does not correspond with the actual reality of 
political life within such as state as there are always interests, desires and tensions 
between the local and federal levels that have to be taken into account.  
No doubt, this is what in part influenced the polis’ decision to become part of 
the Achaian koinon in 235 BC. An event that accomplished several changes for the 
Achaians, since the Megalopolitan distaste for Sparta and their constant squabbles would 
shape the federal politics in such a manner that no other polis had done before it. 
Ultimately thiss resulted in the koinon’s downfall after the Achaian War of 146 BC. 
Megalopolis’ Achaian membership came as a result of Lydiades’ decision to renounce 
his dictatorship, when he realised the extent of the Achaian expansion and the potential 
danger for his city. He is admirably praised in the sources for his actions as they were 
considered to be selfless, but there had to be some sort of personal gain for Lydiades to 
even have been willing to give up his sole rule over the city. This also raises the question 
whether the citizens of Megalopolis approved of this new political development, which 
is not mentioned in the sources. Moreover, if they did agree, would they have had the 
same motives as Lydiades? Because scholarship on Megalopolis and Achaia has devoted 
surprisingly little attention to this episode, the first section of this chapter will examine 
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Lydiades’ motivation and that of the citizens in addition to discussing the tyrant’s overtly 
positive image in the literary sources. 
While it was a profitable decision for both the polis and its former tyrant 
Lydiades due to Megalopolis’ newfound prominence within the confederacy, the 
process did not come without difficulties. Unlike other federal states such as the Boiotian 
or Arkadian koina which united cities from the same ethnic group, the Achaians from 
the third century onwards had a unique federation in which members were connected 
by a complex structure of different identities as poleis from separate ethnic groups 
interacted with one other under the unifying influence of the federal government.
215
 
While Polybius’ comments on the internal unity and equality of the federation seem 
very intriguing (Pol. 2. 37-40), the reality of the matter was rather different. 
Consequently, an individual city such as Megalopolis with its own urban and ethnic 
identity had to find a way to express this identity, whilst dealing with this overarching 
federal government. Because of this, Megalopolis’ membership of the koinon had a 
profound influence on Achaians and the polis and its citizens. Interestingly, both Sikyon 
and Megalopolis’ memberships brought about significant changes in Achaian politics. 
When Sikyon joined the koinon shortly after 251 BC as the first non-Achaian member, 
it was the start of a big period of Achaian expansion which was directed against 
Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese.216 As will be discussed throughout this thesis, 
something similar happened when Megalopolis joined and brought with it an intense 
focus on Sparta.217  
As argued in chapter one, the distinct local identity Megalopolis possessed was 
the result of a long process. By becoming a member of the Achaian koinon, another 
element – i.e. an Achaian one – was added to the already layered identity of the Arkadian 
polis. By Polybius’ time an inhabitant of Megalopolis considered himself to be both 
Arkadian and Achaian. To demonstrate this, I will use Polybius as the ultimate example 
in the last section of the chapter, so as to find out what a Megalopolitan considered to 
be important elements of his own identity by analysing his views on his own city, his 
native region and the federal state. However, as Polybius was notoriously biased when it 
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came to his personal experiences, I will compare his views on the matter to other source 
material from Megalopolis through which the city as a whole expressed its identity.  
1. Megalopolis joins Achaia 
In 235 BC, Megalopolis became a member of the Achaian koinon. According to our 
sources, this decision was made by the tyrant Lydiades who had foreseen the threat that 
the Achaian koinon could pose to Megalopolitan independence. The Macedonian 
influence of Antigonos Gonatas in the Peloponnese was being threatened by the 
Achaians shortly after Aratos brought an end to tyranny in Sikyon in 251 BC and Sikyon 
then joined the Achaian koinon (Plut. Ar. 2-9).
218
 At the same time, an additional 
problem emerged through the rebellion of Antigonos’ viceroy Alexander. This resulted 
in the losses of his holdings at Corinth, Chalkis and Piraios. The king still had a garrison 
in Attika and his allies in the rest of the Peloponnese and he managed to get back control 
over Acrocorinth after Alexander’s death, to ensure the rebellion did not have any long-
lasting effects.
219
 However, the Achaian threat became greater after Aratos managed to 
gain control of the Acrocorinth via a nightly expedition during his second strategia in 
243 BC (Pol. 43. 4-6). This resulted in the polis of Corinth becoming a member of the 
Achaian koinon soon after.
220
 An alliance between the Achaians and Agiv IV of Sparta 
at first seemed to cause even more problems for Antigonos in the Peloponnese. Yet by 
241 BC this alliance had fallen apart and the new king Demetrios II, who had succeeded 
his father after his death in 239 BC, still had a series of loyal allies in the Peloponnese. 
However, a year into in his short reign – he was only king for ten years before his death 
in 229 BC – Demetrios had to wage a war against a coalition of the Achaian and Aitolian 
koina, whose interests had now aligned against Macedon.
221
 While successful at first, the 
war took its toll on the Macedonian position of power in the Peloponnese and saw more 
Macedonian allies join the Achaians, most notably Lydiades and Aristomachos of 
Argos.
222
 By the time of Demetrios’ death, Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese 
had all but disappeared. 
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It was clear that under Aratos’ leadership the Achaian koinon was becoming a 
strong player in the Peloponnese, at the cost of the Macedonian kings. While Lydiades’ 
could have foreseen this, his reasons may also have been a little more personal. For, 
soon after the city was part of the federation, the tyrant enjoyed a very promising federal 
career. In fact, he seems to have been the only man who could rival the power and 
influence of Aratos (Plut. Ar. 30. 2). The inhabitants of the polis no doubt approved of 
this decision as they were aware of the benefits that membership of the Achaian koinon 
could bring. For example, they now had the support of an entire network of poleis, i.e. 
the members of the koinon, which were much closer geographically than Macedon was 
and could rapidly intervene in case of a Spartan attack. Because the Arkadian koinon 
seemed to have a similar structure to the Achaian koinon, it could easily have carved out 
an important position for itself within this new federation. Furthermore, it proved to be 
a final step in the development of the Megalopolitan identity. The city, and the Achaian 
political leaders from Megalopolis in particular, soon began to exhibit an obvious loyalty 
to their new federal state. As Polybius’ views on the matter will show, a Megalopolitan 
was subsequently not only Arkadian but also Achaian. Because of the importance of this 
event in the formation of the Megalopolitan identity, this first section of chapter two will 
examine the motives of the tyrant and the city of Megalopolis to become a member of 
the koinon. Additionally, the figure of Lydiades will be looked at in more detail so as to 
understand why a polis such as Megalopolis, which – as I have argued – has a strong 
connection to democracy and democratic values due to its connection to the Arkadian 
koinon, would allow a tyrant to rule their city. Possibly, this could be connected to his 
father’s prominence within the polis. 
1.1. Lydiades of Megalopolis  
Lydiades, who was part of the Megalopolitan elite, came to power in the city in 251 BC 
after he helped defeat the Spartans at the battle of Mantinea.
223
 Both he and other 
members of his family are well attested in the epigraphical material of Megalopolis: 
Lydiades and his father Eudamos were the subject of a hero cult (SEG 52 447) and his 
son Aristopamon had an equestrian statue dedicated to him (SEG 48 524). In 235 BC, 
Lydiades gave up his power over the polis and the Arkadian city became Achaian. The 
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sources tell us little about possible motives for this course of action. Lydiades is 
mentioned by Polybius, Plutarch and Pausanias, all of whom depict him in a very 
positive manner. It is more than likely however that both Plutarch and Pausanias had 
based their accounts on that of Polybius, who had every reason to paint an extremely 
favourable picture of the man that joined Megalopolis with the Achaian koinon. This is 
obvious from the fact that the idealised account of the Achaian koinon was the context 
in which the following passage was placed (Pol. 2. 44. 5): 
‘Λυδιάδας μὲν οὖν ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης ἔτι ζῶντος Δημητρίου, κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ 
προαίρεσιν, πάνυ πραγματικῶς καὶ φρονίμως προϊδόμενος τὸ μέλλον 
ἀπετέθειτο τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ μετεσχήκει τῆς ἐθνικῆς συμπολιτείας’  
(‘while Demetrios was still alive, Lydiades of Megalopolis anticipated the future, 
laid down his tyranny willingly with great pragmatism and good sense, and 
adhered to the ethnic confederation’). 
Polybius praises Lydiades’ ability to foresee the future and act accordingly, something 
that both Aratos and Philopoimen also did at critical moments (Pol. 2. 47. 4; 2. 67. 4). 
According to Plutarch, Aratos shows this ability when he had Sikyon join the koinon to 
solve some internal troubles within the polis (Plut. Ar. 9. 5-6.). These incidents had 
started after Aratos had liberated his native city from the tyranny of Nikokles and the 
people exiled during his reign returned to the city. Plutarch clearly states that Aratos’ 
incentive for Sikyon to join the federation was connected to his desire to solve these 
internal troubles as well as safeguard his city against any outside attack.
224
 Additionally, 
Polybius tells us that the real reason why Sikyon joined the League was in fact Aratos’ 
determination to free te Peloponnese of of tyrants (Pol. 2. 43. 3.). Moreover, as we will 
see later on in this chapter, Aratos’ actions and motives, just like Lydiades’, were to 
benefit himself as well as his native city as both enjoyed a prominent role within Achaian 
politics after 251 BC. 
Thu,s as a Megalopolitan himself, Polybius considered Lydiades to be another 
one of these great statesmen and his decision to give up his tyranny in Megalopolis a key 
point in Achaian history. Lydiades’ ability to foresee that joining the Achaians was the 
best possible course of action for Megalopolis – and himself – in light of the changing 
power dynamics in the Peloponnese, was the reason why Polybius admired him and it 
also explains why he depicts the man in a positive light. Of course, this is to be expected 
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due to Polybius’ bias and while reality was most likely rather different, the true nature of 
Lydiades’ character will remain unknown as both Plutarch and Pausanias echo Polybius’ 
accolades. According to Plutarch, he was a man of noble character whose passion was 
responsible for his association with certain tyrannical ideals (Plut. Ar. 30. 1) and  
‘ὁ δὲ οὐκ ὢν ἀγεννὴς οὐδὲ ἀφιλότιμος τὴν φύσιν, οὐδὲ ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν 
μονάρχων ἀκρασίᾳ καὶ πλεονεξίᾳ πρὸς ταύτην ῥυεὶς τὴν ἀδικίαν’  
(‘neither of common birth nor naturally lacking in ambition, nor, like most sole 
rulers, driven by ill temperature and arrogance into this iniquity’).  
Pausanias (Paus. 8. 27. 12), on the other hand, says he was  
‘οἴκου μὲν οὐκ ἀφανοῦς, φύσιν δὲ φιλότιμος ὢν καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα, ὡς ἐπέδειξεν 
ὕστερον, καὶ φιλόπολις. ἔσχε μὲν γὰρ ἔτι νέος ὢν τὴν ἀρχήν: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἤρχετο 
φρονεῖν, κατέπαυεν ἑαυτὸν ἑκὼν τυραννίδος, καίπερ ἐς τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἤδη οἱ τῆς 
ἀρχῆς καθωρμισμένης’ 
(‘a man of distinguished family, by nature ambitious and, as he proved later, 
patriotic. For he was still young when he came to power, but on reaching years 
of discretion he voluntarily resignated the tyranny, although by this time his 
power was already securely established’).
 
 
Because of the overtly positive account of Lydiades in the literary sources, finding a 
motive behind the decision to join the Achaian federation may prove problematic.
225
 
However, it must have become apparent by 235 BC that Achaia under the leadership 
of Aratos, at least in the Peloponnese, was a force to be reckoned with. Both Lydiades 
and his predecessor Aristodamos were men who like other tyrants in the Peloponnese 
had come to power as tyrants in their city through the support of Macedon.
226
 Lydiades 
may therefore have realised that renouncing his claim on the city would be the best 
possible course of action.
 227 
 Additionally Plutarch also tells us that (Plut. Ar. 30. 1):  
‘ὡς δ᾽ οὖν τὸν Ἀρίστιππον ἀνεῖλεν, εὐθὺς ἐπεβούλευσε Λυδιάδῃ τῷ 
Μεγαλοπολίτῃ τυραννοῦντι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδος’  
(‘after he (Aratos) had defeated Aristippos (i.e. the tyrant of Argos), he started to 
plot immediately against Lydiades, who was a tyrant in his hometown of 
Megalopolis.).  
This statement suggests that the idea of an Achaian attack on Megalopolis was a genuine 
possibility and will have played a significant role in the motivations of Lydiades as well 
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as the polis to join the federation.
228
 As his actions in Sikyon in 251 BC (Plut. Ar. 4-9) 
and Argos in 229 BC illustrate (Plut. Ar. 4-9; 27-29), Aratos did not hesitate to abolish 
tyrannies in the Peloponnese that were established through Macedonian support. This 
endeavour to eradicate Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese was one of the goals 
of this early expansionist policy employed by the Achaians.
229
 Aratos’ attack on the 
Arkadian polis Kynaitha in 236 BC and his alliance with Sparta in 243 BC may have 
indicated, as Walbank suggests, that he was now ready to turn his attention to Arkadia 
which may have caused Lydiades to panic.
230
 Despite the obvious problems connected 
to the idealised description of Lydiades, it still gives us one conceivable explanation for 
his actions: the exponential growth of the Achaian koinon from the second half of the 
second century BC under Aratos’ management posed a potential danger for anyone 
opposing the Achaians which led Lydiades to make his decision.  
Nonetheless, the apparent selflessness of the ex-tyrant’s actions should be 
doubted. Judging from the rest of Plutarch’s account it appears Lydiades was also 
motivated by a sense of self preservation. After all, he did have a promising career within 
federal politics after Megalopolis became part of the Achaian koinon (Plut. Ar. 30-31). 
In fact, Lydiades was elected as federal strategos three times between 235 and his death 
in 227 BC, i.e. in 234/3, 232/1 and 230/29 BC, something that is even more impressive 
considering the fact that the strategia was an office that could not be held two years in 
succession. While the rivalry between Lydiades and Aratos is not mentioned in Polybius’ 
narrative, Pausanias, echoing Plutarch, does mention that Lydiades became so famous 
among the Achaians that he rivalled Aratos’ fame (Paus. 8. 27. 12). This rivalry was not 
necessarily unexpected as both men had joined the koinon in similar situations and due 
to their positions of power in their respective cities, it is not surprising that both men 
enjoyed succesfull federal careers as well.   
While the koinon was a democracy, former tyrants could easily pursue a political 
career for themselves, since Lydiades is not the only one to become an Achaian 
strategos. For example, a year after Argos joined the Achaian koinon, its former tyrant 
Aristomachos was chosen as strategos.
231
 Moreover, Aratos himself, although he was not 
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a tyrant, enjoyed a promising federal career after Sikyon joined the koinon.
232
 By letting 
these men know that there was still ample opportunity to retain importance for 
themselves and their poleis even within a larger federal framework, the citizens of other 
poleis may have been inclined to join the federation as well. However, Lydiades as a 
Megalopolitan had already realised this before joining the federation and this may 
explain why ‘ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν Ἀχαιοῖς ἐγένετο οὕτω δόκιμος ὡς Ἀράτῳ παρισωθῆναι τὰ 
ἐς δόξαν’ (Paus. 8. 27. 12: ‘among all of the Achaians his own fame equalled that of 
Aratos’; Plut. Ar. 30. 2).
233
   
An additional explanation might be offered by the inscriptions of what has been 
dubbed the family exedra of Eudamos and Lydiades by Eftychia Stavrianopoulou. The 
Greek text which covered three big blocks made of a dark chalkstone that carried several 
lifesize statues, inscribes two decrees for Eudamos and his son Lydiades as well as one 
(or possibly two) honorary inscriptions for both men. The inscriptions themselves are 
most likely dated to the start of the second century BC based on the forms of some of 
the Greek letters as well as the fact that the honours were dedicated after Lydiades’ death 
in 227 BC.
234
 However, this does not indicate that the decrees themselves were passed 
decades after the death of both men. Hans Lauter has posed the theory that the original 
decrees for Eudamos and Lydiades could have been passed soon after their deaths, but 
the destruction of the public buildings on the Megalopolitan agora during the Spartan 
attack under Kleomenes in 222 BC meant that a lot of these had to be rebuilt and 
potentially some of the inscriptions on them had to be inscribed again after 222 BC.
235
 
If this rebuilding and re-inscribing indeed happened at the start of the second century 
BC, then it might have been something that Polybius himself had been aware of and 
could therefore have indirectly influenced his positive portrayal of Lydiades.  
While the decree concerning Lydiades and possible honours for the man is in a 
very fragmentary state (SEG 52 447 l. 34-67), his father Eudamos was the recipient of a 
rather high number of honours bestowed upon him by the city, considerin he received 
a hero cult (l. 1-33). Additionally, he got a bronze statue (l. 8-10), his own altar and 
accompanying sacrifices (l. 14), which were to be overseen by the hierothytes of the city 
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as they were responsible for the sacrifices (l. 17). Finally, his descendants were to be 
responsible for the supervision of the offering and were the only ones who had the 
privilege of consuming the honour portion or geras.  
Stavrianopoulou proposes an intriguing, but a somewhat far-fetched theory 
about Eudamos being one of the ones responsible for the murder of the other 
Megalopolitan tyrant Aristodamos in 251 BC. She thinks he could easily be the same as 
the Ekdemos or Ekdelos described in the literary sources (Plut. Ar. 10. 2; Paus. 7. 27. 
12).
236
 She then goes on to argue that Eudamos’ actions were part of the wider Greek 
fight for freedom against Macedon as exemplified by the Chremonidean War and the 
liberation of Sikyon in 251 BC. According to Stavrianopoulou this is why Eudamos 
received such elaborate honours from the city and why Lydiades was able to gain power 
of Megalopolis as a tyrant so easily, despite the Arkadian predilection for democracy, 
since all he had to do was take advantage of his father’s fame.
237
 Moreover, Eudamos’ 
apparent connection to Aratos might also explain why Lydiadas chose to join the 
Achaians and not the Aitolians.  
While the premise is an interesting one, there are several problems with 
Stavrianopoulou’s theory. For one, there is no strong evidence supporting her claim that 
Eudamos and Ekdemos/Ekdelos are the same person. And if his father really had anti-
Macedonian sympathies, it is remarkable that Lydiades himself remained loyal to 
Macedon and became the tyrant of the city. Finally, if there had really been any type of 
connections between Aratos and Lydiades’ father, would they have been such fierce 
rivals as described by Plutarch? However, there are some elements that point in favour 
of her argument as well. For one the fact that Megalopolis bestowed such elaborate 
honours on Eudamos would indicate that his actions were indeed very beneficial for the 
city and its inhabitants. This is further indicated by the fact that he should serve as an 
example for all future Megalopolitans so that they should also be ‘τ]ὸς καλὸς [καὶ 
ἀγαθὸς ἄ]ν[δρ]ας καὶ [εὔνος] καὶ εὐεργέτας καὶ δικαίως’ (l. 25: ‘good and noble men 
and full of goodwill and benefactors and righteous’), just as many other Hellenistic 
benefactors of the time (l. 28-33). Moreover, Lydiades is referred to in the inscription 
as the son of Eudamos, indicating the individual honoured in the first place was in fact 
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Eudamos and not his son (l. 36). So even though it seems unlikely that Eudamos was 
indeed one of Aristodamos’ murderers, the fact remains that he was an important figure 
in Megalopolis who continued to shape the Megalopolitan policy. Therefore, Lydiades 
could very well have taken advantage of his father’s fame to gain power. In conclusion, 
it is an interesting theory to consider when exploring Lydiades’ motives for giving up his 
tyranny. 
Even though Lydiades’ had his own personal motives for making Megalopolis a 
part of the koinon as is exemplified by his promising federal political career, first and 
foremost he remained loyal to Megalopolis. He tried to convince the Achaians of the 
necesity for an expedition against Sparta, but was opposed by Aratos (Plut. Ar. 30. 3). 
Also, when the city came under Spartan attack in 226 BC during the Achaian War with 
Kleomenes, Lydiades went on to defend Megalopolis against the Spartans in the battle 
at Mount Lykaion, even when Aratos, who was acting as strategos, had not consented to 
a confrontation with the enemy (Plut. Kleo. 6). As a Megalopolitan, the former tyrant 
was much more aware of the danger that Sparta could pose the federal state and 
Megalopolis in particular, something that Aratos did not as a northern Peloponnesion 
did not.
238
 Lydiades died in the struggle, wanting to defend Megalopolis against Sparta at 
any cost, clearly proving he was a Megalopolitan in addition to, if not before, being an 
Achaian. This was later echoed in Philopoimen’s actions at the battle of Sellasia in which 
he led a group of Megalopolitans in a tactic manoeuvre against Achaian wishes (Plut. 
Phil. 6. 7) and Polybius’ comments on the polis discussed in the second section of this 
chapter.  
In conclusion, Lydiades was motivated by personal gain, as is illustrated by his 
subsequent federal career, but his motives behind the decision to give up his tyranny of 
Megalopolis were also connected to the well-being of the polis and its citizens who could 
have exercised pressure from below for a non-tyrannical, democratic government.  
1.2. Megalopolis and its Achaian membership 
As mentioned previously, one of the markers of Megalopolitan identity which came 
about as a result of the polis’ foundation by the Arkadian koinon was, in addition to 
their antagonism towards Sparta, an ingrained adherence to and understanding of 
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federalism, which was connected to the ideals of democracy. This was hardly surprising 
as both elements were important tenets of the foreign policy of the Arkadian koinon 
during its short lifespan.
239
 Even though the sources do not tell us much about the 
constitution of Megalopolis, it is plausible to assume that Megalopolis was opposed to 
tyranny until Aristodamos the Good with the help of Antigonos Gonatas assumed power 
as a tyrant in the city in the 270s BC (Paus. 8. 27. 11). At first sight, Aristodamos’ tyranny 
might be problematic, but it seems as though this may have been acceptable in certain 
circumstances as was the case for Aristodamos’ tyranny as his Macedonian support 
managed to protect the city from Spartan attacks. Furthermore, Lydiades’ decision of 
235 was also met by the approval of the citizens as it also had the same result, i.e. 
protection against Sparta, when Macedonian protection seemed to have decreased.  
 This becomes even more apparent when looking at Polybius’ comments on 
tyrants. In the constitutional evolution of book six, the historian considers tyranny to be 
the corrupt form of kingship (Pol. 6. 7) which is exactly what happened to the rule of 
Philip of Macedon as he turned from a promising young man to the insane tyrant we 
see in the later books of the Histories.
240
 Tyrants were men who were prone to 
overindulgence with regards to food, luxury and amorous endeavours (Pol. 6. 7. 7). 
Elsewhere he says that  
‘τοὔνομα περιέχει τὴν ἀσεβεστάτην ἔμφασιν καὶ πάσας περιείληφε τὰς ἐν 
ἀνθρώποις ἀδικίας καὶ παρανομίας´  
(Pol. 2. 59. 6: ‘the word (tyrant) encompasses the height of profanity and 
embraces all unlawfulness and injustice in men’)  
and argues that it is the role of a tyrant to rule his subjects against their will through fear 
and hatred (Pol. 5. 10. 6). Undoubtedly, Polybius greatly disapproved of those 
individuals that had taken control of a free city against the will of the inhabitants. He 
considered them to be evil and savage men who were prone to the most depraved 
actions. Since good kings could also become tyrants as exemplified by Philip, it is 
reasonable to argue for a reverse evolution as well, meaning that a former tyrant could 
also turn into a good leader. Even though he does not mention this explicitly, I believe 
that this is what Polybius thought about Lydiades: by giving up his tyranny and letting 
Megalopolis join the Achaians, he had become a good politician.  
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Therefore, even though Aristodamos and Lydiades were tyrants that had taken 
control of the city, the fact that they had done so with Macedonian support made it more 
acceptable for the Megalopolitan citizens as result of the pro-Macedonian tradition in 
the polis. Considering the connections that had already been established by Philip II 
between himself and several cities in the region like Megalopolis, it is hardly surprising 
to find a tyrant such as Aristodamos at Megalopolis. In fact, he was most likely part of a 
wider network of tyrants that had been installed by Antigonos Gonatas to increase his 
influence within the Peloponnese.
241
 However, not all of these cities were pleased with 
this Macedonian influence over the area and so a contingent of Greek poleis led the 
charges against Antigonos Gonatas in the Chremonidean War (267-261 BC).
242
 Since 
western Arkadia was missing from the famous inscription that contained a list of the 
members of this coalition (IG II² 686 and 687), it seems reasonable to assume the region 
and Megalopolis were not involved in the conflict and could have even supported 
Macedon. 
 
Moreover, in the case of Megalopolis and its interactions with Macedon, 
there seems to have been a definite connection to Sparta and its operations in the 
Peloponnese.
243
 For example, a battle between the Megalopolitans and the Spartans took 
place at the time of Aristodemos’ control over the polis which resulted in a hard-won 
victory for Megalopolis (Paus. 8. 27. 11). But the fact that this battle could take place, 
despite the Macedonian support for the city, clearly shows that Sparta still constituted a 
big threat to Megalopolis. It even gives the impression that after the Macedonian kings 
had their pawn in place within these poleis, the cities and their tryants were left to their 
own devices.
244
 Nonetheless, before it joined the Achaian koinon, there seemed to be a 
considerable pro-Macedonian tradition within the city that continued to be part of the 
Megalopolitan identity even after the polis became a member of the Achaian koinon. It 
was even partly responsible for the creation of an alliance between the koinon and 
Macedon.  
This pro-Macedonian tradition may have allowed tyrants such as Aristodamos 
and Lydiades to come to power in the poleis and use it to protect the cities against Sparta. 
The citizens of Megalopolis also knew that the Macedonian influence in the 
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Peloponnese was threatened by the Achaians. Thus, being a member of a koinon 
brought some advantages to the citizens which independent poleis would not have had. 
One of these benefits was the access to a wider network of cities, something that was very 
useful when dealing with the new political reality of the Hellenistic period in which the 
Greeks had to deal with bigger powers like the Hellenistic kingdoms and Rome.
245
 
However, the prime incentive for the inhabitants of Megalopolis to join was the 
realisation that with the loss of influence of the Macedonian kings in the Peloponnese, 
they would have to look elsewhere for support against the occasional attacks from Sparta. 
As discussed above, fear as well as defiance of Sparta had always been a crucial 
characteristic of Megalopolitan history and identity and judging by the many Spartan 
invasions of Megalopolis during the fourth and third centuries BC, it was evident that 
that the citizens would benefit from the membership of a federal state.
246
 Additionally, 
this membership could give the polis the opportunity to expand its strategy of 
antagonism against its neighbour through the foreign policy of the Achaian koinon, 
which from the moment Megalopolis became Achaian, increasingly concerned itself 
with Sparta.
247
 Likewise, the fact that Megalopolis needed another state to help defend 
itself against Spartan attacks. This because of its geographical proximity to Sparta and 
because the city ‘δυσφύλακτον οὖσαν διὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν’ (Pol. 2. 55. 2: 
‘was very difficult to defend because of its size and isolation’).  
It seems as though the combination of all of these different elements led to the 
Megalopolitan acceptance of Lydiades’ actions as the citizens knew perfectly well that 
becoming part of a federal state again would allow them to cooperate more easily with 
the other neighbouring poleis and regions against Sparta whenever the opportunity or 
necessity arose.
248
 Furthermore, while Lydiades’ motives were not as noble as Polybius 
would like us to believe, the former tyrant remained loyal to Megalopolis despite his 
ensuing federal political career. Therefore, even though his tyranny of the city may have 
been tolerated only because of his connections to Macedon, he had to be considered, 
just like Polybius, as a prime example of how a Megalopolitan looked at his native polis 
and the federal state. This is exemplified by Lydiades’ decision to fight against Sparta in 
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the battle at Mt Lykaion when he led a cohort of Megalopolitans agains Kleomenes 
without the approval of the koinon. However, some things had changed between 
Lydiades’ time and that of Polybius. While Polybius considered the polis to be both 
Arkadian as well as Achaian, it appears Lydiades did not see it that way and chose the 
polis over the federation. This is in clear contrast with Philopoimen’s actions during the 
war with Nabis in which he left the polis to its own devices after being ousted during one 
of his bids for strategos. Clearly, the decision of 235 BC marked a change in the 
formation of the Megalopolitan identity by adding an Achaian component. 
2. Megalopolis: Arkadian or Achaian? 
Before the polis joined the Achaian koinon, Megalopolis was the biggest city in Arkadia. 
The expression of this Arkadian identity happened through the civic and federal coinage 
issued by Megalopolis as well as through the cults and sanctuaries discussed in the 
previous chapter that had a connection to the wider region of Arkadia.
249
 However, when 
we look at the work of Polybius, possibly the most famous Megalopolitan aside from the 
Achaian statesman Philopoimen, he seems to consider himself an Achaian first and an 
Arkadian or even Megalopolitan second. Polybius’ attitude towards Achaia as a 
Megalopolitan is not only interesting because he is our main source for this period, but 
also necessary because of the lack of individuals identifying themselves as both 
Megalopolitan and Achaian in inscriptions, something that we do have for other cities.
250
 
Nonetheless, at first sight there may appear a certain discrepancy between Polybius’ 
account and the material culture, as the coinage from Megalopolis has numerous 
connections to the city’s Arkadian past.  
This seems to leave us with two different answers to the following question: did 
the Megalopolitans consider themselves to be Arkadians or Achaians? The answer is, 
as I will argue, a combination of both. Despite Polybius’ obvious predilection for the 
Achaian koinon in the early books of his Histories which may be explained on account 
of his significance in Achaian politics, the historian had nothing but praise for his 
hometown and region. He considered himself a Megalopolitan, Arkadian and Achaian, 
thereby exemplifying the same kind of complex identity as the whole city did when it 
came to its coins or indeed any other manner through which it expressed its local 
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identity. Therefore, I will use Polybius in this next section as the main example to 
illustrate how the Megalopolitan indentity had evolved throughout its Achaian 
membership. By analysing his narrative and views in the context of his background as a 
Megalopolitan, I will clearly show that Megalopolitan identity as a process had changed 
and ultimately the ‘Achaianness’ of a Megaopolitan became an integral part of their 
identity.  
Megalopolis was more than just Arkadian and Achaian: it had its own well-
defined identity which was strongly influenced by both its traditional native region of 
Arkadia and, most likely by Polybius’ time, its membership of the Achaian koinon.  
2.1. The Achaian statesman from Megalopolis: Polybius on Achaia, 
Megalopolis and Arkadia  
While the Achaian constitution had many merits, the most important ones for Polybius 
were its ‘ἰσηγορία καὶ παρρησία’ (Pol. 2. 38. 6: ‘equality and freedom of speech’). These 
constituted at the basis of the koinon’s demokratia, another virtue that was deemed 
important to them: ‘τό γε μὴν κοινὸν πολίτευμα, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν, ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ 
συνέχειν ἐπειρῶντο’ (Pol. 2. 41. 6: ‘the federation attempted, as I have said, to remain 
a democracy’). In view of Polybius' personal connection to the koinon, it is not at all 
surprising to find an outright positive account of the koinon and its actions in the first 
books of his Histories.
 251 
His respect for the state that he grew up in is therefore not 
unexpected as it influenced Polybius’ views on the events of his time and the parties 
involved in them. This undoubtedly prompted him to convey Achaia and Greece in 
general in the most favourable way vis-a-vis his audience.
252
 Polybius as a proud Achaian 
must have believed it necessary to include an account of Achaia's rise to prominence in 
his narrative on the development of a universal history.
253  
Moreover, this idealised 
account forms the best opportunity for the author to foreshadow that - just as he 
predicted with the Romans - the Achaian koinon will face decline in the end, a notion 
that Polybius will address in the later books of his narrative. 
So, what made Achaia unique from other federal states? Apparently, the 
difference lay in this policy of ἰσηγορία and παρρησία which would result in the ultimate 
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achievement of the koinon. This was the unification of the Peloponnese under one 
federal government with its own laws, weights and coinage,
 
exactly what had made Achaia 
one ‘τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων καὶ γνωριζομένων ἐθνῶν καὶ τόπων … τῆς οἰκουμένης’ (Pol. 
2. 37. 5: ‘of the most important and recognised nations and regions … of the world’).
 
According to Polybius, this unification was taken to such an extreme that the 
Peloponnese was more like a single city by the late 180s BC. Yet unlike a typical polis, 
the inhabitants of the area were not enclosed by one wall (Pol. 2. 37. 11). This passage 
should not be taken at face value, since we know that the actual reality of being a member 
of a federation was much more complex than the author insinuates, particularly during 
the first half of the second century BC when Sparta and Messene stirred troubles for the 
koinon in the Peloponnese.   
Despite this polity only being based on equality and freedom of speech for 
Polybius, Craige Champion has added two other elements to the Achaian polity: a 
concern for the right legal procedure and the trumping of collective over individual 
needs.
254 
Even though these two last aspects were not alluded to by the ancient author, 
Champion makes a valid point in mentioning them here. One particular scene in the 
Histories perfectly illustrates this: Polybius mentions that three members of the 
federation refused to pay their contributions to the federal army during wartime and 
instead opted to hire a private army (Pol. 4. 60). This action was condemned by 
Polybius, as he says that  
‘ἐχρῆν γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἰδίαν χρείαν μὴ παραλιπεῖν, εὐκαιροῦντάς γε δὴ καὶ 
δυναμένους, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν πολιτείαν δίκαια συντηρεῖν, ἄλλως τε δὴ 
καὶ κομιδῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἀδιαπτώτου κατὰ τοὺς κοινοὺς νόμους, τὸ δὲ 
μέγιστον, γεγονότας ἀρχηγοὺς τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν συστήματος’  
(4. 60. 10: ‘For while they were not allowed to consider their own needs, since 
they were strong and rich enough, they had to at least do right by the political 
koinon; especially as recovery of payment was perfectly assured to them by the 
common laws; and most of all seeing that they had been the founding cities of 
the Achaian koinon’)  
Nevertheless, he does not blame them for pursuing their own interests, since the policy 
pursued by the koinon allowed cities to pursue matters in their own self-interest.
255 
According to Polybius, the koinon did not require the absolute commitment to the 
common good as suggested by Champion. Obviously, the continuity of this policy - 
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comprised of ἰσηγορία and παρρησία on the one hand and the upholding of collective 
needs and correct legal procedures on the other hand - is exactly what made the 
Achaians the best example of a Hellenistic federation, at least in Polybius’ eyes.
256
 Since 
this is clearly an idealised Achaia, the following question could be raised: is it possible 
that Polybius is actually talking about the koinon, as it exists in Polybius’ own time? This 
is very likely due to the similarities of this federation (Pol. 2. 37–43) to the one that 
Polybius knew while growing up and that was at the zenith of its political power under 
Philopoimen’s leadership. This argument can be supported by the use of the words ‘ἐν 
τοῖς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς καιροῖς’ (Pol. 2. 37. 6: ‘in my own times’) in connection to this Achaian 
political unification of the highest degree. As we have previously seen, the author here 
means the unification of the Peloponnese under Achaian leadership, something that did 
not happen until much later, in the 180s BC. Furthermore, the decision to rotate the 
primary assembly meetings between all the Achaian cities may be a practical measure to 
ensure the general Achaian policy of equality and freedom of speech, a measure which 
was introduced in 188 BC as well.     
Polybius’ short and idealised description of the nature of the Achaian 
constitution is followed by a historical overview of the events that happened in mainland 
Greece before the author starts his actual narrative in the year 220 BC. These scenes of 
the koinon in action show us an entirely different picture: i.e. that of an Achaia which 
was not nearly as strong as the author would like us to believe. For example, the decision 
to involve Macedon in the struggle against Kleomenes during the Achaian War with 
Kleomenes (229-222 BC) should be considered a good illustration of a weak Achaian 
koinon as a result of the bad condition of the federal army before Philopoimen's reforms 
in 208 BC (Pol. 11. 10). The frailty of the Achaian army was one of the elements that 
generated disunity amongst its members, in particular when their leaders failed to protect 
them (Pol. 4. 60). Additional problems came in the shape of foreign powers such as 
Rome which succeeded in dividing the Achaians for many generations after it had made 
the controversial decision to become a Roman ally in 198 BC (Livy 32. 19-23).
257
 
Moreover, other internal disputes with particular member-states such as Sparta or 
Messene posed more threats to the stability of the federal state by rebelling and seceding 
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The combination of all of these elements shows that there is a marked 
difference between the idealised Achaia, depicted in book two, and the actual federal 
state that features as an actor in Polybius’ narrative of the historical events of the third 
and second centuries BC.
258  
Moreover, in the last ten books of the Histories, there is no trace of this earlier 
praise due to Polybius’
 
displeasure with the politicians as well as the people of the 
Achaian koinon. After all, their actions resulted not only in his banishment to Rome but 
in the eventual decline and destruction of the Achaians as well. The image Polybius 
sketches is that of a federal democracy in decline due to the failings of its people who 
blindly followed their demagogic leaders. The reason for this hostility is quite clear, for 
it stems from the extreme disappointment felt by Polybius in the politics of his native 
state, which started to decline after his banishment to Rome as a direct result of the 
actions of his political opponent Kallikrates. If the koinon was indeed in decline, did 
this process commence with Kallikrates’ rise to power after his notorious embassy to 
Rome in 180 BC? Champion, who compares Achaia’s degeneration with Rome’s 
demise, recognizes an earlier pattern of degeneration – already starting after book six - 
which culminates in the generations of disastrous statesmen such as Diaios and 
Kritolaos.
259
 In his treatment of books seven to fifteen, Champion sees the Achaian 
leader Philopoimen as an unusual example of virtue amongst the Achaian, just as Scipio 
Africanus was for the Romans.
260
  For Polybius’ subsequent books, Champion argues 
that even though there was ample evidence of virtue in Achaia, the Roman power had 
created the necessity for compromise within the fundamental political principles of the 
koinon as it was forced to move away from these ideals.
261
 So even if the degeneration of 
Achaia was a process that had been happening for a while, it was the embassy of 
Kallikrates to Rome in 180 BC that acted as a catalyst for the events that consolidated 
this process. From that moment on a change seems to have been brought about in 
Roman foreign conduct as well as in the relationship between the two states. Clearly, 
Achaia was no longer on equal footing with Rome. This new relationship would 
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eventually lead to further degeneration of Achaia and the whole of Greece, described 
by Polybius in the last ten books.  
This thesis of a slow degeneration of both Rome and Achaia posed by Champion 
is compelling. He definitely makes a good case and, obviously, the Achaian decline was 
a process that had started long before the Achaian War of 146. However, Champion’s 
attempts to fit this process into his wider theory of Hellenic virtue versus barbaric vice 
are unconvincing. The author sees the Achaian decline as the result of the state 
abandoning its Hellenic ideals and virtues in favour of other more basic ones that has 
led it towards a state of barbarianism. Because this dialectic centres on the collective 
Achaian ideals and identity, it fails to take into account the political realities of the 
Achaian federation and the influence that local rivalries had on federal politics and 
identity. Additionally, this idea of a long process of decline is only visible in the work of 
Polybius. The epigraphical and numismatic evidence, though limited, show an entirely 
different picture. The minting of bronze federal coinage by a large number of member 
states as well as a number of boundary disputes that were peacefully resolved prove that 
the federal state was still working considerably well in the years before 146 BC.
262
 
Therefore, while this is an interesting (and partly correct) interpretation of Polybius’ 
narrative which needs to be distinguished from the reality of the events, this decline of 
Achaia was more than just a drawn-out process and in reality must have been significantly 
less pronounced than Polybius lets us believe.  
Polybius' disapproval of the league's politics in the years leading up to the 
Achaian War, i.e. 150-146 BC, expresses itself clearly in his description of the leading 
political leaders at the time - Kallikrates, Kritolaos and Diaios – which stands in a direct 
contrast to his potrayal of Aratos. While Polybius is excessively positive about the latter, 
the historian lets no opportunity slip by to criticize the former. A great example of this 
is the passage in book thirty where the historian illustrates the widespread hatred for 
Kallikrates (Pol. 30. 29); or when he talks about the men responsible for the downfall of 
the koinon (Pol. 38. 3. 13):  
‘ἐγὼ γὰρ ἠγνοηκέναι μὲν φαίην ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ παραπεπαικέναι τοῦ 
καθήκοντος, ἡμαρτηκέναι δὲ τοὺς αἰτίους γεγονότας τῆς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀγνοίας’  
(‘I would say that the masses were ignorant and were led astray from their duty, 
but it was those who were responsible for this ignorance that were in the wrong’). 
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However, the Achaian people were guilty as well because they blindly followed the 
foolish ideas of these demagogues, leading to Polybius’ description of the massesas 
infected by ‘ἀνοίας καὶ τῆς ἀκρισίας’ (Pol.  38. 18. 7: ‘such madness and confusion’), 
‘παρεστηκότος ταῖς διανοίαις’ (Pol. 38. 12. 7: ‘willing to lay aside common sense’), and 
‘ἠγνοηκέναι μὲν φαίην ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ παραπεπαικέναι τοῦ καθήκοντος’ (Pol. 
38. 3. 13). Polybius’ idea of a koinon in decay is further supported by his comment on 
the general state of deterioration in Greece at this time due to the stubbornness of its 
men whose reluctance to have children resulted in the decline of population, agriculture 
and eventually Greece itself (Pol. 36. 17).  
 According to Polybius, the appearance of demagogues and mobs within a 
(federal) state is the sign that this state was transitioning from a democracy into an 
ochlocracy (Pol. 6. 57). Nonetheless, it is important to note that Polybius’ overtly 
negative image of these leaders has to be nuanced since demagoguery was a notion 
influenced by the political customs of the time and it was a common phenomenon for 
politicians to accuse them of demagoguery before Rome in order to disgrace their 
rivals.
263
 Just as Polybius describes his political opponent Kallikrates as a bad leader and 
who in turn accused Polybius and his political associates of being demagogues. In book 
thirty-eight, Polybius claims that the cause for the extremely negative image of 
Kallikrates, Diaios and Kritolaos was not because of prejudice, but due to his endeavour 
to stay close to the truth. However, this statement was one of the rhetorical devices 
employed by Polybius to justify his own personal feelings on the matter.
264
  
Notwithstanding these underlying motives, the fact remains that Polybius’ 
hostility towards the Achaians of his time is fascinating and it exemplifies a changing 
attitude towards the koinon. Yet even within these extremely negative comments about 
the Achaians, there are some elements that prove that the koinon still enjoyed a certain 
prestige with other states and maybe even with Polybius. For example, Rome still made 
the effort to warn the league against foolish actions because  
‘ἀποδεδεγμένοι τὸ ἔθνος ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου καὶ νομίζοντες ἔχειν αὐτὸ πιστὸν 
μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν, ἀνασοβῆσαι μὲν ἔκριναν διὰ τὸ φρονηματίζεσθαι 
πέρα τοῦ δέοντος, πόλεμον δ᾽ ἀναλαβεῖν ἢ διαφορὰν ὁλοσχερῆ πρὸς τοὺς 
Ἀχαιοὺς οὐδαμῶς ἐβούλοντο’  
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(Pol. 38. 9. 8: ‘they had favoured the League for a long time and regarded it as 
the most trustworthy of the Greeks; and they had decided to warn it, since it had 
become too presumptuous beyond the necessary, but they did not intend to take 
up war or fight with the whole of the Achaians’).  
This was a view shared by Polybius who still held respect for the koinon as a federal 
institution, despite his extreme disappointment in the political course taken by the 
Achaians after his exile to Rome. A clear attestation of this can be found in Polybius’ 
actions after the Achaian War when he defended Philopoimen's legacy, convinced his 
fellow Achaians not to buy any of Diaios' possessions that were sold as spoils by the 
Romans after the war; and in his help in adjusting the Greeks as soon as possible to the 
measurements taken by Rome (Pol. 39. 3-6).
 
Polybius might even have been involved in 
the re-establishment of the koinon after 146 BC, which was re-established by the 
Romans several years after the War (Paus. 7. 16. 10).
265
  
 It is thus apparent that the historian was proud to be an Achaian citizen despite 
his genuine disappointment in the political course after his banishment to Rome. Yet 
Polybius was actually more than just an Achaian: he was a true Megalopolitan and 
Arkadian at heart. Looking at several passages in his work (Pol. 2. 55; 2. 61; 4. 20-21 
and 4. 32-33) in which the author talks about his native region, it becomes clear that 
Achaia was not the only region that he held in high esteem.
266
 In his account of the 
Achaian war with Kleomenes (229-222 BC) and more importantly in the middle of his 
critique of the historian Phylarchus, Polybius takes the time to comment on ‘ὴ εὐψυχία 
τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν’ (Pol. 2. 55. 4: ‘the courage of the Megalopolitans’). After having 
fought valiantly during the city’s conquest and subsequent destruction by the Spartan 
king in 224 BC, the latter could not find anyone among the survivors who would be 
willing to betray their polis or, more importantly, ‘ὴ πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους πίστις’ (Pol. 
2. 61. 7: ‘their loyalty to their allies’). According to the author, this blatant refusal to 
abandon the commitment they had made, even if it meant losing everything they held 
dear, deserved nothing but the deepest respect and highest admiration. For there was 
no finer deed (‘κάλλιον ἔργον’) known to Polybius, as their alliance with the Achaians 
had already led to the loss of their lands, homes and possessions which were now under 
the control of Sparta. Nonetheless, when the Megalopolitans were unexpectedly given 
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the opportunity to get all of this back, they still refused to join the king (Pol. 2. 61. 2). 
While one could argue that the Megalopolitan refusal to abandon their alliance with 
Achaia indicated that for Polybius, the Achaian identity was more important than his 
Megalopolitan one, to me it is obvious that the author is applauding his fellow citizens 
for their loyalty to their own values, i.e. their hatred for Sparta, even before their loyalty 
to the Achaians. 
In this context, the criticism uttered by Polybius against Phylarchus is completely 
understandable, if not heavily biased, due to the latter’s omission of the greatest and 
noblest of actions. The author can simply not understand why Phylarchus would choose 
to ignore the actions of the Megalopolitans but rather devote a large amount of his work 
to describe in grotesque detail the ordeal the Mantineans suffered at the hands of the 
Achaians after going over to Kleomenes (Pol. 2. 56. 6-8). Clearly, Phylarchus had done 
this to support his belief that history should be written to entertain and not ‘τὰ καλὰ καὶ 
δίκαια τῶν ἔργων ἐπισημαίνεσθαι’ (Pol. 2. 61. 6: ‘call attention to good and right 
deeds’). Aside from the many other critiques expressed in the Histories about 
Phylarchus and his historical method, it seems that his silence on the bravery of the 
Megalopolitans was extremely offensive to Polybius as both a Megalopolitan and a 
historian. After all, he considered this behaviour to be a typical characteristic of his 
hometown and it deserved the necessary respect and attention since it was a benchmark 
for him which each and every one of his readers should aspire to learn from.  
 Additionally, this passage illustrates more than just Polybius’ admiration for the 
actions of the Megalopolitans. In fact, for him it embodied everything that Megalopolis 
and its inhabitants stood for. Like in many other cities in the Peloponnese there was a 
deep-seated hatred for Sparta among the citizens of the Arkadian town, though their 
conduct during these events proves that the Megalopolitans were different even in their 
aversion towards their neighbour. For the Megalopolitans, their hatred towards Sparta, 
combined with their relatively recent membership of a federation and connections to 
Macedon, was enough to keep them on the Achaian side in the war. Eventually, it was 
this combination of Megalopolitan characteristics that would lead to the Achaian alliance 
with Macedon and Kleomenes’ defeat at Sellasia (222 BC).
267
 Unlike Megalopolis, many 
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of the other poleis that were also known to have hated Sparta chose to act differently 
and betrayed their allies the moment the enemy was at their doorstep. For example, the 
Mantineans did surrender themselves to the Aitolians and Kleomenes and betrayed the 
Achaians after all they had done in support of the polis (Pol. 2. 56). As another 
important Arkadian polis, both of them shared certain characteristics which can be 
considered to be specifically Arkadian, and yet when they were faced with the same 
dilemma they decided to act in very different ways. In his treatment of Mantinea, 
Polybius is very harsh on the polis which he believes was rightly punished by the 
Achaians for deserting them.  
In later passages from book four (4. 20-21 and 32-33), Polybius shows exactly 
how he feels about Arkadia. The author names the Arkadians among ‘ἔθνεσι τοῖς 
μεγίστοις τῶν κατὰ Πελοπόννησον, μᾶλλον δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν’ (Pol. 4. 
32. 3: ‘the greatest nations in the Peloponnese or almost the whole of Greece’)
268
 and he 
talks about the Arkadian customs and way of life to explain why the Kynaithians, a rough 
and violent people, differed greatly from the other Arkadians who were known among 
the Greeks for their ‘ἀρετη’, ‘φιλοξενία καὶ φιλανθρωπία’ and ‘ἡ εἰς τὸ θεῖον 
εὐσέβεια’ (Pol. 4. 20. 1: ‘virtue’, ‘hospitality and benevolence’ and ‘reverences towards 
the gods’). In Polybius’ eyes, the savagery of the Kynaithians originated in their 
abandonment of the crucial element of the Arkadian education: making music. Due to 
the hard nature of life as farmers in the mountains in the middle of the Peloponnese 
and the Arkadian predisposition for austerity (‘αὐστηρία’) because of the geography and 
climate
269
, the Arkadians realised very early on that the introduction of music was 
beneficial: ‘σπεύδοντες τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀτέραμνον διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐθισμῶν κατασκευῆς 
ἐξημεροῦν καὶ πραΰνειν’ (Pol. 4. 21. 4: ‘they hoped to tame and soften the hardened 
soul through habits with this purpose’). Evidently, the Kynaithians had lost their way and 
could no longer – nor should they - be put on the same footing as the rest of the 
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 The reason for this digression on the virtues of the Arkadians lies in the 
passage’s general context: in the preceding chapters Polybius narrates certain events in 
Kynaithia in the 220s BC (Pol. 4. 17-19). At the time, the polis was divided between 
Achaian and Aitolian loyalty and eventually the polis ended up betraying the Achaians 
just as the Mantineans had done.  
Because of this betrayal by yet another Arkadian polis, it seems to me that 
Polybius felt the need to clarify to his audience that not all Arkadians shared this 
predilection for betrayal and that in general they could be considered as the epitome of 
ἀρετη as is evidenced by the Megalopolitans’ noble actions. Moreover, the Kynaithians 
seem to have lost the ideals of philantropia and philoxenia generally exhibited by the 
Arkadians through their actions to the extent that they no longer held any trace of the 
federal nature, contrary to the Megalopolitans. While the historian has shown that 
Megalopolis was an Arkadian city that embodied the best qualities of the region, 
Polybius’ stress on the Megalopolitan loyalty to the Achaians clearly indicates that both 
the polis and its inhabitants set themselves apart from the other Arkadians. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, this is also evident from the interactions of the polis with other 
Arkadians in the years after its foundation. Obviously to Polybius, Megalopolis was the 
best example of the Arkadian ἀρετη but the fact that they did not betray the Achaians 
was what distinguished them from the other Arkadians.  
By Polybius’ time there had clearly been an evolution towards a combined 
Achaian-Arkadian identity when it came to Megalopolis and its citizens. While they 
became increasingly loyal to the Achaian koinon throughout the second century, 
Lydiades’ actions at Mt Lykaion proved that this was certainly not the case at the start of 
the city’s Achaian membership. Clearly, to the Megalopolitans of the third century, there 
was an obvious distinction between their local idenitity and the federal one as being 
Megalopolitan meant that first and foremost you were loyal to the city in case of any 
danger. This is also exemplified by the Megalopolitan embassy to Antigonos Doson to 
ask for help against the Spartan attacks during the Kleomenean War as well as the 
boundary disputes discussed in the next chapters, for these demonstrate that the polis 
was in first instance concerned with its own safety and local interests. Unfortunately, 
there is no other literary source to equal Polybius and his narrative with regards to the 
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wider Megalopolitan views on their own city, Arkadia and the Achaian koinon. This 
makes it rather difficult to draw general conclusions relating to the question posed at the 
start of this segment. Of course, several meliambic poems written by the poet Kerkidas 
of Megalopolis, which are preserved on an Oxyrinchus papyrus found in Memphis, 
could have the potential to fill in this gap (POxy. 1082). However, the fragmentary state 
of these poems and the nature of their content make it rather difficult to draw certain 
generalisations about the Megalopolitan identity in the third century BC. On the 
contrary, Kerkidas seems to have been preoccupied with the unequal distribution of 
wealth (possibly within Megalopolis; Kerk. Mel. 2), and other matters of a more personal 
nature such as love and the gods (Kerk. Mel. 3 and 6). The figure of Kerkidas can be 
identified with two other possible men from Megalopolis by the same name: one was a 
contemporary of Demosthenes and a Megalopolitan politician, while the second one 
lived in in the third century and was one of the Megalopolitan envoys to Antigonos 
during the Kleomenean War (Pol. 2. 48. 4-6).
271
 However, considering the familial links 
between several individuals of the same name from Megalopolis such as two different 
individuals called Lydiades known from the epigraphic record as mentioned above, it is 
very possible that these two men were related as well, with the Kerkidas mentioned by 
Demosthenes and contemporary authors being the latter’s grandfather (Dem. De cor. 
295).
272
 Although it is rather difficult to say with certainty, the poet Kerkidas has 
sometimes been identified with the third century statesman from Megalopolis.
273
 In 
conclusion, Kerkidas’ poems might suggest that there was a significant division in wealth 
among the Megalopolitans in the last years of the third century BC as this is a topic that 
is a recurring theme in Kerkidas’ writing.  
Throughout this section my analysis of Polybius’ views and convictions have 
shown that he was more than just another Hellenistic historian. He was a Megalopolitan 
of the second century BC whose commitment to the institutions and politics of the 
Achaiain federal state indicated had become an essential part of his identity. As an 
individual Polybius clearly exempified the federal nature of Megalopolis which had 
allowed it to flourish within Achaia itself.  
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2.2. The Megalopolitan identity and the city’s coins 
As we have seen, Polybius has a deep respect for the according to him greatest of the 
federal states, Achaia, as has become apparent to anyone who has read his work. Yet 
this feeling is accompanied and sometimes rivalled by an underlying feeling of pride of 
being an Arkadian from Megalopolis, which was undoubtedly the most successful polis 
from the region.
274
 If we take Polybius’ account as a general representation of how a 
Megalopolitan identifies and represents himself, one thing becomes clear. By the writer’s 
time, a Megalopolitan considered himself to be Arkadian as well as Achaian, resulting 
in a complex layered identity. Nevertheless, how far can we generalise Polybius and his 
views? The civic and federal coinage produced by Megalopolis seems to support this 
theory. On the one hand, the civic coin types that were produced by Megalopolis after 
its membership of the koinon created a definite link to the polis’ Arkadian identity. 
Through the depiction of traditional Arkadian gods like Pan and Zeus Homarios on the 
coins, the polis was clearly illustrating its pride of being Arkadian. On the other hand, 
Megalopolis’ active role in the early production of the Achaian federal bronze coinage 
indicates that the city considered itself to be an important member of the Achaian 
federation. Clearly, the Megalopolitan coinage exhumes the city’s multi-layered identity 
just as much as Polybius does through his narrative. 
In general, coins give us a good idea of how the polis wanted to depict itself to 
the outside world as they illustrate the presence and the importance of civic identity in 
Greek poleis during the Hellenistic period and before.
275
 While there is evidence that 
individual poleis minted civic coinage throughout the Hellenistic times, federal coinage 
is also attested.
276
 There is no standard example of federal coinage as the different nature 
of the federal states is reflected via their coinage. Coin types from the Aitolian federation, 
for example, only bear the inscription ΑIΤΩΛΩΝ indicating that the minting of coins 
was the sole responsibility of the federal government.
277
 On the other hand, the Achaian 
federal coins tell an entirely different story. Aside from the civic coinage used by 
member states, there are two major types of Achaian coins: bronze and silver. The silver 
triobols or hemidrachms typically have the head of Zeus Homarios on the obverse and 
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on the reverse a wreath of laurel surrounding a monogram of the letters alpha and chi, 
which is accompanied by the polis’ ethnicon and the name of the magistrate responsible 
for the minting.
278
 While the dating of these coins is rather problematic due to their 
presence in hoards dating to a wide time span, I believe the most likely period for these 
to have been minted is between 251, i.e. the entrance of Sikyon into the League, and 
146 BC, when the federation was at the height of its power.
279
 The bronze coins, generally 
in worse condition than the silver ones, were produced in one single minting period after 
200 BC and depict Zeus Homarios sitting on a throne being offered a wreath by Nike 
on the obverse and on the reverse a personification of Achaia holding a wreath.
280
 Just as 
with the silver coins, the bronze ones represent both the federal state and the member 
city because of the presence of both the legend AXAIΩΝ as well as the polis’ ethnicon 
and the name of the magistrate (in full or abbreviated).
281
 The fact that both the polis’ 
ethnicon and the Achaian monogram appear together on the coins indicate that 
individual member states could operate within the federal framework with a high degree 
of autonomy and had a lot of input in the decisions taken by the koinon. Issuing federal 
coinage, therefore, seems to have been controlled and planned by the federal state as 
evidenced by Polybius (Pol. 2. 37. 11).
282
 Moreover, the Achaian federal coins also 
support Polybius’ statement that within the koinon all members were equal and could 
remain relatively autonomous in the organisation of their own civic affairs as well as the 
expression of their own local identity and interests. This is also illustrated by the 
boundary disputes involving Megalopolis and other member states in chapter three, 
which show that the Achaian poleis could very easily pursue these local interests within 
the federal framework without too much involvement from the federal government. Yet, 
the eventual responsibility for the minting of the money was executed by the cities and 
due to the significant numbers of coins from Megalopolis we know that the polis 
considered itself to be a member of the Achaian koinon.
283
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 Jennifer Warren even posed the theory that Megalopolis played an important role 
in the spread and creation of the bronze Achaian federal coinage as it was one of the 
first member states to start minting the bronze coins due to a discrepancy in the different 
variations of the coin design.
284
 So if Megalopolis was indeed one of the first members to 
start minting these bonze coins, this would prove the city was still one of the dominant 
poleis within the koinon in the years before the Achaian War with Rome despite the 
lack of information we get about it in the other sources. Moreover, despite a plethora of 
other reasons for the minting of these coins, Warren has argued that the coins had the 
objective, in addition to the payment of rations (σιτώνιον), of expressing federal pride. 
This was exactly the reason why the member states of the Achaian koinon chose to mint 
these bronze coins: they wanted to show that they were proud to be part of the Achaian 
koinon and Megalopolis was no exception to this rule.
 285
 Additionally, the sheer size of 
the production of the bronze coins in comparison to the silver ones makes this theory 
even more compelling: 45 members of the koinon produced these in comparison to 
only sixteen producing the silver triobols. This could also disprove James Dengate’s 
theory that Megalopolis produced federal coinage only as a token coinage due to the 
lack of these silver coins coming from Megalopolis as this seems to have been the case 
for other member poleis as well.
286
 If Megalopolis was indeed one of the first poleis to 
mint the bronze coins, it is very clear that the city was still an important member of the 
Achaian koinon even during a period for which we have little evidence.   
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In addition to the Achaian federal coins, Megalopolis minted other coin types, 
one of which was once thought to have been Arkadian federal coinage
287
 but due to the 
evidence of several coin hoards, these are more recently thought to have been produced 
by Megalopolis at the same time as its Achaian federal coins (182-167 BC).
288
 These so-
called Arkadian koinon issues were silver triobols with the head of Zeus Lykaios with a 
wreath facing left on the obverse and on the reverse a seated nude Pan holding a 
lagobolon in his left hand with syrinx or cloak accompanied by a monograph AP 
indicating the Arkadian koinon.
289
 The second coin type issued by the polis as its civic 
coinage features the same head of Zeus on the obverse and the seated Pan on the reverse 
but with the letters MEΓ instead of the Arkadian monogram which is believed to have 
had a later minting period (151-146 BC).
290 As we have already seen the Achaian koinon 
allowed its members to mint their own coinage and thus the federal state would not have 
opposed Megalopolis minting its own civic coins in addition to the federal issues.
291
 Since 
Megalopolis did mint these Arkadian types after it joined the federation, it is clear that 
the citizens considered themselves to be Arkadian in addition to their Achaian 
membership, just as Polybius’ writings have indicated. 
This conclusion was also partly drawn by Dengate in his seminal article on the 
triobols of Megalopolis. Dengate however argues that these coins indicate that the reason 
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that Megalopolis started minting these Arkadian types had to be found in Philopoimen’s 
actions of 194 BC which cost the polis the control of several of its neighbouring cities.
292
 
This is an interesting theory but he states that Megalopolis minted these coins to show 
that the city, as the former capital of the Arkadian koinon, had to be seen as the leader 
of the Arkadians and as we have seen there is no reason to assume that Megalopolis had 
been the capital of the federation.
293
 Moreover, while Megalopolis was an important 
polis, it did try its best to make sure that other states in the Peloponnese knew that the 
city was more than just another Arkadian polis. For example, Megalopolis’ anti-
Spartanism may have been the reason why the polis strove to distinguish itself from the 
other Arkadians, who did not shy away from the occasional alliance with Sparta.
294
 
Obviously, one clear conclusion can be drawn from both Polybius as a representative of 
Megalopolis and the coins minted by the polis: the decision made by Lydiades in 235 
BC set in motion a process which altered the core elements of the Megalopolitan identity 
resulting in a polis that considered itself to be Arkadian - as it has done before – as well 
as Achaian.  
Moreover, the federal nature of the Megalopolitan identity is also present 
throughout this second segment as it is exemplified both by Polybius in his writings and 
the federal coinage produced by Megalopolis. Since Megalopolis was one of the first 
poleis to actively produce Achaian federal coinage that had both the federal 
ethnicon/monograph and the civic one, the polis showed that it had a distinct connection 
to the Achaian federal state, even more than other member states that started minting 
these coins at a later stage. As for Polybius, throughout his narrative it is clear that the 
historian was as much an Achaian as he was a Megalopolitan. Polybius can thus be 
considered the personification par excellence of a Megalopolitan for whom the Achaian 
federal membership was an important part of his identity.        
***** 
Throughout the different segments in this chapter, it has become clear that the 
relationship between Megalopolis and the Achaian koinon had evolved during the 
period of the polis’ membership. When Lydiades made the decision to join the 
federation in 235 BC, both he himself and the citizens were motivated for very different 
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reasons, but one thing was clear: if the city wanted to protect itself against the looming 
threat of Sparta, then they would have to ally themselves with the Achaian koinon, an 
emerging state in the Peloponnese. Thus, as soon as Megalopolitan was an Achaian 
member, it fully embraced the koinon’s ideals and was one of the dominant city-states. 
Due to its size and reverence for federalism it produced a significant part of the Achaian 
elite. Moreover, Megalopolis was very active in the political life of the federation by 
sending officials to the other side of the Peloponnese when many others did not do so 
or by minting a very large portion of the federal coinage. This did not mean however 
that the citizens renounced their Arkadian identity.  
Because of the inclusive and open nature of the Achaian koinon, which had long 
counted Achaians and non-Achaians amongst its members, a polis could easily keep its 
distinct local identity in combination with the federal one, something that is expressed 
by individuals in inscriptions and on the federal Achaian coinage. For Megalopolis, this 
meant that the city could mint their Arkadian-style coins side by side with the Achaian 
federal coinage. All of this eventually led to the addition of an Achaian element to the 
previously distinct Arkadian identity of Megalopolis, as is attested by Polybius when he 
talks about Megalopolis, Arkadia and Achaia in his narrative: by the middle of the 
second century BC Megalopolis had become Arkadian as well as Achaian.  
Moreover, this chapter has also provided a new contextualised portrait of 
Polybius as a Megalopolitan. It is important to realise that this is a context in which he 
and his narrative need to be considered even by those interested in Polybius as historian 
or political theorist. Particularly since Polybius’ Megalopolitan background and the 
impact this had on his personal views and ideas has been largely ignored in previous 
research. As the analysis of his narrative in this chapter has shown, Polybius’ comments 
on the interaction between the local and federal politics within a koinon such as the 
Achaian one as well as the wider Hellenistic politics are valuable to broader topics and 




PART 2: MEGALOPOLIS AND ACHAIA: AN 






As the core components of the Megalopolitan identity have now been established in part 
one of this thesis, the second and third parts will focus on the actual effects of this local 
identity on Achaian politics. It has already been discussed how, soon after 235 BC, the 
city became one of the most prominent members of the federal state and Lydiades had 
actively pursued a federal career. While this second part analyses Megalopolis as a 
member of the Achaian koinon and its interactions with the other member states, the 
relationship between the polis and the federal state constitutes the core of chapter three, 
as it was what distinguished Megalopolis from the other Achaian members. After all, all 
of the poleis that belonged to the Achaian koinon had the same rights and obligations 
as Megalopolis. All of these member states were entitled to federal citizenship, 
participation in the federal institutions, had access to federal magistracies and striking of 
federal coinage, but simultaneously had to contribute to the federal treasury, obey 
federal laws and follow established procedures. Moreover, through its interactions with 
the other members of the Achaian federation as well as via active participation in the 
day-to-day political activities - by minting coins for example and hosting the Achaian 
assembly in the city - Megalopolis showed itself a devoted member of the Achaian 
koinon. Interestingly, it is precisely through its struggles with the other Achaian poleis in 
the form of boundary disputes that Megalopolis showed that the city knew how to use 
these federal procedures and magistrates to its own advantage.  
 The boundary disputes between Megalopolis and Messene, Thouria, Helisson 
and Sparta that take up the majority of the third chapter are the best sources to show 
how and why Megalopolis did this. Because they provide such an interesting insight into 
other facets of Achaian political life, I will also address the general composition and 
structure of the Achaian koinon, its history and institutions.  
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Chapter 3:  Megalopolis in the Achaian koinon 
Once Megalopolis joined the Achaian koinon (235 BC), the interaction between the 
polis and the federal state was one that had a profound influence on both parties: by the 
middle of the second century BC Megalopolis had added a distinct Achaian element to 
its complex, local identity and Achaian political life was soon overflowing with prominent 
Megalopolitans whose personal agenda and hatred for Sparta helped shape the federal 
government and its actions more than once. While this relationship between the two 
parties was unique in terms of the influence that the local identity of Megalopolis had 
on the Achaian foreign policy, in other areas it was very similar to that of Megalopolis’ 
fellow members in the federal state. All Achaian member states had the same rights and 
obligations: first of all, the citizens had the right to hold federal citizenship in addition to 
the local one or could own property in other member poleis. On the other hand, the 
poleis had the freedom to conduct their affairs at the local level according to their own 
designs, the right to be represented in the federal institutions and to vote via their 
representatives on federal decisions, to mint federal as well as civic coinage. Finally, they 
also had to meet the obligation to provide means and manpower for the federal army 
and treasury.  
 These general rules also shaped the way the poleis within the Achaian koinon 
communicated with one another. However, what exactly was the nature of these 
interactions and how did a polis like Megalopolis use these to its own advantage and 
create a dominant position for itself within the federation? In what follows I will argue 
that in addition to the obvious influence Megalopolis had on Achaian foreign politics 
(which will be discussed at length in part three of this thesis), the city had a certain impact 
on the internal affairs of the federation as well, albeit in a less obvious manner. This was 
due to the nature of the polis’ foundation by the Arkadian koinon which seems to have 
brought about a strong understanding among the citizens of what it meant to be part of 
a structure that was bigger than the polis and how to use that to their advantage. I will 
therefore analyse the available material to show that in its boundary disputes with other 
Achaian member states Megalopolis had the habit of involving the federal magistrates 
and procedures in order to win these disputes and increase its position within the 
Achaiain koinon. In the first section of the chapter, I will look at how Megalopolis 
behaved as a member of the Achaian koinon and illustrate that it was indeed an 
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important polis that actively took part in the Achaian political and institutional life. A 
short overview will then be given of the possible ways in which members could encounter 
one another to define the common protocols that guided inter-urban relations. 
Moreover, I will also prove that in general the Achaian koinon preferred to stay out of 
these disputes as it allowed its member states to interact without any involvement of the 
federal government as long as these interactions were limited to within the federation. 
Finally, I will analyse Megalopolis’ interactions with other member states to show exactly 
how Megalopolis used the federation to its advantage. 
1. Megalopolis as a member of the Achaian koinon 
 
As a member of the koinon Megalopolis had to deal with the federal government as well 
as other poleis from a variety of ethnic backgrounds and regions. For a polis such as 
Megalopolis with its own traditions and relationships this must not have been easy, for 
it was no longer only connected to the Arkadian poleis but was now dealing with an 
increasingly complicated set of adversaries. All in all, the decision to join Achaia seems 
to have been a good one for the city as it soon played a prominent role in the federation 
and produced some of its most influential statesmen. Megalopolis shaped federal 
politics in a way that not many other cities had done before. In this next section of the 
chapter I want to look at the polis in its Achaian federal context and find out how 
Megalopolis fits into and deals with some of the unique Achaian features and ideals. 
Therefore, I am examining the internal structure of the federation to prove that as one 
of the biggest polis of the Achaian koinon, Megalopolis wanted to actively be involved 
in the Achaian institutions and federal political life.  
The Achaian koinon set itself apart from other federations due to its inclusion 
of poleis from all the Peloponnese which resulted in a melting pot of local and federal 
identities. Clearly, this had been part of its policy since the conception of the first 
Achaian koinon during the fourth century which contained both Achaians and non-
Achaians after the incorporation of Aitolian Kalydon and Lokrian Naupaktos in 389 
BC.
295
 This fact made it easier for the second Achaian federation to continue along these 
lines and probably laid the foundation for the expansionist policy during the Hellenistic 
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 According to Emily Mackil religion played an important role in the formation 
of the Achaian koinon as it provided the new state with a shared communal identity 
while protecting important local cults such as the sanctuaries of Zeus Homarios, first in 
Helike and later in Aigion, and that of Artemis at Ano Mozaraki.
297
 After the 
disintegration of the first Achaian koinon under Alexander’s successors, a second one 
was formed by the cities of Dyme, Patrai, Tritaia and Pharai, mainly as a continuation 
of the first federation. It did not take long for the first member from outside to join.
298 
As 
we have seen in the previous chapter, the main political aims of the federal organisation 
were spreading equality (ἰσηγορία) and freedom of speech (παρρησία) throughout the 
Peloponnese. This could be done in two ways: either the cities joined Achaia willingly, 
convinced by the prestige of the federal democracy, or they were ‘freed’ from tyranny. 
The implementation of this policy was partly achieved by the use of allies such as 
Macedon and Rome (Pol. 2. 42. 4-6). The use of allies is quite typical for Greek states 
at this point due to the changing political reality of the Hellenistic period where ‘big’ 
foreign powers involved themselves in Greek affairs and this was one of the few ways of 
playing any sort of role on the international level. Additionally, it enabled the Achaians 
to defend themselves against other Greek states and their allies at a time when the 
Achaian military was in disarray.  
At the head of this federation stood the strategos who was supported by a series of 
federal magistrates, a federal council and a primary assembly that met four times a year 
in regular meetings or synodoi in addition to the synkletos, a special meeting that was 
called to decide on matters concerning war or peace, receive ambassadors from the 
Senate or deal with anything outside of the competence of the primary assembly.
299  
The 
discussion on the exact nature and composition of the Achaian assemblies and the 
primary assembly in particular is quite problematic due to the lack of information from 
Polybius.
300
 Although I will not concern myself with an overview of different arguments 
here, I will make some of my own conclusions based on the organisation of other federal 
offices in this section. 
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As the koinon was a federal state in which individual city-states convened 
together, there were two political realities at work: the federal government with its federal 
responsibilities and the poleis working at the local level.
301
 Joining the Achaian state 
meant that the citizens of a city added an extra layer to their own identity through the 
addition of federal membership of the koinon. In several inscriptions individuals started 
using both their local ethnicon as well as the federal one, so someone from Megalopolis 
could choose to use the following formula in an inscription: ΑΧΑΙOΣ 
ΜΕΓΑΛΟΠΟΛΙΤΟΣ. There are countless examples in the epigraphical record attesting 
this practice, many of which are collected by Rizakis.
302
 However, the fact that there are 
no Megalopolitans doing this is quite interesting and problematic as it severely limits our 
understanding of how individual Megalopolitans perceived themselves within the 
federation. Furthermore, the use of a double ethnicon is also seen on the federal 
Achaian coinage where it was also employed by the city-states.  
So, in addition to retaining all local rights, inhabitants of an Achaian member 
state also obtained civic rights in other member states. This in turn increased mobility 
within the federation as they were now allowed to marry inhabitants of other poleis, own 
land and live there. This was probably the case with Aratos and his property in Corinth 
(Plut. Ar. 41. 2) or another Achaian Hieron of Airgira who possessed property in Argos 
where he hosted a delegation of Oropians (IG VII 411 13-17).
303
 Moreover, an 
inscription found in Epidauros which lists 156 casualties of the War of 146 describes 
103 names names under the category of ‘Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ σύνοικοι’ (IG IV2 1 28 l. 59: 
‘Achaians and synoikoi’). In addition to the traditional citizens of the polis, there seem 
to have been two foreign groups in Epidauros, i.e. Achaians from other member states 
as well as the so-called synoikoi. The fact that their fellow Achaians are separated from 
the synoikoi, indicated that the Achaians were still an entirely different group whithin 
Epidauros, although one that was not completely foreign.
304
  Undoubtedly, social and 
economic mobility of citizens across the koinon was promoted and normalised because 
of the federal nature of the Achaian state. Yet having federal citizenship meant that a 
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citizen had civic rights in other Achaian poleis and not political rights which, unlike in 
the case of isopoliteia, were still limited to the person’s native polis. Internally nothing 
really changed for the cities themselves as they were allowed to retain local officials, laws, 
institutions and other rights: they could still conduct their daily businesses and operate 
to a high degree of autonomy without being scrutinised by the federal government.
305
 
This can also further explain why these cities managed to revert back to an older polis-
centred political order after the Achaian War of 146 BC.  
Considering they now had to contribute to the federal army and treasury, the 
poleis could take action whenever they deemed it necessary, even if this was against the 
dictates of the federal government, just as Lydiades and the Megalopolitans had done in 
their defence against Kleomenes in ca. 224 BC (Pol. 2. 55. 1-6). Moreover, if member-
states were involved in disputes with one another, which happened quite frequently, they 
did not have to apply to the federal state for arbitration which is attested through the fact 
that there was no standard procedure to follow in these cases.
306
 Of course, the new 
inscription from Messene proves that the Achaians did have their own magistrates (the 
federal damiorgoi) to support its members in case of these boundary disputes and it 




 In return for the contributions to the federal treasury and army, the cities in turn 
received a plethora of federal rights: they were represented in the council and regular 
meetings in which they could vote on important federal decisions, their citizens could 
become Achaian statesmen and the poleis could mint federal coinage. It is precisely 
through these federal rights that a polis could leave a mark on federal politics and gain 
an important role within the federation. This is exactly what Megalopolis did as a result 
of its distinct local identity that allowed the polis to understand how federal states 
worked.
308
 In fact, its leader Lydiades became important enough for Plutarch to mention 
him as Aratos’ rival at the highest level of federal politics, indicating that Megalopolis 
shaped the League’s politics from the very beginning (Plut. Ar. 30. 3). Furthermore, in 
a seminal prosopographical analysis of the Achaian elite known to us through different 
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sources, James O’Neil clearly shows that the influential position of Megalopolis within 
the federation can also be illustrated by looking at the origins of the Achaian statesmen, 
as there seems to be a predominance of members from Megalopolis in addition to 
individuals from Sikyon and what O’Neil calls ‘Old Achaea’, i.e. the traditional Achaian 
heartland which included the four founding poleis of the koinon: Dyme, Pharai, Patrai 
and Tritaia.
 309
 Interestingly, out of the 74 individual leaders that O’Neil has found, 
seventeen come from Megalopolis.
310
 While Polybius’ narrative is the main source for 
O’Neil’s study as the vast majority comes from the Histories, several of Achaian leaders 
from Megalopolis are also attested to in inscriptions. In three instances, these men were 
only mentioned in inscriptions. It is thus likely that the polis did enjoy a position of 
importance within the federation. Additionally, O’Neil’s analysis clearly shows that 
within the federation there was a tradition of influential families coming from these three 
areas dominating federal politics which clearly discredits Polybius’ comment on the 
extremely democratic and egalitarian nature of the federation. Obviously, pursuing a 
federal political career seems to have been primarily reserved for the rich elite. 
 This pattern can also be identified in two different lists of Achaian federal 
nomographoi. One of the inscriptions was found in Epidauros and should be dated 
between 210 and 207 BC based on the forms of the Greek letters of the inscription as 
well as the fact that this period fits best with some of the many problems created by the 
seemingly random distribution of nomographoi among known member states (IG IV.I
2
 
73). The second one from Aigion should be dated slightly later on the basis of the 
terminus post quem of 182 BC, resulting from the appearance of both Sparta and 
Messene on the list as Achaian members, something which we known took place only 
after 182.
311
 While the exact function of the office is unspecified, the two lists do tell us 
something about the internal organisation of the federation as they prove that the college 
of nomographoi was organised along the principle of proportional representation.
312
 
Each of the cities provided a consistent number of representatives according to their size 
and importance: large poleis such as Megalopolis sent three nomographoi, medium 
sized poleis two and the smaller poleis one.
313
 When comparing both lists however, 
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several problems arise. For one, as is the case with the prosopographic analysis of the 
elite, several of the larger and more important poleis such as Corinth which are known 
to have been members of the koinon are absent from the lists.
314
 While the list from 
Aigion is clearly missing its first part and thus could have included these cities, the 
Epidauros list is complete and does not mention any of these poleis. Yet this does not 
necessarily have to remain an issue as is proven by an attractive theory posed by Sergey 
Sizov.
 315
 He argues that there is a marked difference between the two meetings: only a 
portion of the board of nomographoi could be present in Epidauros where a sacred law 
that had been written required the presence of the federal officials. The absence of a 
significant number of nomographoi can be explained by the long and difficult journey it 
took for the citizens of some poleis to get to Epidauros, as well as the fact that not all 
poleis might have found it worth going in the first place. The meeting in Aigion, on the 
other hand, must then have been attended by the complete college of nomographoi 
because of the centrality and importance of the place within Achaia. It is interesting 
however that Megalopolis appears on both lists, since it surely cannot have been easy for 
the nomographoi from the city to travel to Epidauros which was a considerable distance 
away (around 130 kilometres lay between both sites today). This however can be 
explained by a thorough understanding of federalism and federal institutions, as has 
already been exemplified in several cases, that was ingrained in the Megalopolitan 
identity and which made it easier for the polis to make an effort and send its 
nomographoi to Epidauros.
316
 If the board of nomographoi was organised according to 
the principle of proportional representation, it is plausible that this was also the way in 
which the Achaian primary assembly was organised, with delegates who represented and 
voted for their city according to its size.
317
 
Furthermore, things had changed for Megalopolis in the period between the 
creation of the first and that of the second list. Whereas the polis provides three 
representatives at the time of Epidauros, its number had been reduced to two in the 
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Aigion list. Does this indicate a decline in the importance of Megalopolis within the 
koinon? The vote that Megalopolis had lost was most likely the result of Philopoimen’s 
encouragement of some of the neighbouring communities of Megalopolis to secede and 
become independent members of the koinon (Plut. Phil. 13. 5). Several of these are 
known to have minted federal coinage later on.
318
 Philopoimen was apparently irritated 
by the attempts of his hometown to banish him because of his departure for Crete that 
left others to deal with Nabis. Consequently, the loss of these communities meant a 
considerable reduction of land controlled by Megalopolis. Clearly, if the area under the 
polis’ control and the people it represented had decreased, then the number of 
nomographoi it would send to the meetings should subsequently be reduced. However, 
this does not seem to have affected Megalopolis’ position of influence within the 
federation as we have seen from the discussion of the coinage in the previous chapter as 
well as the epigraphic sources below. On the contrary, a decision taken by the Achaians 
at the suggestion of Philopoimen in 188 BC proves the opposite. The meetings of the 
Achaian assembly always met at the temple of Zeus Homarios in Aigion until 
Philopoimen made the proposal to rotate the meetings among all the member-states 
(Livy 38. 30. 1-6). This was most likely done for two reasons: to break the political 
importance of Aigion and make it easier for the male citizens of the more remote poleis 
in the Peloponnese to attend federal meetings. This decision will have had a 
considerable impact on the political nature of the federation as the importance of the 
cult of Zeus Homarios in connection to the identity of the Achaians was significantly 
reduced. When the koinon expanded, the need for this religious and ethnic base of 
Achaian political unity seems to have disappeared and substituted by a complex network 
of individual poleis which were connected by their membership of the Achaian koinon. 
No doubt, Philopoimen also hoped that through this change of meeting place both he 
and Megalopolis would acquire even more influence within the federation. This may 
have been the case at the start as Megalopolis hosted two out of four gatherings of the 
Achaian assembly in the 180s BC, while later ones took place in other poleis. An analysis 
of Polybius’ work as well as several inscriptions have yielded the following results: after 
the decision of 188 BC, one attested meeting took place in Elis and another in Tegea, 
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two in Megalopolis and Argos, three in Corinth and four in Sikyon. However, this does 
not have to indicate anything in particular as there were four regular meetings every year 
and the exact location is specified for only a handful of these meetings. 
Clearly, in many ways Megalopolis was a typical member of the Achaian koinon: 
it minted federal coinage, was represented in the federal institutions, hosted assembly 
meetings after 188 BC and a considerable number of influential Achaian statesmen were 
Megalopolitan. Moreover, from the available source material an important conclusion 
can be drawn: given the chance, Megalopolis would not hesitate to take part in federal 
politics or express its affinity with it. The influence of Megalopolis on federal politics 
was exercised primarily through the actions of these statesmen as they were undeniably 
shaped by their Megalopolitan provenance, as a more detailed analysis of their actions 
within the federal foreign policy in the next chapters will further prove. Nevertheless, 
the city of Megalopolis showed that, even as an individual entity, it could still use the 
federal institutions to its own personal advantage as we will see below. 
2. Inter-urban interaction within the Achaian koinon 
In the Hellenistic age, there were many different kinds of states at play. Aside from the 
many poleis interacting with one another just as they had done for centuries, on the 
political stage they had to give way to the bigger foreign powers like the Hellenistic 
kingdoms and Rome. This meant that for a polis it could be quite difficult to navigate 
the plethora of ways in which it could interact with other states, especially if the polis was 
part of a federal state. The relationship between the polis and the federal government 
seems to have differed widely - just as their internal organisation did - from one koinon 
to the next. As we have seen in the previous section, inside the Achaian koinon the 
interplay between the federal and the local level was quite complex as they operated in 
two spheres where the federal government looked out for federal interests like the 
internal organisation of the koinon and its foreign policy, while the poleis governed 
locally with quite a high degree of autonomy. Moreover, there were very few restrictions 
for members of the Achaian koinon and the ways in which they interacted with each 
other. As long as the parties cooperating with one another were part of the federation, 
the federal government saw no reason to intervene or create a standard procedure for 




2.1. Interstate cooperation within and outside of the Achaian koinon  
 
It is important to note that this changed when outsiders became involved, for any contact 
with a foreign polis or state had to be regulated through the federal state. Before moving 
on to a detailed analysis of the internal interactions between the different member states 
and Megalopolis in particular, it is necessary to see how the federation dealt with its 
poleis and their interactions with states outside of the koinon. For example, in a 
territorial dispute around 192 BC between the Achaian polis Pagai and the Boiotian 
town of Aigosthena, both koina seem to have represented their respective members in 
the resulting arbitration.
319
 Clearly, member poleis could do what they wanted when they 
were dealing with fellow member states, but in case of a dispute or any other kind of 
interaction with a state outside the federation the federal government would step in.  
Additionally, there are several references in the sources stipulating that 
embassies from members to external states had to be approved by Achaia or they were 
deemed illegal. This is apparent for example from the struggles the many Spartan 
embassies sent by the polis or its exiles to plead their case with Rome in its struggle with 
the federal government after it had been forced into the koinon by Philopoimen after 
Nabis’ death in 192 (Pol. 23. 4). However, when this kind of embassy was approved, 
they mostly seem to have been acting on behalf of the polis in question, not the federal 
government. This was the case for Megalopolis, when two of its citizens approached 
Antigonos Doson in 225/4 BC to secure his support in the Achaian war against 
Kleomenes of Sparta who was terrorising the polis and its surrounding area due to the 
longstanding animosity between the two states (Pol. 2. 48). While Megalopolis had to 
ask for the koinon’s approval to undertake this action, it is very important to note that it 
was still the city that was asking for the king’s support and not the federal government 
which only became involved in the matter only after the Megalopolitan envoys reported 
back to the federal assembly with a positive reply from the king.
320
 When the polis of 
Stymphalos was asked for help by the exiled citizen body of Elateia, a polis with whom 
the citizens had very close relations, they sent an embassy to the Achaian assembly on 
their behalf (SEG 11 1107 l. 10-15). These events were described in an honorary decree 
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from the Elateians from Stymphalos which is discussed by Mackil.
321
 The noteworthy 
thing here is that the Elateians in question claimed to be the citizen body of the city 
which had been uprooted at the time and were thus exiles. However, if the Elateians had 
indeed lost their own city, they could not send a legitimate embassy to the Achaians, 
which is why Stymphalos had to intervene. Clearly, official matters such as contact 
between the polis, exiles and outside forces such as Rome had to be handled through 
an Achaian embassy but locally, the federal institutions do not seem to have been 
involved, for Elateian exiles could participate in Stymphalian cults, were given land and 
were allowed to live in the city.
322
 Similarly, the koinon considered the embassies to 
Rome on behalf of the Spartan exiles to be illegal as they did not have the federal state’s 
approval. Apparently, the same rule applies for exiles: locally, cities did what they 
wanted, but any foreign contact had to go via an official Achaian assembly. 
 However, individual citizens seem to have been able to conduct and maintain 
personal relationships with these foreign powers without too much difficulty or control 
from above. In no way were these relationships simple and in some cases, they caused 
trouble between the individual and the federation as was the case with Philopoimen and 
his stint in Crete (Plut. Phil. 13). Yet we are dealing with personal relations of individual 
citizens which were not connected to federal politics or the federal state. In fact, among 
several of the influential Achaian statesmen there seems to have been a tradition of using 
these personal relations to their own advantage. For example, several Achaian statesmen 
such as Aratos, Eperatos and Kykliades of Pharai and Philopoimen had connections to 
Macedonian kings at different moments in their careers, which seem to have been a way 
for them to increase their power and prestige within the federation (Plut. Ar. 44. 1).
323
 
Likewise, if we are to believe Polybius, Kallikrates’ relationship with Rome is what 
enabled him to dominate Achaian politics after 180 BC (Pol. 24. 8. 9). However, it is 
important to note that these contacts were also used by the other parties to increase their 
influence within the Achaian koinon by backing a candidate in the federal elections. As 
was the case with Philip’s support for Eperatos of Pharai during the Achaian elections 
for the strategia of 219 BC (Pol. 4. 82. 2-8). Moreover, it seems as though an individual’s 
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connections did not have to be limited to one outside party, as can be seen from Aratos’ 
dealings with both Philip V and the Ptolemies, since his son Aratos the Younger was 
chosen to take part in an Achaian mission to Ptolemy V because of his father’s 
connections to the king (Pol. 24. 6. 6). This fact is also apparent from the many 
attestations of individual Achaians in the epigraphic record of states outside of the 
koinon. Hieron of Aigira, for example, was honoured by the city of Oropos for his many 




Judging from this source, interactions between an outside polis and an Achaian 
citizen could take many forms: the individual acting as a foreign judge in a dispute with 
a third party, or as representative of a group of exiles in the federal institutions, or as a 
proxenos or benefactor for a group of citizens or as a city, or an ambassador for his 
native town.
325
 In most cases the individual receives a whole array of honours from the 
polis that he is interacting with. These included asylia, ateleia and sometimes even 
honorary citizenship of the polis. On the whole, it seems as though it was much easier 
for a person than a city to communicate with a state that did not belong to the koinon 
without the approval of this federation as long as they did not act as a representative of 
the Achaian koinon. 
Internally, as already argued, members were left to their own devices. There 
seems to have been no limitation as to how they could form reciprocal relationships. 
Smaller towns could join bigger ones through a synoecism, or split from them to become 
independent members of the koinon, as was the case with the communities that split 
from Megalopolis in 194 BC, probably at the insistence of Philopoimen (Plut. Phil. 15. 
4). As already discussed in chapter two, Achaian member states could also decide to 
take action together against the federation, if they believed that the federal government 
was not acting in their best interests, as was the case when Dyme, Pharai and Tritaia, 
disappointed by Aratos’ military leadership, gave up their contributions to the federal 
army instead opting to hire their own mercenary army (Pol. 4. 60. 4).  
Because most of the interactions discussed in the preceding paragraphs are 
political in nature, it would be beneficial to examine a final, non-political way in which 
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the members of the koinon cooperate with one another and others outside of the 
federation. Throughout the Hellenistic period the majority of the religious festival and 
games in the Peloponnese would send out theoroi to announce and promote their 
festivals (epangelia) in order to attract foreign participants and spectators.
326
 Certain 
individuals or the theorodokoi were appointed, either by their home town or the 
organisers of the festival, and given an array of responsibilities so that these sared envoys 
were accommodated as best as possible.  
Paula Perlman makes a very good point in her seminal work on the theorodokoi 
of the Peloponnese about the religious nature of the function and argues that the 
appointment of these individuals was a way for the sanctuaries in the Peloponnese to 
ensure continuous and positive interactions with Peloponnesian cities despite the rapidly 
changing political loyalties of these poleis.
327
 Yet, despite Perlman’s stress on the 
primarily non-political nature of the theorodokoi, the marjority of the people chosen for 
this office were politically active or had relatives who were, serving as ambassadors, 
strategoi, damiorgoi or tyrants in their native city or federal state.
328
 Moreover, there also 
seems to be a strong connection between the office of theorodokos and that of a 
proxenos (a strictly political office) as the same individuals are named as both in the 
inscriptions, in most cases becoming proxenos of the polis connected to the sanctuary 
for which they were acting as proxenos. Clearly, the best theorodokoi were those who 
had experience dealing with foreign delegations throught their pursuit of other activities 
such as diplomacy or personal gain.
329
 
The office of the theorodokoi is important for interstate cooperation of the 
Achaian member states since it shows that these poleis also interacted with one another 
in non-political spheres as from individuals from Troizen, Argos, Corinth, Pellene, 
Aigina, Dyme, Messene and Tegea are found on two inscriptions naming the individuals 
that acted as theorodokoi for the Chtonia in honour of Demeter in Hermione, dated to 
the late third century BC (IG  IV, 727A an 727 B). Additionally, theorodokoi of Achaian 
member states are also known to have acted for religious festival outside of the koinon 
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such as the Leukophryeneia in Magnesia on the Meander.
330
 A series of inscriptions 
recording the answers of poleis, koina and kings about the status of the festival and 
inviolabilty of the city, are interesting for the present discussion as they include 
theorodokoi from the federation (IMagn. 39) as well as several of their members 
including Megalopolis (IMagn. 38). It seems as though, at least in terms of religious 
interaction, not all contact between Achaian member states and outside cities had to go 
via the federal government. This is also indicated by the fact that when the sacred envoys 
set out on their epangelia tour, they visited those communities within a koinon that 
where that most important and merited an invitation to the festival, as it was extremely 




2.2. Interstate conflict within the Achaian koinon 
 
While the Achaian poleis cooperated in many ways, in other instances they acted as 
judges in third party disputes or fought about territory and boundaries with neighbouring 
cities. I will now turn to these boundary disputes as I believe they play an instrumental 
role in explaining how the local identity of Megalopolis dictated its contacts with fellow 
members as well as the federal government. However, before we can look at 
Megalopolis in particular, it is necessary to focus on other Achaian poleis and their 
relationships to assess if and how Megalopolis was unique here and what kind of role 
the federal government played in these disputes.  
In general, a number of things could become the subject of an argument between 
two parties: financial matters, acts of aggression like the declaration of war or breaking 
of treaties, or territorial disputes in connection with a religious sanctuary or boundaries.
332
 
It is specifically this last category that takes up the majority of the inter-poleis disputes. 
Generally, there were two kids of boundaries that two parties would fight over, i.e. 
natural or political.
333
 Obviously, the motivation for these conflicts was often more than 
just territorial gain. Boundary disputes were connected to the local interests and 
ambitions of the poleis involved. Control of certain regions or access to an influential 
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sanctuary would offer one of the combating parties a strategic advantage over a 
neighbour, while others were part of much bigger feuds such as the one between Sparta 
and Megalopolis, which caused the two poleis to fight recurrently over the Belminatis 
and Akritis regions.
334
 These regions had been part of the animosity between the two 
cities from the moment it was taken from Sparta by Philip II and given to Megalopolis 
(Plut. Mor. 216b), after which they remained Arkadian until Kleomenes conquered the 
region in the 220s BC, thereby making it a constant subject of arbitration.  
When a mutual agreement or solution could not be reached amongst both 
parties, they voluntarily subjected their dispute to a third party which would then act as 
either a mediator or arbitrator. The main difference between these two terms is that 
mediation encourages the conflicting parties to come to an agreement without a binding 
verdict. This meant that the final decision still lay with the disputants and they did not 
necessarily have to respect the mediator’s suggestions. Arbitration, on the other hand, 
meant that a neutral third party was given the ultimate and binding decision on the matter 
and decided who would be victorious and what actions had to be taken to ensure a lasting 
and peaceful solution.
335
 Of course, these boundary disputes were not always successfully 
arbitrated,  illustrated by the recurring conflicts between Megalopolis and Messene in a 
new inscription found in 2008 in Messene, or the recurring conflict between Sparta and 
Megalopolis.
336
 Moreover, Sheila Ager has argued that we could consider about ten 
percent of the cases from the Hellenistic age to be repetitive in nature and, more 
importantly, she points out that we do not know the outcome of half of the disputes.
337
  
While there was no standard procedure for international arbitration, the general 
practice was the following: 1. The parties first agreed to submit their disagreement to a 
neutral third party either voluntarily or as a result of a pre-existing arrangement such as 
the kuria-clause in a decree (this may have called for a forced arbitration). 2. The third 
party was then chosen and was either a city acting as a neutral judge (polis ekkletos) or a 
group of foreign judges from different cities. 3. Subsequently, the conflict was brought 
before the arbitrator who would come to a decision based upon the arguments made by 
both parties. If boundaries were involved, a physical examination by a smaller committee 
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may have been required by the polis or foreign judges. 4. The dispute could then have 
two possible outcomes: the arbitrator would vote in favour of one party or a new border 
line could be drawn up after the physical examination by the arbitration committee. 5. 
Eventually, the final decision and action were recorded in an inscription that was 
commissioned by the victorious party to ensure that this was a permanent solution 
(epikrisis) and sometimes individual judges were honoured; for example, Elis honoured 
the Corinthian judges following a boundary dispute the polis had won which Ager argues 
may have been connected to its entry into the koinon.
338  
Within the Achaian koinon conflicts were generally resolved without the 
involvement of the federal government and, more importantly, there was no standard 
procedure.
339
 However, several boundary disputes do suggest that the koinon expected 
all members – both existing and potential - to conduct their affairs in a certain way. For 
one, there could be no conflict among Achaian member states as is evident from the 
boundary dispute between Achaia and Sparta which had to be arbitrated to ensure 
internal Achaian peace:  
‘ὅπως δα[μ]οκρατούμενοι καὶ τὰ ποθ’ αὑτοὺς ὁμονοοῦντες οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ 
διατε[λ]ῶντι εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ὄντες ἐν εἰράναι καὶ εὐνομίαι’  
(IvO 47; Syll. 665 l. 17-19: ‘so that the Achaians, governing themselves 
democratically and agreeing among themselves for all time remain in peace and 
harmony'’).  
So, all conflicts between poleis that wanted to become part of the koinon and any existing 
members had to be resolved before a city could join the koinon, as can be seen from an 
arbitration by Megara between Epidauros and Corinth about the regions Spiraion and 
Sellanys around 240 BC.
340
 The words ‘κατά τόν αἶνον τόν τῶν A[χαι]ῶν δικαστήριον’ 
(IG IV
2
 1.71. 4-5: ‘according to the decision of the Achaian judges) indicate that Megara 
acted at the request of the federal government; and a second inscription seemingly 
dealing with the entrance of Epidauros
341
 into the Achaian League mentions a settlement 
of all Epidaurian conflicts with Corinth – ‘Kορίνθιοι ἔχοντε[ς π]ρός τοὐς (…) 
ἀντιλέγοντι τοί Επιδ[α]υρι[οι’ (IG IV2 1.70 17-18: ‘the Corinthians had in (…) with their 
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opponents the Epidaurians’). Additional support for the statement comes from a stele 
bearing the measures taken by the Achaians in connection to Orchomenos’ entry into 




 Here a potential conflict 
between Orchomenos and Megalopolis is mentioned which is interesting as the 
individuals in question were actually Methydrians living in Orchomenos. Apparently, 
they had put up a golden statue of Athena Nike taken from Megalopolis as collateral for 
their settlement in Orchomenos, and the polis had to ensure that a financial 
compensation was paid to Megalopolis by the Methydrians living in Orchomenos. 
While there is no explicit proof that arbitration of a city’s unresolved conflicts was 
required before it became an Achaian member state, I think the available evidence 
suggests that the federal government did at least expect that all potential members had 
any ongoing conflicts with Achaian members resolved.
343
  
In general, it seems as though the federal state did not meddle in these interstate 
conflicts, yet the poleis did have the option to appeal to the koinon. The task would then 
be delegated to a contingent of influential citizens from all over the federation as they 
did in the boundary disputes between Megalopolis and Messene or Megalopolis and 
Thouria. Alternatively, a polis ekkletos could be appointed by the federation which 
could be a fellow Achaian member state since internal Achaian conflicts were arbitrated 
frequently by another member of the federation.
344
 While this is apparent in the 
boundary dispute between Epidauros and Corinth which was arbitrated by Megara and 
one between Epidauros and Arsinoe which was to be decided upon by a delegation from 
several Achaian poleis including Pellana, Aigion or Aigeira and Telphousa 
(IG IV2 1.72), this was not the standard or only possible practice. Thi is seen from yet 
another conflict involving Epidauros and Hermione which was arbitrated by judges from 
Miletos and Rhodes at the request of both poleis (MDAI(A) 59). In many other cases, 
the arbitrating polis is unknown due to lacunae in the epigraphic text which makes it 
difficult to give a comprehensive overview of who exactly was arbitrating in these Achaian 
conflicts. In the instances in which we see the koinon itself appearing as a litigant – as 
for example in the dispute with the Boiotian koinon - in conflicts with its own members 
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or when it acted on behalf of its members in Megalopolis and Pagai in their respective 
territorial tiffs, a neutral party would be selected to intervene such as another koinon, 
Rome or an independent polis.
345
  
In addition to acting as a litigant on behalf of its members or delegating the 
arbitration to a third party as discussed above, the federal government could also act in 
a supervisory role in internal arbitrations. While we cannot state with absolute certainty 
that the federal state was not always involved in the arbitration process due to the 
fragmentary nature of some of the inscriptions, it seems reasonable to conclude from 
the available evidence that, as stated above, the federal government tended to not be 
involved unless there was a need for them to be. In the cases where the federal 
government was involved, the federal damiorgoi are mentioned several times in 
connection to the arbitration process. In addition to their administrative tasks, these 
public magistrates seem to have been responsible for the legal element of the disputes 
as they were the ones accepting the appeals from the parties and had to ensure that the 
final decision would be upheld.
 346
 They could issue a fine to one of the parties if the 
arbitrator’s decision was ignored. It seems to me that the issuing of these fines is one of 
the few ways in which the federal state got itself involved in these matters, as they would 
undoubtedly have been issued with an eye on keeping rowdy members in check. The 
fact that these fines were always issued by the federal damiorgoi gives the impression that 
they might have been the result of a federal law unbeknownst to us.
347
 However, as we 
can see from the Spartan-Megalopolitan inscription, these fines were not always paid, 
which brings their effectiveness and use into question.  
In total, there are twelve cases that required arbitration between cities that were 
known members of the Achaian koinon. These twelve cases included arbitrations 
between Epidauros and Corinth, Epidauros and Arsinoe, Alipheira and Lepreon, 
Megalopolis and Helisson, Megalopolis and Thouria, Messene and Phigaleia, 
Hermione and Epidauros, Sparta and Megalopolis, Troizen and Arsinoe, Megalopolis 
and Messene; a treaty between Kleonai and Argos, and a potential arbitration between 
Orchomenos and Megalopolis.
348
 There are references to the federal state in seven of 
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these: all of the disputes connected to Megalopolis – which will be discussed in more 
detail below – and the boundary disputes between Epidauros and Corinth as well as 
Epidauros and Arsinoe. It is easy to explain why exactly the federal state was involved in 
the first boundary dispute between Epidauros and Corinth as it has been argued that this 
was connected to Epidauros’ application to become a member of the koinon.
349
 While 
the inscription on the boundary dispute between Epidauros and Arsinoe mentions the 
Achaian strategos (just as the first boundary dispute does) as a means of dating the 
inscription, there are no other references to the koinon or its institutions which leads 
me to conclude that the koinon was not involved in this arbitration. However, all of the 
inter-poleis disputes concerning Megalopolis clearly refer to several aspects of the 
federal Achaian state. What this means for Megalopolis, and the role of the federal state 
in its arguments with others will be discussed in the last part of this chapter. 
3. Megalopolis, boundary disputes and the Achaian government 
In this last section of chapter three I will analyse several important documents 
concerning Megalopolis and its interactions with other Achaian member states. This 
analysis will show that through these relationships the Megalopolitans acted as any other 
polis did at the time: they fought with neighbours over territory, had trouble with towns 
under their control and their citizens could pursue alliances without any interference 
from above. However, the fact that in each and every one of these disputes there is some 
sort of reference to the federal state raises questions as to how the federal government 
was involved, which of the parties wanted this and more importantly, whether the 
internal relationship between Megalopolis and the federation could be considered 
unique. There are five disputes that have been preserved from Megalopolis’ time as a 
member of the Achaian League: an internal problem with some exiles from Methydrion 
residing in Orchomenos and boundary disputes with Helisson, Thouria, Messene and 
Sparta. It is important to note, however, that none of these inscriptions were found in 
the polis itself. They were either inscribed in the other polis connected to the dispute, 
as was the case for Messene and Orchomenos, or were found in Olympia, which, due 
to its importance within the Greek world, seems to have functioned within the koinon 
as the place for the proclamation of the most important federal documents – in addition 
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 The Achaian koinon used Olympia as well to showcase its relations with 
Rome. Therefore, it seems to have been logical for Megalopolis to inscribe the boundary 
disputes with Helisson, Thouria and Sparta in Olympia, as this would showcase their 
victories as well as their relationship with the federation to a wide range of visitors and 
the other poleis within the koinon. The places where these inscriptions were found show 
that the predominance of Megalopolis within the boundary disputes between the 
members of the Achaian koinon is not due to accidental survival as the city had made 
the effort to actively showcase their victories in these conflicts by setting up these 
inscriptions in public places such as Olympia. Moreover, it proves that Megalopolis was 
an active member of the Achaian koinon. For each of the conflicts, I will provide some 
basic information concerning the inscription, dating, the broader historical context and 
potential points of interest for the questions raised above.  
3.1. Orchomenos becomes an Achaian member (shortly after 235 BC) 
The first conflict associated with Megalopolis is not a boundary dispute but an 
inscription that recorded the entrance of the Arkadian city Orchomenos into the koinon 
at some point after 235 BC (Mackil n. 39). In the last four lines of the inscription 
Megalopolis is mentioned in connection to a group of exiles or expatriates from 
Methydrion who were living in the city of Orchomenos. Apparently, they had put down 
a golden statue of Athena Nike as collateral for a sum of money from Orchomenos, but 
the Achaians required the Methydrian exiles to repay this money to Megalopolis (l. 17-
21).  
The inscription itself was found in the city of Orchomenos and the text is kept 
reasonably intact with the exception of a few restorations at the end of the first lines. The 
date for the inscription has to be placed shortly after 235 BC because Megalopolis did 
not join the Achaian koinon until after Lydiades renounced his tyranny (Plut. Ar. 30. 1) 
and before that Orchomenos was under the control of others, first of Kleomenes and 
later the Aitolians (Pol. 2. 46).
 351
 The passing reference to Megalopolis in this inscription 
is interesting as the text itself is rather vague about what was actually going on with the 
golden statue. We know from Polybius (Pol. 4. 10) and Pausanias (Paus. 8. 12. 2) that 
Methydrion was a town under Megalopolitan control. There could be a group of 
                                                          
350
 Zoumbaki (2010), 111. 
351
 Ager n. 43, 129-131. 
121 
 
Methydrians living in Orchomenos who had taken this statue of Nike with them without 
Megalotopolitan approval, as is evidenced by the Orchomenos’ agreement to the 
repayment of the money. There is no indication where the statue came from since this 
detail is omitted from the inscription: it could have been stolen from Megalopolis by the 
Methydrians or they could have taken it from their own polis which, since it was under 
Megalopolitan control, meant that the money should still be repaid to the 
Megalopolitans. However, this is only one possible interpretation of the text as, based 
on the restauration of ‘οἱ μετοική]σα̣ντες’, these Methydrians could also be a group of 
migrants from Methydrion living in Orchomenos instead of being based in their native 
city. 
What is obvious however is that there were issues between the two poleis. As we 
have seen in chapter one, Megalopolis controlled a large area with several communities 
that were not always content with the polis. Moreover, the existence of bronze federal 
coins from Methydrion suggests that the town was one of the communities that seceded 
from Megalopolis in 194 BC in order to become an independent member of the 
Achaian koinon.
352
 This makes Ager’s suggestion that the Methydrians living in 
Orchomenos were in fact the leaders of a failed rebellion against Megalopolis who had 
stolen the statue to ensure safety in Orchomenos plausible even though this is not 
explicitly mentioned.
353
 The strong links in the design of the Megalopolitan and 
Methydrian coin dies imply that they were made by the same die engraver, indicating 
that there was still a close connection between the two states after the Third Macedonian 
War. 
 
Even though the poleis enjoyed a close relationship in the 180s BC, this does not 
mean that the Methydrians and Megalopolitans could not have been involved in a 
smaller dispute that involved the golden statue. Unfortunately, because of the Greek 
phrasing, this is all we can say with certainty. 
The involvement of the federal state however, which is alluded to several times 
(l. 5 and 10:  τὸ κοινὸν τ[ῶν Ἀχαιῶν’ -  l. 6, 12, 13 and 16: ‘οἱ Ἀχαιοί’) comes as no 
surprise since Orchomenos was to become a part of the koinon. As we have seen in the 
previous section, this was one of the few instances in which the federation would concern 
itself with interurban relations, as conflicts between potential and existing members were 
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to be avoided at all costs. Clearly, Achaian involvement - just as in the case of Epidauros 
and its entrance into the Achaian koinon - was due to federal interests because of the 
general expectation that all disputes should be settled before joining the Achaian koinon. 
So, if both Megalopolis and Orchomenos had not been members, the federation would 
never have insisted that this business had to be resolved as soon as possible or  
‘ἐὰμ μὴ ἀποδιδῶντι τὸ ἀργύριον τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις, καθὼς ἐξ[ε][χώρησεν 
ἁ πό]λις τῶν Ὀρχομενίων, ὑποδίκους εἶμεν τοὺς μὴ ποιοῦντας τὰ δίκαια’ 
(l. 20-21: ‘if they do not give back the silver to the Megalopolitans, as the polis 
of Orchomenos has agreed, those who do not act rightly will be liable for trial’).  
Therefore, it is the Achaian federal state and not Megalopolis that demanded action to 
be taken in order to resolve this dispute before Orchomenos joined the federation. After 
all, the internal equilibrium was what was most important to the federation.  
3.2. Boundary disputes between Megalopolis and Helisson and Megalopolis 
and Thouria (182-167 BC) 
Even though the boundary disputes between Megalopolis and Helisson and between the 
city and Thouria are two distinct cases, they will be discussed in the same subsection as 
both conflicts were described on the same marble slab.
354
 Fragments of this marble slab 
carrying the inscriptions were found in Olympia and can be dated to the period 182-167 
BC. For one, Thouria did not become an independent member of the Achaian koinon 
until 182 BC, since it was detached from Messene as a punishment for the city after the 
failed Messenian revolt of 183 BC in which Philopoimen died (Pol. 23. 17. 1-2). 
Additionally, the appearance of several influential Megalopolitans like Διοφάν[ει 
Διαίου, Θεαρίδα[ι Λυκόρτα, and Πολυβίω[ι Λυκόρτα (B. l. 5-6: ‘Diophanes son of 
Diaios, Thearides son of Lykortas, and Polybius son of Lykortas) also helps narrow 
down the dating of the document. These men were active in the years before the mass 
banishment of the Achaians to Rome and are also mentioned in Polybius’ narrative.
355
 
Moreover, both conflicts were arbitrated by an unknown polis ekkletos which could have 
sent out a committee led by a certain Aristomenes - Ἀρι]στομέ[ν]η (Helisson A. l. 3) 
and Ἀριστομένη (Thouria B. l. 14) – to physically inspect the boundary in question. 
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However, most important of all: both cases see Megalopolis and a neighbouring polis 
arguing over a boundary with the federal government somehow involved.  
3.2.1. Megalopolis and Helisson (182-167 BC) 
The inscription tells us that Megalopolis and Helisson argued about a boundary between 
the two cities.
356
 While the second party in the inscription was referred to as the polis of 
the Helisphasians (which is also mentioned in Pol. 11. 11. 6), another inscription (IPArk 
9) makes it clear that this is the collective name for the inhabitants of Helisson, which 
had been connected to Megalopolis at the time of the synoecism (Paus. 8. 27. 3). After 
the dissolution of the Arkadian koinon, it seems to have been shifted between Sparta 
and Mantinea before becoming an independent member of the koinon.
357
 In fact, there 
is an inscription that records a sympoliteia treaty between Mantinea and Helison dated 
to the fourth century BC, which was most likely connected to the wider Spartan-
Mantinean tensions in the Peloponnese at the time (IPArk 9). The conflict itself was 
arbitrated twice but due to the fragmentary state of the text only a few basic pieces of 
information are known about the first dispute, such as the parties involved, the 
arbitrators and a detailed outline of the contested boundary. On the back of the marble 
slab, this detailed description of the boundary is repeated along with clear references to 
the two contending parties, i.e. Megalopolis and Helisson (or the Helisphasians in the 
inscription). This suggests that the first attempt at arbitration was unsuccessful. 
Unfortunately, we cannot say anything about the eventual outcome of this conflict, but a 
possible deadline for a solution may have been proposed as evidenced by the word 
‘τετράμηνος̣’ (B l. 31: ‘lasting four months’). However, considering Megalopolis was 
(ostensibly?) victorious in its contention with Thouria, one could argue that this was the 
case here as well since both disputes appear on the same marble slab which could very 
well have been erected and placed in Olympia to commemorate Megalopolis’ two 
victories. 
Just as with the previous case, several references in the text such as ‘τᾶς ζαμία[ς’ 
(A l. 3: ‘of the fine’) and ‘Ἀχαιῶν δαμ[ιοργoι’ (B l. 30: ‘the Achaian damiorgoi’) point 
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to the involvement of the federation. While the reference to Aristomenes does not mean 
a lot here, it is possible that the koinon had appointed him as the head of a federal 
committee, especially in connection with the fine mentioned a line below, which was 
one of the ways for the federal magistrates to make sure the decision was enforced.
358
 
Kaja Harter-Uibopuu argues that there was a difference between the fine mentioned 
here and the one issued by the federation in the boundary dispute with Sparta. However, 
the new inscription from Messene proves that fines were issued by federal magistrates 
when an arbitration was not respected by one of the parties. This was done by the federal 
damiorgoi which are mentioned both here as well as in the Messene inscription and in 
that instance they act in a judicial capacity by judging whether the dispute could be 
arbitrated in accordance with the federal laws.
359
 Clearly because of the presence of a fine 
in addition to the damiorgoi, there was a need for the federal koinon to intervene – 
possibly at the request of the litigants - as one of the parties may not have respected the 
decision of the polis ekkletos or the committee under Aristomenes. 
3.2.2. Megalopolis and Thouria (182-167 BC) 
On this part of the marble slab we are dealing with another boundary dispute, this time 
between Megalopolis and Thouria and once again there is a detailed description of the 
boundary. There appear to be different stages in this conflict as is evident from the fact 
that an Achaian assembly at Sikyon is mentioned on lines 16 and 17. It is very plausible 
that the arbitration between Megalopolis and Thouria happened as a result of this 
Achaian assembly at Sikyon as an unknown polis can be seen acting as the arbitrator in 
addition to the commission under Aristomenes which acted as a smaller advisory council 
who most likely travelled to the area to inspect the border.
360
 After this examination, both 
parties sent delegates to the polis ekkletos to plead their case. In comparison to the three 
delegates from Thouria, the nine representatives from Megalopolis can be read as a 
clear statement of intent by the Megalopolitans, especially considering the type of people 
that the polis chose to send. To resolve this conflict the polis elected several of their 
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most influential citizens as ambassadors such as Diophanes, Thearides and Polybius. All 
of these men were well known within Achaia as they had held different federal 
magistrates: Diophanes was the Achaian strategos for the year 192/1 BC (Livy 36. 31. 1-
32. 9), Polybius was the hipparch for 170/169 BC (Pol. 28. 6. 8) and his brother 
Thearidas was part of several Achaian embassies to Rome (Pol. 32. 7. 1). Moreover, 
both Polybius and Thearidas were the sons of Lykortas who himself had been a close 
friend of Philopoimen and strategos of the koinon. By sending these experienced men 
to act on their behalf in a boundary dispute that seems to have been requested by the 
federal government, Megalopolis clearly shows that it knew what it meant to be a part of 
a federation and more importantly to use that to its advantage and get its way. This way 
the polis also informed other states that important Achaian statesmen from Megalopolis 
would still represent their native polis in its conflicts. Via these renowned experienced 
figures the city was able to show its prominence within the koinon, whichcould only have 
benefited them.
361
 The fact that Lykortas is not mentioned as one of the Megalopolitan 




 The federal koinon seems to have been the one to decide that the region under 
dispute should belong to Megalopolis:  
‘κατ[ὰ τὸ γραπτὸν ὃ ἔθε[σαν οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ . . . . . . . ἐ]ν τᾶι ἐν [Σι]κυῶνι συνόδω[ι, 
Μεγαλοπολιτᾶν εἶμεν τὰν χώρα]μ πλὰν̣ τὰν Δωρίδα’ 
(A l. 15-18: ‘following the proclamation that the Achaians made … in the 
assembly in Sikyon, the Megalopolitans will possess the land except Doris’).  
While the koinon could intervene in disputes between its members, it rarely did so and 
thus the situation here is a little unusual. The fact that it is in the assembly at Sikyon that 
the Achaians make the decision to grant the land to Megalopolis is noteworthy, since 
the assembly was normally not connected to procedures like this. However, this is not 
the only instance in which the koinon asks another polis to arbitrate a conflict and from 
comparison with the other cases it can be inferred that the first stages of this boundary 
dispute must have been connected to the entrance of an independent Thouria into the 
koinon and the Achaian desire to have this dispute settled. Since we know Thouria was 
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freed from Messene in 182 BC, the Achaians made their decision soon after the 
Messenian rebellion, which is also evidenced by the references to Messene (A l. 6, 10, 
14, 15 and 20) thereby explaining the exceptional nature of this decision. Nonetheless, 
the second ruling by the polis ekkletos after the examination of the boundary by 
Aristomenes and his committee could have still taken place in later years, which would 
be consistent with the presence of Polybius and his brother in the inscription; the 
absence of references to Messene only strengthens this point.
363
 Obviously, the historical 
background explains the reason for the Achaian involvement in this instance but that 
did not mean Megalopolis was not happy about this, as it provided them with another 
chance to use their influence on and understanding of the federation, whilst 
simultaneously showing their influence to other members which is clearly what they 
hoped to achieve through their impressive number of delegates. 
Another inscription found in Thouria (ISE 51) forms an interesting addendum 
to this boundary dispute as it records an agreement between the two cities to have 
disputes (κρίσεις) arbitrated by the city of Patrai (l. 4-8).364 The exact reason for these 
disputes is not known as this was just the agreement for an arbitration, nor is its outcome, 
although the 140 names of Thourian representatives that are part of the inscription 
would suggest that Thouria was victorious as  
‘ἂν νικάσωμες, ἁναγραψάτω ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τᾶς Συρίας εἰς στάλαν λιθίναν τούς τε 
συνδίκους πάντας πατριστί’ 
(l. 11-14: ‘if we should win, all representatives will be engraved on a stone stele 
with their father’s name in the sanctuary of Syrios’). 
Ager dates this inscription to the period around 150 BC, as she argues that the arbitration 
by Patrai was in line with the traditional process that disputes within the federation were 
generally handed over to a third party within the koinon.
365
 If this is the case, this is a 
good example of what happens when Megalopolis does not rely on the federal state to 
support its claims in interactions with other member states. Moreover, the fact that Patrai 
was chosen to be the judge might indicate that the koinon did not deem it necessary to 
intervene and if indeed the inscription is to be dated to the period around 150 BC, the 
federal state and its leaders may have been concerned with other, more pressing matters. 
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However, other scholars have argued that the fact that the federal state is not referred to 
at all in the inscription and the Greek text mentions synedrois, can only indicate that the 
dispute should actually be dated to the period after 146 BC.
366
 I am inclined to follow 
this theory as it is more consistent with the fact that, in the earlier period Megalopolis 
handled its disputes in a different way, with a habit of involving the federal magistrates 
in these conflicts. 
3.3. Boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Messene (soon after 182 BC) 
3.3.1. The dispute  
In the aftermath of the failed Messenian rebellion against the Achaian koinon in 183/182 
BC, the Megalopolitans saw their chance to lay claim to the areas of Endania and Pylana 
which had been in the hands of the Messenians until shortly before the rebellion.
367
 
According to an inscription that was found in Messene in 2008 by Petros Themelis, this 
was the first of several attempts to gain control of these two areas as well as two other 
regions known as Akreiatis and Bipeiatis.
368
 These attempts were eventually unsuccessful 
as can be seen from the Greek text:  
‘ὅπως οὖν ὑπόμναμα εἶ καὶ εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον ὅτι περί τε τᾶς Ἀκρειάτιος 
καὶ Βιπειάτιος κρίμασιν ἐνικάσαμες τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας καὶ περὶ τε τᾶς 
ζαμίας ἇς ἑζαμίωσαν ἁμὲ οἱ δαμιοργοὶ ἑνικάσαμες’  
(l. 85-90: ‘so that there may be a memorial for later times of the fact that we won 
from the Megalopolitans over Akreiatis and Bipeiatis in judgements and that we 
won in connection to the fine that we were fined by the federal damiorgoi’).  
The inscription recounting the boundary dispute between the two states is 190 lines long 
and only half of it has been published. Inscribed on a marble slate, it forms part of the 
base of an equestrian monument situated near a Doric temple in Messene.
369
  
The boundary dispute is rather complicated as there seem to have been several 
arbitrations between Megalopolis and Messene – and a third party called the Kalliatai – 
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about four different regions, i. e. Akreiatis, Bipeiatis, Endania and Pylania.
370
 In addition 
to these arbitrations, the Messenians also filed a lawsuit against the Megalopolitans which 
was overturned by the federal magistrates who instead fined the Messenians for not 
wanting to undergo another arbitration. The conflict was instigated by the 
Megalopolitans about the ownership and produce of the region of Akreiatis whicht they 
claim, in the unpublished section of the document was under their control at the time 
of their entry into the koinon.
371
 Unlike the other disputes, this first proklesis was about 
the ownership of the region and not its boundaries and a court outside of the Achaian 
koinon was chosen.  
A second step was then the Megalopolitan appeal to the Achaian synodos in Elis 
in which they claimed that the regions of Endania and Pylana were theirs (l. 2-11).
372
 
Apparently, the Megalopolitans had tried this before, but had been unsuccessful. This 
time, however, their official claim to the Achaian synodos leads to the first arbitration 
about these regions at the Karneiaseion in Endania by the so-called agemonas, a group 
of influential Achaians. However, before a verdict was reached, the Megalopolitans 
withdrew their claim. The unpublished text also shows that the Megalopolitans now 
changed tactic regarding Akreiatis as they switched the focus from a dispute about the 
ownership of the region to a dispute about the borders.
373
 Shortly, thereafter a new 
arbitration arose between the Messenians and the Kalliatai (who according to the text 
were acting on behalf of Megalopolis), this time about two other areas: Akreiatis and 
Bipeiatis (l. 12-43). This was followed by a second arbitration in the polis of Aigion 
where only seven out of the 147 judges thought the Megalopolitan-Kalliatan claim was 




So, after they won both arbitrations, the Messenians involved Megalopolis in a 
lawsuit concerning the produce from Akreiatis (l. 65-78). Interestingly, the unpublished 
text as discussed by Gerhard Thür shows that this region was at the heart of the conflict 
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between the two poleis as both parties continued to argue about it, inside and outsid of 
official courts: they sent embassies to one another about the matter and argued about it 
even after the verdict rendered by Aigion.
375
 Arguing that this overall dispute was not yet 
settled, the Megalopolitans however used the lawsuit about the produce of the region to 
obtain yet another arbitration about the areas and subsequently the Messenians were 
fined 3000 drachms by the federal damiorgoi for refusing to comply with this decision.
376
 
In the end, the Messenians were also victorious in the final arbitration by six Milesian 
judges and the entire argument was engraved on the equestrian monument (l. 79-100). 
Concerning the date of the dispute, there are some elements in the inscription that 
indicate some connections to the Messenian rebellion against the Achaian koinon in 
183 BC.
377
 Moreover, the identity of the so-called agemones, for example, can help us 
narrow down the time frame considerably. Since Kallikrates of Leontion and Archon of 
Aigira are among those cited as the agemones, the boundary dispute must have 
happened sometime in the early 180s or in the late 170s BC because we know both men 
were only active during this period (Pol. 22. 10. 8; Pol. 24. 8-10). Additionally, the 
opening lines of the decree refer to a time when ‘κατασ[χόν]των τῶν Ἀχαιῶν Ἐνδανίαν 
καὶ [Πυλ]άναν, τᾶς δὲ πόλεος ἀποκατασ[ταθείσ]ας εἰς τὰν συνπολιτείαν τῶ[ν 
Ἀχαιῶν]’ (l. 2-5: ‘the Achaians were occupying Endania and Pylana, and when the polis 
(i.e. Messene) had been restored to the Achaian koinon…’), which further indicates that 
this dispute was connected to a conflict involving Messene and the koinon. Lastly, the 
reference to Apollonidas as strategos of the koinon (l. 30-31) rules out 183/2 BC as the 
year for the synodos in Elis and makes it clear that this particular synodos is not the one 
where the Messenians were readmitted to the koinon.
378
 A list of Achaian strategoi that 
was compiled by Malcolm Errington lists Philopoimen - and Lykortas after the former’s 
death - as the strategos for the year 183/2 BC, Kallikrates for 180/179 BC and Archon 
for 175/4 BC, so this leaves quite a few gaps for Apollonidas to have been strategos.
379
 
Luraghi and Magnetto have spotted the name Αἰνητίδα or Ainetidas in the inscription, 
whom they believe can be identified as the leader of the federal damiorgoi approving 
the fine for the Messenians (l. 96). Moreover, both authors consider him to be the 
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strategos of the koinon at this point.
380
 Ilias Arnaoutoglou on the other hand suggests that 
Ainetidas could very well be the federal grammateus serving here as the eponymous 
magistrate.
381
 However, I think it is possible that we are looking at another strategos. 
Clearly, some time had passed between the judgement of the agemones under 
Apollonidas and allocation of the fine by the damiorgoi under Ainetidas, but we do not 
know exactly how long this was.
382
 
3.3.2. The historical background  
In this boundary dispute, it is obvious that Megalopolis takes the first step with their 
appeal to the synodos. The reason for this lies in the historical background of the events, 
i. e. the Messenian rebellion against the koinon. This was the result of tensions between 
the member state and the federal government who had forcibly inducted Messene into 
the league in 191 BC under its strategos Diophanes of Megalopolis (Livy 36. 31. 1-10).
383
 
This formed the basis of a very troubled relationship between the two states which had 
always been at odds as they ended up on opposite sides of many conflicts, since Messene 
was always weary of the expansionist policy of the koinon which threatened Messene’s 
independence.
384
 Consequently, the Messenians were not thrilled about their Achaian 
membership (Pol.  22. 10. 4-6) and under an influential Messenian named Deinokrates 
the polis tried to secede in 183 BC. Philopoimen, who was the strategos of the koinon, 
tried to curb the rebellion but was captured and killed in Messene (Plut. Phil. 18; Livy 
39. 49; Paus. 4. 29. 12). Following Philopoimen’s death, Lykortas took over as strategos 
and ransacked Messene and the surrounding areas. At the end of the rebellion, 
Philopoimen's body was transported back to Megalopolis and buried there, 
accompanied by great honours. Eventually a statue of the statesman was erected in his 
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Clearly, the Megalopolitans were deeply involved in these events and, it is therefore 
not surprising that Megalopolis was the initiating party of this dispute. They would have 
certainly known that the aftermath of the rebellion would be an ideal time to gain control 
over the contested areas and benefit from the situation between Messene and the federal 
state.
386
  The motives for doing so were undoubtedly connected to Messene rebelling 
against the koinon and their involvement in the death of Philopoimen who, despite the 
attempt to banish him, was very popular in his hometown (Plut. Phil. 1. 4). As we have 
already seen he even received his own hero cult, as is evidenced from the inscription 
mentioned above which dates to 183 BC and details the honours for the fallen hero (IG 
V
2 
432 l. 4-17):  
‘[τ]ιμαῖς ἰσοθέοις [ἀρε]τᾶς [ἕνεκεν καὶ εὐ][ε]ργεσίας, ἱδρύσα[σθαι δὲ εἰς τιμὰν 
αὐτοῦ] [ἐ]ν τᾶι ἀγορᾶι τὸ μ[νᾶμα καὶ μετᾶραι ἐκ …νίας τ[ὰ] ὀστ̣έα εἰς τ[ὰν 
ἀγορὰν … καὶ βωμ[ὸν κατασκευάσαι λευκόλιθον ὡς] [κ]άλλιστον, καὶ 
β[ουθυτεῖν τᾶι ἁμέραι τᾶι] [Δι]ὸς Σωτῆρος, στεφα[νῶσαι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν 
εἰ][κ]όσι χαλκέαι[ς τέσσαρσι?, ὧν στᾶσαι τὰν] [μὲ]ν μίαν ἐν [τῶι θ]εάτ[ρωι … 
[π]ε̣ζικάν, τὰ[ν δὲ ἄλλαν … ․․κον, τὰν δὲ ἄλ[λαν ἐν … [τ]ὰν δὲ ἄλλ[αν ἐν … 
καὶ ἀνακα][ρ]ῦξαι ἐν τῶ[ι ἀγῶνι τῶν Σωτηρίων τὸν] [στ]έφ[α]νον’ 
(‘godlike honours on account of his virtue and his benefaction, and to establish 
a memorial in the agora in his honour, and to transfer his bones from… to the 
agora… and to construct an altar of white marble, as beautiful as possible, to 
sacrifice an ox [on the day] of Zeus the Saviour; and to crown him with (?) four 
bronze statues, of which one shall be placed in the theatre… on foot, and 
another… and another…  and another… and to announce the award of the crown 
at the Soteria games’).  
Since the city goes very far in honouring Philopoimen, it is very clear that they wanted 
to show how important Philopoimen had been to them and how upset it was with his 
death. However, as Peter Kató has pointed out, according to Plutarch the chief 
motivation for the Achaian (and Megalopolitan) actions after Philopoimen’s death was 
revenge, but Polybius gives us a more nuanced image that highlights the political 
background that we can also find in these boundary disputes. In addition to losing their 
beloved leader, the Megalopolitans no doubt felt threatened by the fact that both Sparta 
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and Messene were rebelling against the koinon.
 387
 This must have worried the polis even 
more than other members, since out of all the Achaians, they were geographically closest 
to both Sparta and Messene and formed the border of the territory under control of the 
Achaian koinon. Moreover, this is also reflected in the epigraphical record through the 
boundary disputes that are discussed here and which are dated after or around 180 BC.
388
 
Because of this, it is logical that the Megalopolitans would have thought this 
dispute could be a good way of striking back at the Messenians for causing the death of 
Philopoimen. Up to this point however, as we have already seen, the relationship 
between Megalopolis and Messene was a complex one, since both poleis seem to have 
been closely connected with one another for a very long time.
 389
 For example, both cities 
were first established in the throngs of a profound wave of anti-Spartanism in the 
Peloponnese, a policy heavily advocated by the Thebans.
390
 This hatred of Sparta was a 
unifying factor for both poleis because of their close proximity to Lakedaimon, which 
meant they often had to bear the brunt of Spartan aggression.
391
 Already in the fourth 
century, Demosthenes illustrates this fact in his speech For the Megalopolitans when he 
mentions the scenario of a possible Spartan capture of Megalopolis which then would 
be followed by an attack on Messene. This would increase Spartan power in the 
Peloponnese and make helping the Messenians plausible, since they were an Athenian 
ally at the time (Dem. Meg. 8). Even more, when the Spartan king Kleomenes sacked 
Megalopolis in 223/2 BC, the inhabitants of the city managed to escape and find shelter 
with the Messenians (Pol. 2. 62. 10).
392
 The Messenians were happy to help since 
‘τῶν τε ἀρχαίων ἔργων ἕνεκα ὁπόσα ἐπὶ Ἀριστομένους ὑπῆρκτο Ἀρκάσι καὶ 
ὕστερον ἐπὶ τοῦ οἰκισμοῦ τοῦ Μεσσήνης, ἀποδιδόντες σφίσι τὴν ὁμοίαν’ 
 (Paus. 4. 29. 5: ‘because of old deeds done by the Arkadians at the time of 
Aristomenos and again at the foundation of Messene, they wanted to repay the 
favour’).   
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Additionally, when the Spartan tyrant Nabis attacked Messene, Philopoimen and other 
Megalopolitans came to their aid (Paus. 4. 29. 10). As long as Sparta was involved, the 
relationship between Messene and Megalopolis seems to have been one of mutual 
understanding and cooperation as they were working towards the same goal. Yet when 
the Achaian koinon became involved and forced Messene into the federation against its 
will – and through the initiative of a Megalopolitan no less -, Megalopolis could not 
understand the Messenian point of view, because the Megalopolitans had willingly 
joined since they saw the benefits of being part of a federation. And their relationship 
no doubt became even more strained when the Messenian rebellion led to the death of 
their beloved leader, leading the citizens to attempt to profit from the aftermath of the 
conflict soas to get revenge on the Messenians.  
I am sure that the Megalopolitans were convinced that they would be victorious 
and the koinon would back them in the conflict, since they had done so in other 
boundary disputes and could be expected be extra helpful in this case considering the 
current state of affairs. If we look at the text of the inscription again, it is clear that the 
Megalopolitans were very much mistaken: the federation did not support their claim. 
When Megalopolis entered a formal request (αἴτηνα), ‘τῶν δὲ Ἀχαι[ῶν α]ὐτοῖς 
π[ρο]ειπάντων μή κα περιθέμεν Μεγαλοπολίταις τὰν Μεσσανίων’ (l. 9-11: the 
Achaians answered them that they would not give Messenian lands to the 
Megalopolitans’). This rejection must have come as a surprise for the Megalopolitans 
and it did not stop them from  
‘ἐν τᾶι ἐν Ἄλει συνόδωι θέλειν κριθῆ[μεν μ]ὲν ποθ’ ἁμέ περί τε τᾶς πρότερον 
χώρας ἀ̣ντελέγοσαν ἁμῖν καὶ περὶ τᾶς Ἐνδανίκας καὶ Πυλανίκας’  
(l. 12-15: ‘at the synodos in Elis wanting to go to court with us concerning the 
lands previously disputed with us and they also called us to court concerning the 
lands of Endania and Pylania’).  
However, it might serve as an additional explanation for the polis’ withdrawal when this 
dispute was arbitrated for the first time by the agemones at the Karneiaseion, since the 
actions of the Megalopolitans at this stage of the conflict are quite illogical. One can pose 
the question why they would want to withdraw their claim, knowing fully well that they 
would lose the dispute automatically? I think the answer here can be found in the first 
rejection suffered by Megalopolis – which they had not forgotten by the time of the 
Karneiaseion arbitration – in combination with the identity of the individuals appointed 
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as the agemones by the koinon. All of these were important men from cities outside of 
the disputed regions or the parties involved. Most likely this was done to ensure absolute 
impartiality from all of the judges as they were dealing with two important members of 
the federation so shortly after a delicate situation.
393
 While this makes sense from the 
federal point of view, it was problematic for the Megalopolitans whose influence within 
the koinon mostly came from its ability to understand and manipulate the federal 
government via its own influential individuals. Consequently, a victory in this case was 
rendered highly unlikely. The polis probably agreed to the choice of judges at first, but, 
when things seemed to go awry for them at the actual arbitration, they saw that it would 
be better to withdraw their claim and try reach their goals via the Kalliatai and their 
claim.
394
 Moreover, as the unpulished text shows, the Megalopolitans were still involved 
in an ongoing dispute with the Messenians about the ownership of Akreiatis and 
therefore might not have considered it constructive to further pursue this issue.
395
 
The Megalopolitans would eventually try again and, through a claim made by a 
group called the Kalliatai, two new areas were brought into the boundary dispute. The 
Kalliatai are described by the Messenians as the minions of Megalopolis. While we have 
to remain aware of the heavily biased nature of the inscription, it is very possible that 
these people were indeed acting on behalf of the Megalopolitans. The Kalliatai might 
be one of the komai that separated itself from Megalopolis or it could simply be a small 
city close to Megalopolis with a shared interest in the disputed regions. Pausanias does 
mention an Arkadian city called Kallia (Paus. 8. 27. 4), but it does not border on any of 
the contested areas.
 396
 Whoever the Kalliatai were, they seem to have had a legitimate 
interest in the case. Looking at the connection that still existed between Methydrion and 
Megalopolis after its separation, it is very possible that this was one of the former 
Megalopolitan komai acting under Megalopolitan influence. These claims were judged 
by the city of Aigion where 140 out of 147 judges agreed with the Messenians.  
A short time after this second arbitration the Messenians brought a lawsuit 
against the Megalopolitans in connection to shared produce from one of the contested 
territories. The lawsuit was brought before the federal damiorgoi who ruled that this 
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lawsuit was invalid and instead fined the Messenians. They seem to have supported 
Megalopolis in their counterclaim that argued for another arbitration since no formal 
one had taken place, and fined Messene for not complying with this ruling (l. 70-75). At 
first sight this support for Megalopolis from the federal damiorgoi aligns very well with 
the other boundary disputes that we have seen in the previous inscriptions, but it is 
important to note that they are only fining the Messenians for not agreeing to a formal 
arbitration. As argued previously, this type of fine was often issued by the damiorgoi to 
punish members like Messene when they refused a formal arbitration.
397
 The fact that 
the damiorgoi issued a fine to the Messenians would indicate these federal magistrates 
thought that the previous arbitrations in the case were invalid, since the Messenians were 
required to have the dispute arbitrated one final time by a panel of six Milesian judges 
which once again agreed with the Messenian claim and reversed the fine, thereby ending 
the dispute which was recorded for posterity in the inscription. 
3.3.3. The dispute and the wider interurban interaction within the Achaian 
koinon 
Aside from giving some much-needed information about the relationship between 
Megalopolis and other member states in the second century BC, and more importantly 
the relationship between Megalopolis and the Achaian koinon, the Greek text tells us 
more about of the federal damiorgoi, federal fines and their connections to these 
interurban arbitrations. For example, we can see that this fine was issued by the federal 
magistrates in cases where the parties did not accept the request for arbitration like 
Messene did, or rejected the decision taken by the arbitrator like Sparta did in the 
boundary dispute discussed hereafter. It seems as though these fines were one of the 
few ways that the federal state actively interfered in the arbitration process and because 
of the Messene inscription we know that they were issued by the federal damiorgoi. In 
this dispute, those magistrates are the first point of contact between the federal state and 
its members in case of problems which makes it clear that any appeals to the federation 
will have happened through these magistrates. The fact that they are alluded to in every 
inscription connected to Megalopolis, proves that the polis had a history of settling 
problems with other poleis with the support of the Achaian magistrates. 
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Furthermore, just as in the case of Megalopolis’ boundary dispute with Thouria, 
the legal battle with the Messenians shows that Megalopolis achieved its position of 
influence within the koinon through its understanding of federal procedures. In the 
dispute with Thouria, the polis showed this by sending its most influential statesmen to 
the arbitration. In the Messenian case, the understanding of the federal protocols is 
illustrated by the manipulation of the federal customs via repeated appeals to the federal 
state for arbitration. When one appeal failed, the polis tried to get their way by using 
another method, i. e. soliciting the synodos or the federal damiorgoi, withdrawing or 
changing their claim as soon as it became clear that they were not going to win and then 
involving another group in the dispute.
398
 However, while Megalopolis did fully 
understand that these customs were the basis for its position of power within the koinon, 
the inscription also shows that their strategy did not always produce the intended results. 
It is clear that the polis had misread the events that formed the backdrop to this 
boundary dispute which meant that unlike in the other boundary disputes that involved 
Megalopolis, the polis was unsuccessful.
399
 Finally, the unpublished text also supports the 
argument made in previous chapters that Megalopolis was a city with the highest regard 
for federalism and federal procedures, something that was shared by the Achaian koinon 
in general: Megalopolis argued to change the external court of the Akreiatis dispute to 
an internal Achaian one as Messene had rejoined the koinon since the start of the 
dispute and according to the proper procedures identified at the start of this chapter, all 
ongoing disputes had to be arbitrated in connection with the federal state.
400
 
 So, while Megalopolis did indeed have a prominent position within the koinon, 
the ultimate goal for the Achaian state was to ensure the equality of all of its members. 
Consequently, when Megalopolis attempted to use the events of the Messenian rebellion 
to their advantage by laying claim to territories that had previously been Messenian, the 
federation and those in charge felt it wise to reject this proposal in order to ensure a 
continuation of the internal peace.
401
 This is also evidenced by the choice of the 
agemones who included Kallikrates of Leontion as well as Archon of Aigira, which 
indicates that the federation wanted to ensure neutrality in the judgement of this 
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arbitration. Furthermore, the whole dispute clearly illustrates that Megalopolis must 
have applied to the federal government in disputes with other members of the 
federation. Even though the koinon itself encouraged this, it still refrained itself from 
active arbitration, preferring to delegate this task to others or letting the disputing parties 
chose the arbitrator. It seems that there was a part of the Achaian federal statesmen who 
thought Megalopolis was simply trying to profit from the situation and cause trouble, 
something which they refused to give into. This is why the first Megalopolitan proposal 
was rejected at a synodos that took place in Megalopolis itself (Pol. 23. 16. 12-17. 2). 
After all, the secession of Messene and any possible subsequent conflicts threatened the 
internal status quo of the koinon and this was the absolute last thing that the federal state 
wanted. 
The Messene-Megalopolis inscription is a very interesting document as it 
provides us with a lot of new information on the internal organisation of the Achaian 
koinon and the way its members interacted with each other and the federal government. 
It sheds more light on the function of the federal damiorgoi who seem to have been one 
of the first points of contact between the local and the federal level. Most importantly 
however, this inscription is of vital importance for this chapter as it illustrates that 
Megalopolis was not always successful in its attempts to involve the federal state in its 
boundary disputes. Finally, the inscription clearly shows that the federal state also had 
its own priorities when it came to dealing with its member states. In this case, the koinon 
preferred to preserve the equilibrium within the federation to ensure that it could 
function without any internal troubles after the problems the Messenian rebellion had 
caused, even if it came at the cost of the Megalopolitan ambitions. 
3.4. Boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta (after 164 BC) 
The discussion of the boundary dispute between Sparta and Megalopolis (Mackil n. 45) 
will be the final section of this chapter, as well as bridging the transition to the last part 
of this thesis which deals with Megalopolis’ role in Achaian foreign politics. As the 
conflict between Megalopolis and Sparta was an important part of both the internal and 
the external affairs of the federal state, it is necessary to discuss the boundary dispute 
here and in the last chapter of this dissertation.  This is crucial because Megalopolis’ 
interactions with Sparta were part of its relationships with other members of the Achaian 
koinon, whilst simultaneously being the corner stone of Achaian relations with its biggest 
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ally from the beginning of the second century: Rome. Even though Rome seems to have 
been connected to the dispute as both parties apparently brought their grievances to the 
city (l. 43-44), I will refrain from discussing the significance of this involvement here and 
return to it in chapter five. which is a re-examination of Achaian-Roman interactions 
through the antagonism between the Megalopolitan politicians and Sparta. Accordingly, 
here I will draw attention to the elements important for the internal relationship between 
Megalopolis and the Achaian federal system and how that influenced its interaction with 
other members. 
Just like the stele bearing the Helisson and Thouria inscriptions, this inscription 
was also found in Olympia, and deals with a boundary dispute between Megalopolis and 
Sparta, which later turned into a dispute between Sparta and the Achaian koinon when 
Sparta did not accept the fine imposed on them by the federal magistrates. The most 
plausible date for the boundary dispute is most likely after 164 BC as we can see from a 
passage in Polybius in which Megalopolis and Sparta appealed to Rome to get this 
conflict resolved, which is dated to 164 BC (Pol. 31. 1. 6-7). Pausanias tells us that the 
Roman senate subsequently appointed Gaius Sulpicius Gallus and Manius Sergius as 
intermediaries to solve the conflict, but handed the final decision over to Kallikrates 
(Paus. 7. 11. 1-2). Pausanias’ passage however is problematic since he lists Argos and 
Sparta as the two parties in this conflict.
402
 Even though we cannot be certain that 
Pausanias is making a mistake here and actually means Megalopolis and not Argos, the 
general information he gives does seem to correspond with the inscription and Polybius’ 
passage.
403
 Additionally, the fact that the Romans hand the final decision back to the 
Achaian koinon is completely in line with the conventional Roman-Greek interactions 
in this period. These were characterised by Greek embassies that were going to Rome 
to ask for arbitration or support in their conflicts and on the one hand and the Roman 
Senate, delegating the solution of these conflicts to third parties. This is clear from the 
many embassies sent by Sparta and Messene which in most instances saw the Senate 
refer the case back to the Achaian koinon as was the norm for any internal conflict.
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The main cause for this boundary dispute between Sparta and Megalopolis is 
over the control of the regions Skiritis and Aigytis which had been the subject of struggles 
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between the two states for a long time. Interestingly, Kaja Harter-Uipobuu thinks that a 
first arbitration about these regions occurred under Philip II of Macedon when the king 
restored certain areas under Lakedaimonian control to Tegea, Argos, Megalopolis and 
Messene (Pol. 9. 28. 9-10).
405
 Even though Polybius does not explicitly mention these 
two regions, Harter-Uipobuu cites several other sources to prove her point (Paus. 7. 11. 
1; Strabo. 8. 4. 6; Livy 38. 34. 1; Tac. An. 4. 43. 1.). These sources do show that Harter-
Uibopuu is right about the fact that Skiritis and Aigytis were most likely one of the 
regions Polybius is talking about, since another passage from Livy mentions the 
Belbinatis which was another region between Megalopolis and Sparta which ‘iniuria 
tyranni Lakedaimoniorum possederant’ (Livy 38. 34. 8: ‘the Lakedaimonian tyrants had 
possessed unjustly’). Therefore, I do not think that Philip II’s actions should be seen as 
a first arbitration in a conflict between Sparta and Megalopolis, since there is not enough 
proof for this and the sources cited by Harter-Uibopuu do not refer to a specific 
arbitration.
406
 For example, the Livy passage only uses Philip II for dating purposes, while 
Tacitus and Strabo mention the same general information as Polybius does. However, 
we do know that the Belbinatis region as well as the two regions mentioned in the 
boundary description were frequent points of contention between Sparta and 
Megalopolis due to the many violent attempts to gain control over the areas which were 
originally Arkadian (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 24).
407
 In the following decades, several of the 
Spartan kings and tyrants try to take control of Aigytis, Skiritis and Belminatis: 
Kleomenes managed to conquer the Athenaion in 228 BC only to have it restored to 
Megalopolis by Antigonos Gonatas (Pol. 2. 54. 3); Machanidas gained control of the 
Belbinatis again in 210 BC (Pol. 4. 37. 6), after which it remained under Spartan control 
until Philopoimen defeated Nabis of Sparta in 192 BC, when the region finally became 
part of the Megalopolitan territory again.
408
 
While the inscription records a decision on the boundary dispute between 
Sparta and Megalopolis, we clearly see the federal state acting as a litigant on behalf of 
the Megalopolitans:  
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‘ἀπόφασις δικαστᾶν π̣[ερὶ χώρας ἀμφιλλεγομένας, τῶν αἱρεθέντων] δικάσαι 
τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς κ[αὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις’  
(l. 1-2: ‘the decision of the judges about the lands under dispute. These were 
chosen to judge between the Achaians and the Lakedaimonians’). 
The fact that Sparta was apparently given a fine (l. 5-6: περὶ τᾶς ζαμίας ἇς ἐζαμίωσα[ν 
… τὸν δᾶμον τὸν Λα]κεδαιμονίων’ - ‘about the fine imposed... to the people of 
Lakedaimon’) further indicates that the polis had caused trouble by not accepting 
previous verdicts which were in favour of Megalopolis since  
‘οἱ δικασταὶ ἔκριν]αν γ̣[ενέσθαι] [τὰν Σκιρ]ῖτ̣ιν καὶ τὰν Αἰγῦτιν Ἀρκ̣[άδων ἀπὸ] 
τοῦ τοὺς Ἡρακλείδας εἰς [Π]ε̣λοπόννασον κατελθεῖν.’ 
 (l. 34-36: ‘the judges decided that Skirits and Aigytis were Arkadian ever since 
the Herakleidai returned to the Peloponnese’). 
 This is the reason why the federal state is so involved in this boundary dispute and acts 
as a claimant in this inscription: Sparta was causing internal trouble within the koinon by 
not accepting the previous arbitration by 101 judges (l. 37-38) which meant the koinon 
had to actively take a stand. In fact, the entire reason for writing this inscription was  
‘ὅπως δα[μ]οκρατούμενοι καὶ τὰ ποθ’ αὑτοὺς ὁμονοοῦντες οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ 
διατε[λ]ῶντι εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ὄντες ἐν εἰράναι καὶ εὐνομίαι’  
(l. 17-19: ‘so that the Achaians, governing themselves democratically and 
agreeing amongst themselves, could remain in peace and benevolence for all 
time’).  
After all, the highest priority for the koinon was to secure its internal peace and the best 
way to do this was to enter the conflict on the side of the Megalopolitans. The fact that 
the two parties were Sparta and Megalopolis may have been the reason why the koinon 
also felt the need to personally intervene, since they did not do so in the previous 
dispute. Although there is no clear evidence in the inscription for Megalopolis having 
appealed to the koinon to settle this dispute before asking Rome to intervene, the past 
actions of the two states in connection to the conflict make it clear that the koinon (and 
its allies) supported Megalopolis. The polis obviously knew this and may very well have 
tried to use its position within the koinon to secure a positive judgement.  
 




Throughout this chapter, Megalopolis’ membership of the Achaian koinon has been 
examined and it has become apparent that the polis can be characterized as a typical 
Achaian polis. We have seen that the polis was quite influential within the federal state 
and that it actively took part in the internal life of the federal state. As we have seen in 
the previous chapter, Megalopolis was one of the first poleis to mint the bronze federal 
coinage and express their pride at being part of the federation. In addition to this, 
Megalopolis also sent representatives to the federal institutions and hosted the federal 
assembly several times in their city after 188 BC. That the Megalopolitans valued their 
participation in these institutions can be inferred from the fact that the polis appears on 
both nomographoi lists, since this indicates that the polis was willing to send their 
nomographoi to meetings even when the whole board did not have to be there. This 
commitment of the polis to the federal institutions and procedures is also a typical 
example of the Megalopolitan identity and is also exemplified by Polybius in his 
comments on the superiority of the Achaiain constitution as discussed in chapter two.  
However, through its interactions with the other members of the federation, this 
picture becomes even more complete. Generally, it seems as though the Achaian koinon 
preferred to stay out of conflicts between its members but when it came to Megalopolis, 
there appears to always be some sort of federal involvement. While this generally 
supports my thesis that Megalopolis held a special position in the Achaian koinon, the 
specifics of each of the five boundary disputes discussed in this chapter provide a more 
nuanced result. In the first place, the koinon intervened to secure the internal status quo 
of the federation as was the case in the disputes between Megalopolis and Messene and 
Megalopolis and Sparta, but this does not mean that Megalopolis did not try to use its 
position within the federation to its own advantage. The polis clearly understood how 
the federal institutions and procedures worked which is why they were so keen on taking 
part and representing themselves. In the boundary disputes, the city also shows this 
through their repeated and varied appeals in the boundary dispute with Messene where 
they try different approaches to get control over the disputed areas, but they remain 
unsuccessful in the end. In the boundary dispute with Thouria, the polis has a different 
tactic which is successful: they sent their most influential and famous citizens to represent 
Megalopolits at the arbitration. Moreover, all of the inscriptions refer to the federal 
damiorgoi and allude to some sort of fine. As we have seen from the recently excavated 
Messene inscription, these fines were issued by the damiorgoi when one of the parties 
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was unwilling to cooperate with the arbitration process or the arbitrator’s final verdict. 
All of this further indicates that Megalopolis seems to have had a habit of appealing to 
the federal magistrates in case of any arbitration that involved other members to ensure 
that they would receive the result they were hoping for. Furthermore, even when it came 
to their disputes with other members of the koinon Megalopolis was also committed to 
ensuring that these were settled peacefully and in accordance with the federal 
procedures. 
 This federal involvement in all of these disputes is striking as it indicates that 
there was something special about the relationship between the Achaian federal state 
and Megalopolis, something that rarely happened for other Achaian member states. 
While this is obviously true as Megalopolis did influence the foreign policy of the 
federation through its distinct local identity and interests, more generally speaking the 
first segment of this chapter has shown that as a member of the koinon, Megalopolis was 
also just like any other city. This is also clear from the boundary dispute between 
Megalopolis and Messene in which the koinon’s number one priority was to ensure the 
equality of all of its members and make sure that the internal peace was kept. This meant 
that Megalopolis did not manage to get support from the koinon as a whole, which it 
was able to do in the other disputes in which there was no direct threat to the organisation 
of the koinon. Furthermore, the boundary dispute with Sparta shows this as well, but in 
this instance, it was Sparta that was the menace so the federation acted as a litigant on 
behalf of Megalopolis. Clearly, as far as the federal state was concerned, Megalopolis 
was a typical member of the federation, yet due to the polis’ ability to utilise the federal 
institutions to its own advantage in these interactions and its active participation in these 
institutions, Megalopolis often succeeded in using the Achaian magistrates to increase 
its importance as a source of influence on the koinon whilst simultaneously furthering 
its own local interests. This is especially clear on the international level where the city 
was able to indirectly put its stamp on Achaian foreign politics through the many federal 
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The last chapter has shown that internally, the relationship between Megalopolis and the 
Achaian koinon was often just like that of the other member states. However, the polis 
set itself apart from those other member states as it tried to use the federal institutions 
and procedures to its advantage on many different levels such as the boundary disputes 
discussed in the previous chapter or Philopoimen’s proposal to rotate the meeting of 
the federal assembly in 188 BC in order to break the political monopoly of Aigion. As 
long as this did not influence the status quo within the koinon, the Achaians did not 
seem to mind, but if Megalopolis’ actions were to endanger the federal equilibrium - as 
they threatened to do so in the boundary dispute with Messene – the federal state would 
choose to uphold the democratic nature of the federal state and prevent the polis’ 
actions. The next section will show a very different side of the Achaian-Megalopolitan 
relationship as the influence of the local identity of the polis is very clear in the Achaian 
foreign policy during the period from 235 to 146 BC.  
The way in which Megalopolis influenced the Achaian foreign politics can be 
dedected throughout the polis’ federal membership. In the 220s BC, Megalopolis as a 
city was responsible for the first connections between the Achaians and the Macedonian 
king Antigonos during the Kleomenean War. However, after the Achaian synodos of 
198 BC, the koinon abandoned their alliance with Philip V of Macedon in favour of 
Rome, and the nature of the Megalopolitan influence shifted from the civic level to the 
individual one as a result of the rise of important individuals from Megalopolis within 
Achaian federal politics, including like Philopoimen and Lykortas. Therefore, because 
the Megalopolitan role in Achaian foreign politics was very different in the second 
century BC from what it had been in the decades after they first joined the Achaian 
koinon, I have chosen to discuss the Achaian foreign politics in the third and second 
centuries in two separate chapters. This will also allow me to highlight some of these 
differences and changes in the Megalopolitan influence on the Achaian foreign policy 
as well as the development of the city’s own local identity. Moreover, the two chapters 
consistently show that careful research can show that no Greek polis was unified and 
Greek political life marked by a complex interaction between different internal factions, 
even for cities outside of Sparta and Athens.  
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Chapter 4: Megalopolis and Achaian foreign politics in the third century 
BC 
After Megalopolis joined the Achaian koinon in 235 BC, it did not take long for the city 
to be embroiled in its first international conflict: the Achaian War with Kleomenes III 
of Sparta (229-221 BC). Kleomenes ascended to the throne around 235 BC and soon 
became a formidable adversary (Plut. Ar. 35. 4).  Tensions between Sparta and the 
koinon increased over the next few years, so when Kleomenes took possession of the 
Athenaion in Megalopolitan territory, the Achaians declared war with Sparta (Pol. 2. 46. 
6). Lasting until 221 BC, the struggle was in many ways decisive for Achaian claims in 
the Peloponnese and their international politics due to the Achaian decision to invite 
the Macedonian king Antigonos Gonatas into the war around 225 BC. This was the start 
of an alliance between the two states.  
 The Kleomenean War will be used as a case study of Megalopolis’ influence on 
Achaian foreign politics in the third century BC because it is the perfect example of the 
ways in which the core elements of the Megalopolitan identity shaped these federal 
interactions. For one, this was the first time that the Achaian koinon went to war with 
Sparta. The fact that this happened only six years after Megalopolis became a member 
of the federation is more than just a coincidence. Lydiades’ actions during his federal 
career prove this point as they were directed at Sparta from the very start (Plut. Ar.  30. 
3). It is clear therefore that the inclusion of Megalopolis into the federation brought with 
it an increased focus on Sparta because of the traditional antagonism between the two 
poleis and the fact that Sparta now shared an adjacent border with the federation through 
Megalopolis. In addition to Sparta becoming a federal concern, the war was also 
responsible for creating a formal alliance between the Achaians and the Macedonian 
kings, via Antigonos and his successor Philip V.  Polybius tells us that Aratos was the 
architect behind this alliance, which is noteworthy as his previous policy of expansion in 
the Peloponnese was supposed to expel any Macedonian influence in the area. The 
Achaian expansion was also the reason why several tyrants like Lydiades renounced their 
tyranny and joined the koinon. However, as we have already argued in the introduction, 
Polybius has a habit of writing a version of events that was dominated by individuals such 
as Aratos in this case. This means that we lose sight of other actors at play such as 
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Megalopolis. Because of this, I believe that Megalopolis as a polis was responsible for 
establishing thr first contacts between Achaia and Macedon. 
As a result of the problematic nature of the sources that describe the events of 
this war, it is important to nuance this Polybian claim and see what can be said with 
certainty once the sources are analysed. This chapter will therefore start with a general 
description of the events as they are depicted by four ancient authors, which will be 
followed by an analysis of the problems surrounding these narratives. Particular attention 
will be paid to Aratos’ role as architect of the Achaian-Macedonian alliance as well as 
the connection of Megalopolis to the events of the War. In a second section of this 
chapter, I will discuss the history of Megalopolitan relations with Macedon to support 
my argument that Megalopolis was the real engineer of the alliance between the two 
states. Finally, throughout this chapter, Megalopolis’ and the Achaian interactions with 
Sparta will be discussed and emphasized to as they formed the core element of 
Megalopolis’ influence on Achaian foreign politics and connect Achaian relations with 
two very different allies – i.e. Macedon and Rome – during the third and second 
centuries BC. 
1. The literary sources on the War against Kleomenes (229-222 BC) 
1.1. The discrepancies in the accounts of Polybius and Plutarch about the War 
We know of four ancient authors who describe the Kleomenean War: Polybius and 
Plutarch in addition to Aratos and Phylarchus whose works are now lost. Both Plutarch 
and Polybius give distinct versions of the conflict. While Plutarch places the historical 
events in relation to the biographical nature of his lives, Polybius’ account is quite 
problematic in general, particularly as it occurs in book two of his Histories which served 
as the introduction to Polybius’ narrative. In contrast to Polybius’ later accounts of wars 
and conflicts, the description of the Kleomean War might not be as detailed because of 
this. However, both authors agree that these were the main events of the war: soon after 
his ascension to the throne, Kleomenes installed a series of social reforms in which 
former debts were cancelled, the Spartan land was equally distributed between the 
citizens and the old Lykurgean constitution was restored by abolishing offices such as 
the ephorates.
409
 Kleomenes conquered several of the Arkadian cities closest to the 
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Spartan border. When he made a move on the Athenaion in Belbina in 229 BC, which 
was a region under Megalopolitan control but heavily contested between the city and 
Sparta, the Achaians went to war with Sparta. After a few years, Kleomenes had achieved 
considerable successes: he won several decisive battles against the Achaians including 
the one at Ladokeia in 227 BC where Lydiades of Megalopolis had died, and Ptolemy 
III Euergetes had abandoned the Achaians in favour of the Spartan king (Pol. 2. 51). 
This left the koinon and its leader Aratos in a state of isolation and meant they had no 
other option than to ask Antigonos and his Macedonian forces to aid them, particularly 
after Kleomenes gained control over the city of Corinth in 225 BC. All sources mention 
Megalopolis’ involvement in this affair because of their previous relations with Macedon.
 
The Megalopolitan embassy to Antigonos took place in 227 BC but it was not until 
225/224 BC that the Achaians officially ratified an alliance with an embassy that included 
Aratos’ son. By then the situation had become dire as the koinon had lost the financial 
support provided by Ptolemy III and Kleomenes had gained several notable military 
victories. This alliance marked a clear change in the war as Macedon was now fighting 
on the Achaian side. In 224 BC, Antigonos revived a new version of the Hellenic League 
which united his Greek allies under his leadership against Kleomenes.
410
 Together, the 
allies managed to regain control over the Arkadian cities. Because of the loss of these 
cities, Kleomenes felt threatened and attacked Megalopolis (Plut. Kleo. 12. 2). Only in 
222 BC, not long after the destruction of Megalopolis, did the two allies finally succeed 
in defeating the king in the battle at Sellasia.  
While the general outline of the war is the same for both Polybius and Plutarch, 
the differences in their accounts provide us with a few problems. A first issue lies in the 
very different nature of the works of both authors. Polybius’ description of the 
Kleomenean War is part of his idealised description of the constitution of the Achaian 
koinon in book two and is an explanation why the federation succeeded in incorporating 
the entire Peloponnese by Polybius’ time. Therefore, the events of the war and Aratos’ 
actions during it belong in this wider context: the idealised description of the Achaian 
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polity and the men responsible for it. This is evidenced by Polybius’ words on Aratos’ 
role in the polity:  
‘ἧς ἀρχηγὸν μὲν καὶ καθηγεμόνα τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς Ἄρατον νομιστέον τὸν 
Σικυώνιον’ 
(Pol. 2. 40. 2: ‘Aratos of Sikyon should be seen as the initiator and guide of the 
project’). 
In Plutarch’s case the war is mentioned in his Lives of Kleomenes, Aratos and briefly in 
the Philopoimen. As the main goal of these Lives is biographical, thus presenting us with 
two somewhat constrasting perspectives, making it difficult to get a nuanced view of what 
actually happened. 
Additionally, Plutarch’s Lives of Aratus and Kleomenes are a lot more detailed, 
even mentioning details that Polybius himself omitted such as the so-called political crisis 
within the koinon that happened shortly before the official creation of the alliance (Plut. 
Ar. 39-42; Kleo. 16-19). In these passages, Plutarch describes the resentment felt by 
some of the Achaians for Aratos and his policy and their willingness to align themselves 
with Kleomenes, which is why some of them were ‘conquered’ so easily by the king.
411
 
After the king’s conquest of Corinth in 225 BC, Aratos apparently only barely made it 
out of the city and was soon elected general plenipotentiary (Plut. Ar. 41. 1). 
Subsequently, Kleomenes attempted to reconcile with the Achaians by offering them a 
joint garrison at Acrocorinth under his leadership but Aratos declined (Plut. Kleo. 19. 
8). Another example of this was Plutarch’s extensive details on Lydiades’ political career 
after he joins the federation (Plut. Ar. 30; 35-37), something that is completely ignored 
in the Histories. While it is rather interesting that Polybius does not provide us with 
more information about Lydiades, whom he clearly admired, his silence on the first 
matter can be explained by the ideological context of book two of his narrative – i.e. the 
need to portray Aratos and the koinon in the best possible way – as he could not achieve 
this by giving a detailed overview of this political crisis. Moreover, the historian did not 
want to admit that there might have been those within the federation that supported the 
policies of Kleomenes, which has been suggested as the real reason behind Polybius’ 
hatred for Kleomenes and his support for the Achaian War against the Spartan king.
412
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Another illustrating example of the differences between Polybius’ and Plutarch’s 
accounts was the motivation of all parties to go to war. In his Kleomenes, Plutarch tells 
us that both sides had their reasons. The Spartan king thought it would be easier to 
install social reforms in the city during a time of war and Aratos  
‘παρηνώχλει τοῖς Ἀρκάσι καὶ περιέκοπτεν αὐτῶν μάλιστα τοὺς τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς 
ὁμοροῦντας, ἀποπειρώμενος τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ τοῦ Κλεομένους ὡς 
νέου καὶ ἀπείρου καταφρονῶν’  
(Plut. Kleo. 3. 4-5: ‘started disturbing the Arkadians and sacking the lands of 
those closest to the Achaians, trying to test the Lakedaimonians, and Kleomenes 
who he thought of as a young and inexperienced man").  
Contrastingly, in the Aratos, he seems to try everything to avoid going to war with 
Kleomenes (Plut. Ar. 35). These different statements have everything to do with the 
nature of the two Lives which were meant to praise their respective subjects, making it 
obvious that the comment Plutarch makes about Aratos harassing the Arkadians was 
most likely a fabrication to shine a positive light on Kleomenes and his actions. If one 
considers that Plutarch seems to have used Phylarchus’ histories as his source for the 
Kleomenes, this might further explain the nature of these contrasting statements in both 
lives as they were both based on sources that had their own subjective views on the war. 
For Polybius, the Aitolians and their actions were the main motivation behind 
the war. The Kleomean War was the result of a secret pact between the Aitolian koinon, 
Kleomenes and Antigonos according to Polybius (Pol. 2. 45-47). At first glance Polybius’ 
statement on this so-called triple alliance may very well be possible: the Aitolian koinon 
found itself by 228 BC in a declining position of power because of Antigonos Doson’ 
emergence as a strong Macedonian king along with the rapid growth of the Achaian 
koinon in the Peloponnese.
413
 However, closer examination of past relations between 
Sparta, Macedon and Aitolia, easily discards this mention of an alliance as just another 
claim made by Polybius – undoubtedly echoing Aratos – to justify the Achaian political 
actions of the time. The alliance fromed by the Achaians and Aitolians against Doson’s 
predecessor Demetrios to protect both states against Macedonian aggression, was most 
likely inactive by 228 BC because of a lack of mutual support in ongoing conflicts that 
both koina were involved in (Pol. 2. 44. 1). Moreover, Kleomenes’ acquisition of three 
Aitolian allies, i.e. Mantinea, Tegea and Orchomenus, without direct Aitolian action as 
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a result of the loss of these allies may indicate a friendly inclination of the Aitolians 
towards Sparta.
414
 Thus an alliance between Sparta and Aitolia could be a possibility in 
the early years of the Kleomenean War. In fact, it was referred to by the Megalopolitan 
ambassadors Kerkidas and Nikophanes in their speech to Antigonos Doson when they 
were asking the king for help against Kleomenes in 225 BC (Pol. 2. 49. 9). However, 
this may have been Megalopolitan propaganda uttered by these envoys to secure 
Antigonos’ involvement in the war. Nonetheless, the participation of the Macedonian 
kings in this particular agreement between Sparta and Aitolia is rather unlikely, since 
past relations between Macedon and Aitolia would not allow a Megalopolitan-Aitolian 
affliation to be established.
 415
  Clearly, Antigonos would not have preferred to have the 
Peloponnese dominated by the Aitolians, much more than he would have the Achaians 
or Kleomenes. So, the triple alliance that was the cause of the Kleomenean War 
according to Polybius is extremely unlikely to have involved Macedon, but it is rather 
possible that the Aitolians were involved on the Spartan side; that is at least until they 
withdrew themselves from the conflict early on.
416
 
Due to these different explanations provided by both authors, the exact motives 
behind the war cannot be determined with certainty. However, both parties must have 
considered the benefits that would come from fighting this war. After his ascension in 
235 BC, Kleomenes implemented a series of socio-political reforms with the goal of 
creating a stronger Sparta that he would ultimately restore to its former grandeur through 
a leading position in the Peloponnese.
417
 This would be much easier to do in a time of 
war when external forces were only concerned about the king’s actions outside of Sparta 
(Plut. Kleo. 3. 4-5). Additionally, if Kleomenes wanted to dominate the Peloponnese, 
he would have to do so by opposing the Achaian koinon, which had now incorporated 
one of Sparta’s oldest enemies, Megalopolis. From the very moment that Kleomenes 
started stirring up trouble in Arkadia and the Megalopolitan borderland, the city would 
most certainly have appealed to the rest of the koinon to undertake action. Outwardly, 
Plutarch's statement about the Achaians and their leader Aratos not wanting a war with 
Sparta could be true because of a previous alliance between the two states under King 
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Agis IV (Plut. Ag. 13-15). Nevertheless, it is also true that by eliminating one of his most 
influential opponents, Aratos would be closer to reaching the completion of the strategy 
he had in mind for the Achaian League, i.e. the expansion of the koinon to include the 
entire Peloponnese (Pol. 2. 40. 2.).
418
 Judging by the casual way in which alliances were 
made and broken, self-preservation and personal gain were essential motivators in 
international politics in mainland Greece during the third century BC.
419
 Hence, a past 
alliance with Sparta would not have stopped Aratos and Achaia from declaring war on 
Sparta if the polis was a direct threat to one of its members, in particular as this past 
alliance was rather shortlived. So, when Kleomenes decided to attack the Athenaion on 
Megalopolitan territory, the Achaians did not hesitate to abstain from their original 
policy of resistance and come to the aid of their Arkadian member state.
420
  
 The second and most important example, where the narratives of Polybius and 
Plutarch vastly differ concerns the events leading up to the formation of the Achaian 
alliance with Macedon. In a very problematic account, Polybius recounts Aratos' 
realisation that after all the defeats the Achaians had suffered at the hands of Kleomenes, 
they would not be able to defeat Kleomenes on their own. And so,  
‘προορώμενος (Ἄρατος) τὸ μέλλον καὶ δεδιὼς τήν τε τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἀπόνοιαν 
καὶ τόλμαν ἔκρινε πρὸ πολλοῦ λυμαίνεσθαι τὴν ἐπιβολὴν αὐτῶν’  
(Pol. 2. 47. 4: ‘foreseeing the future and fearing the senselessness and audacity 




The statesman did this by trying to establish an alliance with the Macedonian king in 
225-224 BC, knowing that these negotiations had to happen in secret due to general 
Achaian resentment for Macedon. Therefore, he turned to Megalopolis because he 
knew that the polis had a good relationship with the Macedonians and its citizens were 
suffering heavily from the war. With the approval of the federal assembly, the 
Megalopolitans sent an embassy to Antigonos Gonatas to ask him for help. After 
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obtaining a promise to aid the koinon, the two ambassadors returned to the federal 
assembly on behalf of their polis to show the outcome of their mission and compel them 
to ask for his support at once.  However, they found themselves opposed by Aratos who 
convinced them 
‘δι᾽ αὑτῶν σῴζειν καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν: οὐδὲν γὰρ εἶναι τούτου 
κάλλιον οὐδὲ συμφορώτερον. ἐὰν δ᾽ ἄρα πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἀντιβαίνῃ τὰ τῆς 
τύχης, πρότερον ἔφη δεῖν ἐξελέγξαντας πάσας τὰς ἐν αὑτοῖς ἐλπίδας τότε 
καταφεύγειν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν φίλων βοηθείας’  
(Pol. 2. 50. 11-12: ‘to save the cities and land themselves: for nothing was better 
or more advantageous. If adverse fortune should prevent this, then, but only 
when they had no hope left in their own resources, he advised them to resort to 
an appeal to their friends’).  
In the following chapter, Polybius explains that the Achaians had fewer and fewer 
opportunities to oppose an alliance with Macedon as Kleomenes conquered more and 
more of the Peloponnese. Finally, his conquest of Corinth solved one of Aratos’ main 
concerns regarding the pending coalition with Macedon and the Achaians officially 
invited Antigonos into the Peloponnese (Pol. 2. 52). 
 Plutarch, on the other hand, does not pay a lot of attention to this supposed 
scheme initiated by Aratos, which he only mentions twice: in the Kleomenes he brings 
up the widespread belief that the Megalopolitans were the ones responsible for involving 
Antigonos in the war without acknowledging any involvement of the Achaian statesman 
(Plut. Kleo. 23. 2). In his life of Aratos on the other hand he says the following on the 
matter:  
‘καίτοι πᾶσαν ὁ Ἄρατος ἀφίησι φωνὴν ἀπολογιζόμενος τὴν ἀνάγκην, ὁ 
Πολύβιος δὲ αὐτὸν ἐκ πολλοῦ φησι καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης ὑφορώμενον τὸ 
θράσος τὸ τοῦ Κλεομένους κρύφα τῷ Ἀντιγόνῳ διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς 
Μεγαλοπολίτας προκαθιέναι δεομένους Ἀχαιῶν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι τὸν Ἀντίγονον. 
οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπιέζοντο τῷ πολέμῳ μάλιστα, συνεχῶς ἄγοντος αὑτοὺς καὶ 
φέροντος τοῦ Κλεομένους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Φύλαρχος ἱστόρηκε περὶ τούτων, ᾧ 
μὴ τοῦ Πολυβίου μαρτυροῦντος οὐ πάνυ τι πιστεύειν ἄξιον ἦν. ἐνθουσιᾷ γὰρ 
ὅταν ἅψηται τοῦ Κλεομένους, ὑπ᾽ εὐνοίας, καὶ καθάπερ ἐν δίκῃ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τῷ 
μὲν ἀντιδικῶν διατελεῖ, τῷ δὲ συναγορεύων’  
(Plut. Ar. 38. 7-8: ‘And yet Aratos says everything that he can say in recounting 
this necessity. Polybius, however, says that for a long time, and before the 
necessity arose, Aratos mistrusted the courage of Kleomenes and held secret 
talks with Antigonus, besides putting the Megalopolitans forward to beg the 
Achaians to summon Antigonos. For the Megalopolitans were most oppressed 
by the war, since Kleomenes was continually plundering their territory. 
Phylarchos tells the same about these things, but it would not be worthy to trust 
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him at all if Polybius did not testify to the same thing. For goodwill makes his 
every mention of Kleomenes ecstatic, and as if he were pleading in a court of 
law, he is forever accusing Aratos in his history, and defending Kleomenes’).  
It is obvious that Megalopolis was somehow connected to the Achaian appeal to 
Antigonos Doson. Yet in the Greek passage cited above, Plutarch does not seem entirely 
convinced by Aratos' version of events which were driven by pure ἀνάγκη, nor by that 
of Phylarchus, who should not be taken at face value on account of his pro-Spartan 
sympathies.
422
 Consequently, the biographer is more persuaded by Polybius’ account 
than that of Phylarchus. Plutarch’s words clearly illustrate the problem we are faced with 
in this chapter: all of the narratives were influenced by their author’s underlying motives 
which, while interesting in themselves, make establishing the exact nature of the 
Megalopolitan role in the war more difficult. So, before this can be done several of these 
issues need to be addressed in more detail. 
1.2. Polybius and Phylarchus 
The historian Phylarchus was a contemporary of Aratos (Pol. 2. 56. 1.). He came from 
either Naukratis in Egypts or Athens and wrote several works including his own Histories 
which covered a wide time period including the Kleomenean War.
423
 Yet, if we are to 
believe both Polybius and Plutarch, there should be some doubt about the credibility 
and veracity of his work. Apparently, Phylarchus had the tendency to ignore the flaws of 
the Spartan kings, Agis and Kleomenes, while attacking Aratos at every possible 
opportunity.
424
 Due to this attitude towards both Kleomenes and Aratos, he has been 
severely criticised by Polybius himself. In an extensive passage (Pol. 2. 56-63), Polybius 
discusses four instances during the years of the war which he believes perfectly illustrate 
Phylarchus’ overall weaknesses as a historian: the sacking of Mantinea by Achaia and 
Antigonos, the execution of Aristomachos of Argos, the sacking of Megalopolis by 
Kleomenes and the size of the booty taken from that attack. Obviously, there is an 
underlying biased tone here as these passages dealt with a few issues in which Polybius 
was emotionally invested.
425
 As an Achaian and Megalopolitan, Polybius would have felt 
an urge to explain the reasons for the Achaian attack on Mantinea and the execution of 
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Aristomachos – who had both betrayed the Achaians - to his audience and, naturally, 
correct any negative judgements about his fellow Megalopolitans.
426
 However, the main 
point of criticism uttered by the historian with which we are concerned here is 
historiographical and is connected to Polybius’ objection to Phylarchus’ natural 
tendency towards sensationalism.
427
 This could not be tolerated by a historian like 
Polybius who prides himself on writing the kind of history void of any exaggerations. 
Through his work Polybius was searching for the truth and he wanted to educate his 
audience by giving them the best possible basis for their own lives (Pol. 2. 56; 8. 8. 3). 
This condemnation of others who wrote their narratives just for the entertainment of 
their audience is echoed elsewhere in the Histories when other historians are discussed 
such as the historians writing on Hannibal (Pol. 3. 47-48) and Timaeus (Pol. 12. 7; 12. 
12).
 428
 Additionally, he tells us that in the case of Phylarchus’ omission of the noble deeds 
of Megalopolis, the author commits a grave offence,  
‘ἐπὶ τί δ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον συγγραφεὺς ἐπιστήσαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας; διὰ τίνος δ᾽ ἔργου 
μᾶλλον ἂν παρορμήσαι πρὸς φυλακὴν πίστεως καὶ πρὸς ἀληθινῶν πραγμάτων 
καὶ βεβαίων κοινωνίαν’ 
 (Pol. 2. 61. 11: ‘since to what could an author with more advantage call the 
attention of his readers, and through what work could he better stimulate them 
to loyalty to their engagements and to true deeds and steady business?’).  
Looking at the work in general, it becomes apparent that for Polybius an emphasis 




There is no question that Polybius vehemently disapproved of Phylarchus and 
his historiographical style, but if we are to believe the passage from Plutarch discussed 
above, it seems that Polybius heavily relied on Phylarchus’ works since they both give a 
similar version of events. So clearly, Phylarchus was one of Polybius’ sources for the 
Kleomenean War, which is surprising considering his constant criticism. We know that 
Polybius also used the account of Aratos, since he tells us that he had chosen to rely on 
the latter’s version of events in connection to the history of the Kleomenean War (Pol. 
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2. 56. 2). Apparently, Aratos did not provide him with a lot of information as he 
remained silent on things like secret negotiations in his memoirs (Pol. 2. 47. 10).
430
 In 
addition to Aratos and Phylarchus, Polybius could have had access to an unknown oral 
tradition from Megalopolis that would have been known to him as a prominent member 
of the city’s elite.
431
 Yet, due to Aratos’ lack of information on the subject, it appears as 
though Polybius was forced to depend upon the testimony of a historian whom he so 
thoroughly criticised a few chapters later. This vehement criticism meant that he would 
have made sure to use Phylarchus’ work in combination with another source such as 
Aratos or the unknown Megalopolitan oral tradition, and make it his own by taking 
Phylarchus and fitting them into his own narrative.
432
 Just because Polybius found fault 
with his predecessor for obvious ideological and historiographical reasons, it did not 
mean that Phylarchus could not be a useful source when Polybius needed one.  
1.3. Polybius and Aratos  
Polybius’ version of the events of the War with Kleomenes has made it rather 
problematic to draw conclusions. If we choose to trust the author’s narrative completely, 
we are left with a shrewd plan set in motion by Aratos to cover all his bases and make 
sure that the Achaians would be victorious in every possible outcome of the war. 
According to Polybius’ account, it was Aratos who was responsible for the Megalopolitan 
embassy to Antigonos in the first place (Pol. 2. 47-51).  Using Megalopolis because of 
its previous contacts with Macedon and their anti-Spartan sentiment, Aratos was the one 
who urged them to go on a mission to Antigonos and secretly establish contact between 
the two men. This was to be the foundation for a future alliance in case it was necessary. 
Clearly, this episode is centred on Aratos which has caused some scholars to be rightly 
concerned about Polybius’ attitude towards this Achaian leader and the truthfulness of 
Aratos’ involvement in the Megalopolitan embassy to Antigonos. In what follows, I will 
discuss several of these modern views and argue that even though Polybius generally had 
a positive view of Aratos, he is also aware of the man’s flaws. Furthermore, the 
Kleomenes’ episode and Aratos’ dominant role in it have to be considered within its 
position within the wider narrative, i.e. the explanation of why the Achaian koinon had 
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succeeded in encompassing the entire Peloponnese. All of this makes it clear that 
Aratos’ starring role as the mastermind of the Achaian-Macedonian alliance was a 
fabrication created by Polybius. 
Karen Haegemans and Elizabeth Kosmetatou try to re-examine Polybius’ 
attitude towards Aratos, especially when using the latter as a historical source.
433
 I agree 
with their general assessment of the reasons behind Polybius’ decision to use the 
Hypomnemata for his own narrative and his betrayal of exactly those historiographical 
principles for which he severely punishes Phylarchus but which he displays himself when 
it comes to the Achaian koinon and people he admired. Nevertheless, I feel that 
Haegemans and Kosmetatou miss the fact that Polybius’ attitude towards Aratos is not 
that of ‘a hardened patriot who could not be objective when dealing with Aratus, the 
hero of the Achaian League’.’
434
 As is clear from the discussion in chapter two, Polybius 
was prone to bias about affairs relating to this native city or state and its great leaders, 
even though he does state that a historian must try to stay objective on these matters (Pol. 
1. 14). While the subjective nature of the Histories can certainly not be denied, it is clear 
that Polybius was aware of the flaws of Aratos as an individual and a historian.
435
 While 
the author describes Aratos’ work as truthful and lucid (Pol. 2. 40. 4), he also says that 
his source concealed a lot of elements of his personal conduct from his audience (Pol. 
2. 47. 10-11). Furthermore, Haegemans and Kosmetatou seem to have forgotten that 
even though Aratos comes across at first as the ideal leader in the narrative, there are 
plenty of instances in which Polybius severely disapproves of Aratos’ personality and 
conduct.
436
 His main flaw proved to be his military leadership or lack thereof, which 
Polybius describes in the following way:  
‘ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς οὗτος, ὅτε τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἀντιποιήσασθαι βουληθείη, νωθρὸς μὲν 
ἐν ταῖς ἐπινοίαις, ἄτολμος δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, ἐν ὄψει δ᾽ οὐ μένων τὸ δεινόν. 
διὸ καὶ τροπαίων ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν βλεπόντων ἐπλήρωσε τὴν Πελοπόννησον, καὶ τῇδέ 
πῃ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀεί ποτ᾽ ἦν εὐχείρωτος’  
(Pol. 4. 8. 6: ‘but this very same man, when he undertook field operations, was 
slow in thinking, timid in his actions, and devoid in personal courage. Because 
of this, he filled the Peloponnese with trophies commemorating his defeats, and 
in this manner he was always easy to master by the enemy).  
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Examples of this are his conduct during the battle at Ladokeia (Pol. 2. 51) and his failure 
to protect Dyme, Pharai and Tritaia during the Social War resulting in their decision to 
stop their formal contribution to the federal state and hire mercenaries instead (Pol. 4. 
60). Therefore, Polybius is not completely oblivious to Aratos’ faults and his critique of 
Phylarchus is thus about more than ‘his need to defend at all expense his choice of 
historical sources in his second book.’
437
 It becomes apparent that this second book is 
more than just a juxtaposition of Aratos’ account versus that of Phylarchus. Furthermore, 
this version of the events was written in a part of the second book that gives an overview 
of the events in Greece before the actual start date of his narrative (Pol. 2. 37. 3). 
However, when read closely, Polybius’ work contains a more personal agenda, i.e. an 
explanation for the grandeur of the Achaian koinon which stemmed from the Achaian 
policy created by Aratos, applied by Philopoimen and finished by Polybius’ own father, 
Lykortas. So, if the historian’s work was written in this context, he needed to portray 
Aratos in the best possible light and could not tolerate Phylarchus’ attacks on the 
statesman. Although there was a political agenda behind the criticism in book two, the 




Polybius has modified the events and by doing so has fitted them into his 
narrative by ascribing a substantial role to the person who monopolised his work at this 
point: Aratos.
439
 There are countless examples of individuals dominating the Histories 
such as the events happening during Philip V’s reign of Macedon (particularly books 
four and five), Hannibal during the Punic War (Pol. 3. 33-94), his assessment of Scipio 
Aemilianus (Pol. 23. 12-14; 31. 22-30) or Polybius’ depiction of Achaian politics 
throughout his narrative, which seemed to be under the sole control of several 
individuals like Aratos and Philopoimen, Lykortas and Kallikrates.
440
 Indeed, Polybius 
is quite often concerned about the impact of the individual on history.
441
 Furthermore, 
he frequently interrupts his narrative with digressions of a biographic nature or on the 
character of these individuals so that his audience might be able to draw suitable lessons 
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 As mentioned before, the entire passage on the Kleomenean War was 
written in the context of Polybius’ history of the Achaian koinon upon which Aratos’ 
actions had a certain impact due to his influential position in it and through which the 
historian wants to convey a certain image, not devoid of personal faults, of the politician 
from which we are to gain certain ideas and lessons about proper conduct. And this is 
exactly, in my opinion, the context in which we should see the politician’s role in 
Megalopolis’ first embassy to Antigonos: a historiographical embellishment resulted in 
ascribing to the statesman a greater prominence than he had in reality. Therefore, if we 
look past the emphasis on Aratos in the embassy to Doson, Plutarch’s statement that 
Antigonos was summoned ‘ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν (ἐπικεκλῆσθαι) μάλιστα τῶν 
Μεγαλοπολιτῶν σπουδασάντων’ (Plut. 23. 2-3: ‘by the Achaians, mostly because of the 
Megalopolitan eagerness’), leaves us with something much more plausible: initially 
Megalopolis had been the main advocate for an Achaian alliance with Macedon.
443
  
2. Megalopolis and the War with Kleomenes 
The initial contact between the Achaians and Antigonos was via the Megalopolitan 
embassy of 227 BC which was, despite Polybius’ claims about Aratos’ involvement, still 
a distinctively Megalopolitan embassy and not an Achaian one.
444
 The fact that 
Megalopolis was suffering severely because of the war, in combination with its traditional 
hatred for Sparta and ties to Macedon meant that the polis would have not have hesitated 
to ask the king for help in case the federation could not help them against another 
Spartan raid (Plut. Ar. 38. 7). Therefore, the theory proposed by Erich Gruen that the 
initiative for this embassy came from Megalopolis without any federal involvement is 
convincing and logical, considering past interactions between Megalopolis, Sparta, 
Achaia and Macedon.
445
 In this next section of the chapter I will discuss those events of 
the Kleomenean War, which directly concerned Megalopolis, as well as past 
connections to Macedon, to show that the Megalopolitan embassy of 227 BC was 
                                                          
442
 Farrington (2011), 329-335. Polybius’ account of Philip is an excellent example of this tendency (Pol. 
4. 77. 1-3; 5. 12. 5-8). 
443
 Gruen (1972), 625. 
444
 Paschides (2008), 237. 
445
 Gruen (1972), 609-625, closely followed by Urban (1979), 117-155; Le Bohec (1993), 366-367. 
159 
 
perfectly in line with the traditional values and policies of the polis which needed help 
against Sparta and which had already been let down by the federal strategos. 
2.1. Megalopolis and the Spartan attacks  
Megalopolis and its territory obviously played an important rol in the war. Their 
geographic proximity to Sparta and the complicated, troubled and occasional violent 
relationship between the two poleis meant that Megalopolis was more prone to attacks 
from Kleomenes than the other Achaian poleis.446 One of the first things the king did 
that provoked a reaction from the koinon and by which ‘πρόδηλον δὲ καὶ πικρὸν 
ἀναδεικνύντα σφίσι πολέμιον ἑαυτόv’ (Pol. 2. 46. 5: ‘he was showing himself a clear 
and keen enemy for them’), was the occupation of the Athenaion in the Belminatis.447 
As we have already seen, this region had previously been under Spartan control, but had 
been given to the Megalopolitans by Philip II after his conquest of Sparta (Livy 38. 34. 
4). Moreover, two boundary disputes, dated to the period 164-148 BC, give us a clear 
insight into the importance of the region as the inscriptions prove that decades later it 
remained a sensitive issue after both poleis were members of the Achaian koinon.
448
 
Kleomenes’ occupation of the Athenaion was thus a deliberate attack and connected to 
the Spartan animosity towards Megalopolis and the Achaian koinon of which 
Megalopolis was now a member. Shortly after this, Kleomenes conquered Methydrion, 
another town that was part of Megalopolitan territory (Plut. Kleo. 4. 4). 
By 227-226 BC, the war had reached its zenith and the Megalopolitans found 
themselves subjected to yet another intrusion on their land. This time Kleomenes 
managed to gain control of the village of Leuktra, which prompted Aratos to rush to 
their aid with his Achaian troops, driving the king back from the city walls (Plut. Ar. 36. 
1.). Having previously been defeated by Kleomenes on Mount Lykaion, Aratos refused 
to complete the offensive, which led Lydiades to disobey orders and lead his cavalry to 
battle against the Spartans.449 Outnumbered, he was killed and his body was clothed in 
purple robes before being returned to Megalopolis (Plut. Kleo. 6. 5-7). From the 
moment Megalopolis had become part of the koinon, Lydiades had also risen to 
                                                          
446
 Roy (1971), 591; Roy (2009), 208-209; and Shipley (2000). 
447
 Walbank (1957), 244.  
448
 See Ager (1997), 133-135 and 374-381, for details of these specific cases. 
449
 Walbank (1957), 250. 
160 
 
prominence at the federal level by challenging Aratos on several occasions and becoming 
strategos. It is apparent that Lydiades had been concerned with Sparta from the very 
start of his federal career since he launched an expedition against Sparta during his first 
strategia (234-233 BC), long before the war had even commenced (Plut. Ar. 30. 1). Even 
though Polybius does not devote much attention to Lydiades’ and his exact function 
within federal politics, it is logical that as the former tyrant of Megalopolis his Achaian 
career would have mirrored that of Aristomachos of Argos. Polybius said that this 
Aristomachos was welcomed by the Achaians as ‘ἡγεμόνα καὶ στρατηγὸν 
καταστήσαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν’ (Plut. Ar. 30. 4: ‘making him their strategos and 
commander-in-chief’) after he had laid down his tyranny. The death of an influential 
statesman such as Lydiades must have been particularly upsetting to the Achaians and 
his fellow Megalopolitans.450 Even more so, since his death was the result of Aratos’ 
weak conduct in the matter and  
‘ὁ Ἄρατος αἰτίαν δὲ μεγάλην ἔλαβε δόξας προέσθαι τὸν Λυδιάδην: καὶ 
βιασθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἀπερχομένων πρὸς ὀργήν ἠκολούθησεν αὐτοῖς εἰς 
Αἴγιον. ἐκεῖ δὲ συνελθόντες ἐψηφίσαντο μὴ διδόναι χρήματα αὐτῷ μηδὲ 
μισθοφόρους τρέφειν ἀλλ᾽ αὑτῷ πορίζειν, εἰ δέοιτο πολεμεῖν’  
(Plut. Ar. 37. 4: ‘Aratos was held to be very responsible as people thought he 
had betrayed Lydiades; and after going away in anger, he was forced by the 
Achaians to come with them to Aigion. There they held an assembly and voted 
not to give him money or maintain mercenaries; if he wanted to wage war, he 
would have to prove himself’). 
The battle at Ladokeia was followed by other successes for Kleomenes including a very 
heavy Achaian defeat at the Hekatombaion at Dyme, which demoralised the Achaians 
so much that it led to the political crisis discussed earlier. These Spartan conquests and 
victories made Aratos and his compatriots desperate enough to accept the fact that they 
would not win this war without help from the Macedonian king. Of course, it also helped 
that the one major obstacle for Aratos’ refusal of Doson’s help, Corinth, had now fallen 
into Spartan hands.
451
 As seen in chapter two, Corinth was a major point of contention 
between Aratos and the Macedonian kings who had used their control over Acrocorinth 
to uphold their influence in the Peloponnese. In 243 BC, Aratos had succeeded in 
gaining control over Corinth after a nightly expedition; since then the polis had been a 
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member of the Achaian koinon. With Corinth now under the control of Sparta, Aratos 
agreed to send a formal request for help in 224 BC, which Antigonos accepted and for 
the next two years a combined Achaian-Macedonian force fought against the Spartans 
until the battle of Sellasia in 222. However, before Kleomenes was defeated at Sellasia, 
he was able to attack and destroy Megalopolis to such an extent that it is one of the two 
events that is visible in the archaeological record of the polis.
452
 Hans Lauter states that 
the destruction of the city can be seen because of the extensive remodelling and 
rebuilding of the political buildings of the polis.
453
 The severity of the destruction is also 
clear from the passages in Polybius where the author talks about the bravery and noble 
conduct of the Megalopolitans (Pol. 2. 56; 2. 61).
454
 Polybius also mentions that  
‘γενόμενος δ᾽ ἐγκρατὴς οὕτως αὐτὴν πικρῶς διέφθειρεν καὶ δυσμενῶς ὥστε 
μηδ᾽ ἐλπίσαι μηδένα διότι δύναιτ᾽ ἂν συνοικισθῆναι πάλιν’ 
(Pol. 2. 55. 7: ‘when he (Kleomenes) got possession of it, he destroyed it so 
severely and cruelly that no one hoped that it could ever be inhibited again’).  
Polybius gives us additional information about the main reason for the Spartan attack, 
which was Kleomenes’ second attempt as he had already tried to attack the city a few 
months before but had been rebuffed by the citizens. Polybius thus believed him to have 
acted with such cruelty because  
‘διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὰς τῶν καιρῶν περιστάσεις παρὰ μόνοις Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ 
Στυμφαλίοις μηδέποτε δυνηθῆναι μήθ᾽ αἱρετιστὴν καὶ κοινωνὸν τῶν ἰδίων 
ἐλπίδων μήτε προδότην κατασκευάσασθαι’  
(Pol. 2. 55. 8: ‘out of all the peoples around, the Megalopolitans and 
Stymphalians were the only ones from whom he (Kleomenes) could not find a 
single person to choosing to share his endeavours or a traitor’).  
This is echoed by Plutarch in his different Lives. He gives a detailed account of 
Philopoimen’s actions in the aftermath of the attack which saw the Megalopolitans flee 
to Messene (Plut. Phil. 5; cf. Pol. 2. 61). The Spartan king had sent an envoy to the 
Megalopolitans at Messene with the offer to restore them to the city but his offer was 
met by refusal from the citizens. Interestingly, in Plutarch’s version of events, this refusal 
was the result of Philopoimen’s insistence that the Megalopolitans not give in to the king 
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because it was apparent that some of the citizens like Lysandridas and Thearidas wanted 
to comply (Plut. Kleo. 24). Unsurprisingly, Polybius does not allude to these two 




2.2. Megalopolis and its relations with Macedon 
The result of these constant attacks on Megalopolis and their vehement opposition 
against Kleomenes and Sparta – as exemplified by Lydiades’ politics and actions before 
his death in 227 BC and the Megalopolitan refusal of Kleomenes’ offer in 222 BC – was 
that the Megalopolitans were suffering more than other poleis during the war. Therefore, 
the citizens knew that they could not continue fighting Sparta on their own and had to 
appeal for help. As a member of the Achaian koinon, the polis was entitled to request 
support from the federal state in return for financial and military contributions. 456 
However, the polis did not ask the federal state for help and instead decided to appeal 
to Macedon for help. This was a logical step for the polis as it had long been on good 
terms with the Macedonian kings, and their military force was much bigger and stronger 
than the Achaian one (Pol. 2. 48. 3).457  
These connections manifested themselves in more ways than just the elements 
already mentioned, i.e. the land that was given back to the polis by Philip II, the 
subsequent loyalty of Megalopolis, sometimes as the only Arkcadian polis, to the 
Macedonian kings during the conflicts in the fourth and third centuries BC
458
 or the 
resistance of the Megalopolitan envoys to the Achaian decision at the synodos in Sicyon 
in 198 BC.
459
 For example, there are several connections to Macedon and the 
Macedonian kings in the archaeology of Megalopolis. Pausanias tells us about the 
Philippeion, a stoa on the agora of Megalopolis that ‘χαριζόμενοι δέ οἱ Μεγαλοπολῖται 
τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν διδόασιν αὐτῷ τοῦ οἰκοδομήματος’ (Paus. 8. 30. 6: ‘the Megalopolitans 
had named the building after him (Philip) out of compliment to him’). Pausanias is 
backed up in his claim by the discovery of stamped roof tiles bearing the inscriptions 
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‘Φιλιππείου’ and ‘Φιλιππείο[υ] …πορος’ (IG V2 469 6a and 6b). These were found in 
the remains of a long building, which is referred to as the Stoa of Philip by archaeologists 
as a result of the inscriptions on the roof tiles and the information provided by 
Pausanias.
460
 The building itself is found on the western side of the agora close to the 
sanctuary of Zeus Soter. Lauter has established several architectural links between the 
two buildings as they used the same building material, the same size and constituted  an 
almost identical stylistic execution of construction.
461
 The Stoa of Philip has been dated 
to the late fourth century BC on account of pottery found during their excavations in 
Megalopolis by Lauter and Spyropoulos, but there is evidence that the building may 
have been built or rebuilt a little later on in the Hellenistic period based on architectural 
elements.
462
 As Pausanias has told us, the building was built by the Megalopolitans and 
named after ‘Φίλιππος ὁ Ἀμύντου’ (Paus. 8. 30. 6). However, Caitlyn Verfenstein has 
tried to argue that the building, which she dates to the second century BC, may have 
been built by the Megalopolitans in honour of Philip V and not Philip II.
463
 While this 
remains a possibility, there is no doubt that this building was connected to the 
Macedonian kings. It shows that the citizens of Megalopolis respected the king enough 
to name a building after him that was at the heart of their polis, and more importantly, 
one that was closely associated with the most important religious sanctuary of the city.  
Pausanias also mentions another structure in Megalopolis that was connected to 
the Macedonian kings, the so-called house of Alexander (Paus. 8. 32. 1). At the time of 
Pausanias’ writing, the house belonged to a private citizen who had told him that the 
building was originally built for Alexander the Great. Near the house was an image of 
the god Ammon with a ram’s horn on his head and shaped like a Herm. While some 
scholars have taken Pausanias at his word and thought that the building may have been 
a cult building or even a shrine to Alexander
464
, William Calder has argued that this was 
most likely a fabrication made by the individual who owned the house to deceive tourists 
such as Pausanias.
465
 He argues that the general state of ruin of the shrines at Megalopolis 
mentioned by Pausanias makes it rather unbelievable that a shrine to Alexander would 
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have remained in use. This seems like a valid theory, particularly as one needs to keep 
in mind that Pausanias was describing his version of Megalopolis for the purposes of his 
own narrative.
466
 Other evidence supports this argument as well, since there was a 
Macedonian who was raised in Megalopolis around 200 BC and who claimed he was a 
descendant of Alexander (Livy 35. 47. 5-8; App. Syr. 3. 13). This man managed to marry 
one of his children, Apama, off to Amynander, the king of the Athamanes, and was 
honoured by the city of Delos for favours he had rendered them (IG. XI
4
 750). Although 
we do not know if this man was indeed a Macedonian or just a Megalopolitan claiming 
to be a Macedonian as Appian and Livy differ on this (Livy: ‘filiam Alexandri cuiusdam 
Megalopolitani’ – Appian: ‘τῶν τις Μακεδόνων Ἀλέξανδρος’), both of these examples 
prove that there was a general tradition in Megalopolis that saw individuals claim 
connections to Macedon for their own personal gain. Moreover, this tactic was also 
employed by Megalopolitan statesmen such as Lydiades, who is believed to have come 
to power with the help of the Macedonian kings, and Philopoimen whose connections 
to Philip V could have contributed to his election as hipparch in 210/209 BC.
467
  
A final connection between Megalopolis and Macedon which I want to 
emphasize, comes from Polybius’ account of the battle at Sellasia in 222 BC (Pol. 2. 65. 
3). Here the historian stated that among the Achaian and Macedonian soldiers, there 
was also a Megalopolitan contingent of approximately a thousand soldiers who were led 
by Kerkidas and were armed in the Macedonian fashion. As Paschides has pointed out, 
this means that the Megalopolitans were using material given to them by Macedon and 
could even hint at formal military training in using the Macedonian phalanx.
468
 So then, 
since the Megalopolitans were armed by the Macedonian kings, this testifies to a deep 
and special connection between the two states, especially, because they were the only 
one of the allies who were armed in this Macedonian fashion. Moreover, the fact that 
Polybius stressed that there was a separate group of Megalopolitans at the battle of 
Sellasia in 222 BC, in addition to the Achaian soldiers further indicates that Megalopolis 
played a significant role in the war. 
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2.3. Megalopolis and the embassy to Antigonos in 227 BC 
The Megalopolitan ties to Macedon which have been referenced to throughout this 
thesis, were one of the typical elements of the Megalopolitan polity. In this war, the polis 
conveyed this part of their policy to the Achaians via their embassy to Antigonos in 227 
BC. As we have seen, the sources are rather ambiguous on the matter and Polybius 
places too much emphasis on Aratos’ role in it (Pol. 2. 48-51). If these schemes are left 
aside, the whole situation becomes much less complicated. The Megalopolitans were 
suffering severely under the war on account of the Spartan attacks early on in the war. 
Consequently, when they realised that the Achaian federation was unable to help them 
due to the weakness of their army, they sent out an embassy, led by Nikophanes and 
Kerkidas, to the Macedonian king to ask for assistance.  However, this could not happen 
without the approval of the federal state, which had to approve a mission before it could 
be sent out, which meant that the Megalopolitan embassy happened with Achaian 
approval, as indicated by Polybius (Pol. 2. 48. 8).  
Moreover, once they were in a meeting with Antigonos, the envoys spent much 
of their time talking about the looming peril of a possible alliance between the Aitolians 
and Kleomenes. Since the speech followed the general structure of a typical Polybian 
speech and focused on one particular argument, i.e. the danger of an Aitolian-Spartan 
alliance, it is easy to assume that there is a core of truth in the speech, even though the 
alliance was most likely a fabrication or exaggeration made by the author.
469
 However, 
one could use it to say something else about the Megalopolitan attitude towards the 
federation. Clearly, the envoys were not only concerned about their own city:  
‘διελέγοντο περὶ μὲν τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος αὐτὰ τἀναγκαῖα διὰ βραχέων καὶ 
κεφαλαιωδῶς, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῶν ὅλων’  
(Pol. 2. 48. 8: ‘they talked briefly and summarily about their own city, no more 
than necessary, but talked a lot about the general situation’).  
Both Nikophanes and Kerkidas, just like the other Megalopolitans as well, were worried 
about the dire consequences the war could have for the Achaian koinon. This behaviour 
fits in with the general attitude of the city towards the federal state as the polis was one 
of the first states to start minting the bronze federal coins and actively participated in the 
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federal institutions or sought federal involvement in their boundary disputes with other 
members. 
However, if Megalopolis was concerned about the consequences of fighting the 
war against Kleomenes on their own, why did they not appeal to the federal state instead 
of Antigonos? Before the reforms put through by Philopoimen in the early 200s BC, 
the Achaian army was disorganised and mostly a combination of individual member-
state contributions and mercenary soldiers. This lack of organisation was chiefly 
responsible for the defeats that the Achaians suffered at the hands of Kleomenes during 
the war.470 In comparison, the Macedonian forces were much bigger and better trained 
and because of their past contacts, it would be easier to obtain their help against the 
Spartans. Moreover, it seems as though the Achaians had nothing against this embassy 
as they approved it before Kerkidas and Nikophanes went to Macedon. Additionally, 
there was a growing sense of dissatisfaction with Aratos and his politics as he had not 
been interested in the inclusion of Sparta into the federation before 235 BC.
471
 
Furthermore, the Megalopolitans could not have been satisfied with his actions when he 
refused to follow through and pursue the Spartan soldiers and Kleomenes in 227 BC 
(Plut. Ar. 36-37). The fact that this led to the death of their beloved tyrant Lydiades can 
only have increased this disappointment. Aratos’ incompetent military skills during this 
war frustrated the member poleis more than once and even Polybius comments on this 
flaw (Pol. 4. 8. 6). Therefore, the combination of an inefficient army and Aratos’ 
inconsistent leadership is what made the Megalopolitans turn to Antigonos, who was a 




This conclusion was also drawn by Erich Gruen.
473
 While he makes several good 
points to support the theory that Megalopolis was the actor responsible for the embassy 
to Antigonos, the most relevant argument for present purposes is his analysis of Aratos’ 
past interactions with Macedon, Sparta and Megalopolis. These interactions clearly show 
that Aratos was not the mastermind behind the Megalopolitan embassy in 227 BC to 
Macedon, since he had actively tried to keep Macedon out of the Peloponnese through 
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alliances with both Aitolia and Sparta (Pol. 2. 44. 1.; Plut. Agis. 13. 4-15. 3).
474
 These 
resulted in the Achaian membership of Megalopolis that stressed the opposition to 
Sparta and a positive attitude towards Macedon. Additionally, there was Lydiades who 
formed a threat to Aratos’ political career according to Plutarch. Because of this, it seems 
rather unlikely that Aratos would indeed have persuaded the Megalopolitans to go to 
Antigonos Doson to ask for help. Moreover, it is apparent that Aratos was still pursuing 
an Achaian policy in 227 BC that was directed against Macedon as is evidenced by his 
opposition to an official Achaian request for Macedonian help at the Achaian assembly 
in which Nikophanes and Kerkidas presented the results of their embassy to Antigonos.  
‘Προελθὼν Ἄρατος καὶ τήν τε τοῦ βασιλέως προθυμίαν ἀποδεξάμενος καὶ τὴν 
τῶν πολλῶν διάληψιν ἐπαινέσας παρεκάλει διὰ πλειόνων μάλιστα μὲν 
πειρᾶσθαι δι᾽ αὑτῶν σῴζειν καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν. οὐδὲν γὰρ εἶναι 
τούτου κάλλιον οὐδὲ συμφορώτερον: ἐὰν δ᾽ ἄρα πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος 
ἀντιβαίνῃ τὰ τῆς τύχης, πρότερον ἔφη δεῖν ἐξελέγξαντας πάσας τὰς ἐν αὑτοῖς 
ἐλπίδας τότε καταφεύγειν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν φίλων βοηθείας.’ 
(Pol. 2. 50. 11.-51.1.: ‘Aratos rose, and after acknowledging the king's willingness 
to assist them and he applauded the attitude of the meeting, he addressed them 
for a long time and urged them if possible to attempt to save their cities and 
country by their own efforts. For nothing was better or more advantageous. If 
adverse fortune should prevent this, then, but only when they had no hope left 
in their own resources, he advised them to resort to an appeal to their friends’). 
Polybius tells us that Aratos took this stance because he was afraid that he would be 
blamed in case this alliance backfired on him and Doson used it to curb the Achaian 
power in the Peloponnese (Pol. 2. 50. 8). However, looking at his previous political 
stance, it seems more logical that Aratos was also concerned with keeping Macedon 
outside of the Peloponnese and the conflict if possible. While I generally disagree with 
Paschalis Paschides’ analysis of the events of the Kleomenean War, as it tends to rely 
too much on Polybius’ account and ignores the more plausible reality of Megalopolis’ 
involvement, he does make a good argument when he states that Aratos’ policy was not 
inconsistent between 227 and 224 BC.
475
 Obviously, in 224 BC he still wanted to expand 
the Achaian influence in the Peloponnese at the cost of Macedon, but it seems that even 
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for him it had become apparent that Kleomenes had become too powerful for the 
koinon to handle on its own and - out of sheer ἀνάγκη - the federation needed to 
complete the process started by the Megalopolitans in 227 BC. Of course, this decision 
must have been made just that little bit easier by the fact that Kleomenes had by then 
conquered Corinth and thus taken away a major point of contention between Macedon 
and Achaia. 
 
* * * * * 
Due to the inconsistent nature of the passages in Polybius and Plutarch, the Kleomenean 
War has always been problematic for modern scholars who want to construct a coherent 
narrative of the war. For one, there are the multiple discrepancies in the narratives of 
both authors which have been discussed at the start of the chapter. However, the biggest 
problem for the present thesis was Polybius’ overemphasis on Aratos and his actions 
during the war. As we have seen, this was typical for the Histories as the individual 
constituted the core of the Polybian narrative, but it was also the result of Polybius’ 
sources: the Hypomnemata of Aratos himself, Phylarchus’ Histories and potentially an 
unnamed Megalopolitan tradition. Throughout this first segment of this chapter, I have 
clearly shown that Polybius’ version of the Kleomenean War did not reflect the political 
reality but rather glorified Aratos and his policy. Furthermore, the differences in the 
historical sources also emphasize the complex character of federalism and federal states 
which can lead to contradictory accounts of the same events. 
If we are to ignore Aratos and his involvement in the envoy of 227 BC to 
Antigonos Doson, then we can assess that this was a purely Megalopolitan effort to cope 
with the stress of the Spartan attacks during the war.
476
 Pressed by the Spartan attacks and 
disappointed by the Achaian army and their leader Aratos in particular, the 
Megalopolitans decided to utilise their old diplomatic relations with Macedon and 
appeal to them for help, no doubt with general Achaian approval. Aratos himself cannot 
have been happy with this development as his past relations with the kingdom were not 
at all positive due to his determination to drive them out of the Peloponnese while 
expanding the Achaian territory.
477
 This might also account for his determination in 
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blocking the motion in the assembly just after the envoy returned from Macedon (Pol. 
2. 50-51). However, he would soon be forced to change his mind because Kleomenes 
was slowly gaining the upper hand in the war. This was possible due to Ptolemy giving 
his funding to Kleomenes, Aratos’ personal defeats and the readiness of several of the 
members to negotiate with Sparta. This last feature is mentioned in a Plutarchean 
passage, which has a certain credibility as the so-called social revolution instituted by 
Kleomenes would have appealed to those Achaians that fell outside of the elites. All in 
all, it seems that the Achaian-Macedonian alliance came into being as a result of the 
Megalopolitan embassy to Doson, which happened on their own accord but with 
Acahean approval. As for Aratos, it seems that although he initially opposed it, he was 
grateful for its existence which made it easier for him to use in 224 BC when he was 
forced to formally accept Macedonian assistance if he were to win the war. 
 As for Megalopolis, the emergence of Philopoimen onto the political stage 
would soon change the way that the polis would influence Achaian foreign politics, 
which, during the second century BC, happened much more through the actions and 
beliefs of the individuals than via the city as a collective actor. However, as our next 
chapter will show, this does not mean that the Megalopolitan characteristics stopped 
shaping Achaia’s international relationships, considering they were the result of local 




Chapter 5: Megalopolis and Achaian foreign politics in the second century 
BC 
About three decades after they first joined forces with Antigonos Doson in the 
Kleomenean War (225 BC), the Achaians found themselves on the verge of yet another 
important political decision. A lot had changed following the establishment of this 
Achaian-Macedonian alliance. By 198 BC, Antigonos had been replaced by Philip V. 
This new Macedonian king waged war against the Aitolians in the Social War (220-217 
BC) and ultimately came head to head with the Romans in the First Macedonian War 
(214-205 BC). The Achaians dutifully stood by their ally during these wars, albeit with 
increasing reluctance. So, when the king got himself involved in yet another conflict with 
Rome, the Achaians had an important decision to make: would they remain loyal to 
their old ally or join the war on the Roman side (Livy 32. 19–25)? As we now know, 
their decision to join Rome proved to be a crucial one for the federal state and its politics 
in subsequent years. For one, it created a strained relationship between the members of 
the Achaian elite who were unsure how to deal with their new ally. This internal discord 
was even further deepened by the secession attempts of Messene and Sparta in the 
course of the second century BC. In fact, most of the problems between Rome and the 
Achaian koinon happened as the result of these secessions, since both poleis went to 
Rome for support against the federation.  
The combination of these factors shows that Achaian foreign politics were now 
connected to the internal interactions between the federal state and its members. 
Megalopolis’ role in the foreign politics was also very different from what it had been in 
the third century BC. After all, the city itself seems to have had less influence than before 
since Achaian international politics were now shaped mostly through a series of 
prominent individuals from the city like Philopoimen, Archon, Lykortas and Polybius. 
These individuals were heavily involved in the internal troubles with Sparta and 
Messene, since Philopoimen was responsible for bringing Sparta into the federation in 
the first place. Moreover, every time the koinon had troubles with Sparta, it was in the 
strategia of a Megalopolitan. However, it is important to note that this view may be 
distorted as a result of Polybius’ and Livy’s narratives which do not focus on the cities as 
political actors but solely on the important individuals. If we look at the material 
evidence such as the boundary disputes analysed in chapter three or the federal coinage 
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produced by these cities, it becomes clear that they were still acting as political units and 
thus making it necessary to be careful when using the literary accounts.  
In this last chapter I will discuss Megalopolis’ role in Achaian politics of the 
second century BC. I will show that the traditional antagonism of its citizens towards 
Sparta had an influence on the Achaian League and its interactions with other Hellenistic 
states. Because of this I am analysing Achaian-Roman interactions from the point of view 
of the traditional antagonism expressed by the Megalopolitan leaders towards Sparta, as 
they were partly responsible for shaping the Achaian policy towards Rome. Therefore, 
I will be examining the actions and political conduct of several of these individuals in 
connection to Sparta and Rome to see how far these were moulded by their 
Megalopolitan identity. Nevertheless, before turning to this discussion, I will start the 
chapter by talking about the Achaian decision of 198 BC to ally itself with Rome, for 
this event was one of the last instances in which Megalopolis as a city still expressed its 
support for the Macedonian king. In fact, they were among the only Achaians advocating 
for loyalty towards Philip. However, as I will argue, a closer look at the Achaian strategos 
Aristainos may prove that even within Megalopolis there was room for individuals to 
move away from the traditional Megalopolitan loyalty to Macedon and replace it with 
loyalty to Achaia.  
1. Megalopolis and the Achaian decision of 198 BC 
This first section of the chapter deals with the Achaian synodos of 198 BC at Sikyon. 
When the Achaians decided whether or not they formally wanted to form an alliance 
with Rome and abandon their old ally Philip V. The discussion of this synodos is crucial 
as it is one of the last times that Megalopolis as a city can be seen acting as a political unit 
in the narratives of Livy and Polybius. Moreover, at this point the Megalopolitans were 
still loyal to the Macedonian kings, something that is not attested to in the sources later 
on. This has led me to the conclusion that this particular element of the Megalopolitan 
identity may have been replaced by an overall sense of Achaian patriotism as displayed 
by Polybius and others. I will start this section with an overview and breakdown of the 
relations of the Achaians with both Macedon and Rome in the period between the 
Kleomenean War (229-222 BC) and the synodos at Sikyon to explain why this synodos 
was happening in the first place. It concludes with a general discussion of the events of 
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198 BC and the implications this had for Megalopolis, particularly if Aristainos was not 
from Dyme, as is traditionally believed, but from Megalopolis. 
1.1. Achaian relations with Macedon and Rome 224-198 BC 
Soon after the War with Kleomenes, a new generation of statesmen and kings found 
their way to power as Philopoimen and other Megalopolitans came to power in Achaia, 
Philip V assumed the power in Macedon (Pol. 2. 70. 6) and a series of kings and tyrants 
succeeded Kleomenes in Sparta.
478
  The war had left its mark on Achaia in particular. 
The Achaian confidence that had been so prominent during the previous decades, when 
the state seemed to be enjoying an unstoppable surge of expansionism in the 
Peloponnese, had now been shattered as they found themselves dependent on Macedon 
and its ruler. The Achaian army, which had been disorganised even before the 
Kleomenean War, had now been left in such a state of disarray that months after the 
fighting had ended the Achaian strategos Timoxenus would not send the Achaian army 
to aid Messene against the Aitolians (Pol. 4. 7. 6-7):  
‘ἅμα δὲ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀπιστῶν διὰ τὸ ῥᾳθύμως αὐτοὺς ἐσχηκέναι κατὰ 
τὸ παρὸν περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις γυμνασίαν, ἀνεδύετο τὴν ἔξοδον καὶ 
καθόλου τὴν συναγωγὴν τῶν ὄχλων. μετὰ γὰρ τὴν Κλεομένους τοῦ 
Σπαρτιατῶν βασιλέως ἔκπτωσιν, κάμνοντες μὲν τοῖς προγεγονόσι 
πολέμοις, πιστεύοντες δὲ τῇ παρούσῃ καταστάσει, πάντες ὠλιγώρησαν 
Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς περὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ παρασκευῆς’  
(‘because he had little confidence in the Achaian forces because of the 
laziness with which had lately neglected the exercise of their weapons, he 
retreated from going to battle and rallying the troops altogether. For the 
fact is that ever since the fall of King Kleomenes of Sparta all the 
Peloponnesians, defeated as they were by the previous wars and trusting 
in the lasting tranquillity, had paid no attention at all to war preparations’).  
The war had also been taxing for some of its members. Due to its geographical proximity 
to Sparta, Megalopolis had suffered extensively from the fighting.
479
 As we have seen in 
chapter four, Kleomenes plundered and conquered the Megalopolitan territory multiple 
times and even though many of the inhabitants could escape to Messene after refusing 
to join him, his last attack on the polis in 222 left many citizens dead and the polis in 
ruins (Plut. Kleo. 12. 2). Moreover, the destruction of Megalopolis was so bad that by 
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the first Aitolian assaults on Arkadian land in 220 BC, the process of repopulating the 
city had only just started (Pol. 4. 25. 4).  
 The exact extent of the damage done to Achaia and Megalopolis was clearly 
illustrated when a new conflict broke out in Greece, the Social War (220-217 BC).
480
 
Tensions had risen between Messene and the Aitolians due to Messene’s attempts to 
seek rapprochement with the Achaians and the Hellenic League that had been formed 
by Antigonos Gonatas during the Kleomenean War.
481
 Soon new alliances had formed 
with the Aitolians, Elis and Sparta on one side and the Achaians, Philip and the Hellenic 
League on the other. The koinon’s inability to defend itself caused a divide between 
Philip and Aratos. That each man had his own priorities became clear when Philip failed 
to answer several of the Achaian calls for help. Because of this, he exposed the weakness 
of both the federal army and the relationship between local members and the federal 
government. This problematic relationship was illustrated by the refusal of Dyme, Pharai 
and Tritaia to contribute to the federal army after the federal strategos Aratos could not 
muster a force to support the poleis against the Aitolians (Pol. 4. 60). Instead, the poleis 
decided to hire their own mercenary force. So, the lack of military skill of the Achaians 
was one of the elements that changed their relationship with Philip.
482
 The only reason 
why the Achaians decided to establish an alliance with Macedon in the first place had 
been their need for support against Sparta. While Achaian interests remained the same 
as long as Aratos was alive, in Macedon matters were a little different. At first, Philip 
seemed happy to continue his predecessor’s line in international affairs, as is quite clear 
from his treatment of Aratos in the beginning of his kingship (Pol. 4. 24). However, after 
a few years, Philip showed that he would be willing to help the Achaians whenever they 
needed as long as there were no pressing matters up north. This became more and more 
obvious over the course of the Social War and especially after Aratos’ death in 213 BC. 
However, nothing would change until the emergence of Philopoimen in on the 
federal and international scene. By the start of the First Macedonian War (214-205 BC), 
Rome had established an alliance with the Aitolians and had become increasingly 
concerned about Philip’s actions (Pol. 7. 9).
483
 In Achaia, the koinon was suffering once 
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again at the hands of Sparta, now under the control of Machanidas. However, in 210 
BC, Philopoimen returned from Crete and was immediately elected as hipparch for the 
year 210/209 BC. His first action was to reform the cavalry by providing the proper 
training and equipment, as well as actively encouraging his men to fight (Pol. 10. 22-
24).
484
 Philopoimen was elected together with Kykliades of Pharai, whose known ties to 
Macedon suggest that the election may have been the result of Macedonian involvement. 
As Errington argues, this meant that at the start of his career Philopoimen associated 
himself with Philip.
485
 Coming from Megalopolis, Philopoimen was aware of the good 
relations of his hometown with Macedon, which he must have used to his own 
advantage.
486
 This is further illustrated by his actions during the battle of Sellasia, which 
impressed Antigonos and marked the beginnning of Philopoimen’s personal 
connections to Macedon (Plut. Phil. 6-7; Pol. 2. 67. 4- 68. 2). Additionally, Philip may 
have seen the merit in supporting a Megalopolitan whose military reforms enabled the 
Achaians to become more self-reliant.
487
 While Errington has made a persuasive 
argument for Philopoimen’s Macedonian connections, I believe that ultimately his own 
character, his military skills and his Megalopolitan background were the essential factors 
for Philopoimen’s election and ascent to the political top in Achaia. By this time, 
Megalopolis had become an important member of the Achaian koinon not only because 
of the size of the polis, but also on account of the central role of the polis in the Achaian 
foreign politics in the decades following its membership. Yet these principles were more 
than just the cause for Megalopolis’ position within the federal state, they were key 
characteristics of Megalopolitan identity exhibited by individuals from the city, including 
Philopoimen. Additionally, as we have seen throughout chapter three, Megalopolis’ 
position of power within the federation was also connected to its ability to participate in 
the federal institutions and understand its relationship with the federal state enough so 
as to manipulate them to its own advantage. 
Philopoimen’s reforms of the cavalry were a success and during the battle of 
Mantinea in 207 BC, the Achaians showed that they were able to defeat the Spartans 
(Pol. 11. 11-18). Due to this success, a new wave of patriotism was created similar to the 
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one that they had enjoyed under Aratos’ leadership. Additionally, the event revealed 
another point of contention between the Achaians and Philip, i.e. the position of the 
Macedonian garrisons in the Peloponnese and Philip’s possession of border castles.
488
 
Over the span of several decades, the kings of Macedon controlled several poleis and 
areas of the Peloponnese by stationing a Macedonian garrison or occupying a nearby 
stronghold such as the Acrocorinth, which was still under Philip’s control, supposedly 
to ensure Achaian safety. When it became clear however that there was no real need for 
Macedon to retain these possessions, Philip made the promise to give back the cities 
Heraia and Alipheira; as well as the region Triphylia to the Achaians at a synodos held 
in 208 (Livy 28. 8. 1-6). However, it was still an issue in 199 BC when Philip used it as a 
last attempt to dissuade the Achaians from joining Rome. 
In 205 BC, the Peace of Phoinike brought an end to the First Macedonian War 
between Rome and Philip and was concluded with the Achaians as adscripti on Philip’s 
side since they were still Macedonian allies at this point. Things were finally looking 
increasingly positive for Achaia: the Spartan danger had been temporarily vanquished 
and within the federal state a new feeling of pride and independence surfaced. In light 
of this context, Errington argues that Philopoimen slowly seemed to be stepping away 
from his association with Philip and adopted a thoroughly anti-Macedonian stance.
489
 
While it is an interesting theory that makes some valid points such as the obvious 
political association of Philopoimen with Aristainos, I think there is insufficient proof to 
label Philopoimen as pro- or anti-Macedonian at this time. Yet it is important to 
remember that Greek polities in this period were ruled by local and personal ambitions, 
and not by their attitude towards the bigger states such as Rome or Macedon.
490
 Even 
though Errington’s theory seems plausible, considering Philopoimen’s later political 
ideologies and actions, it is difficult to say much about his political convictions before 
his return from Crete. Furthermore, what he would have done at the synodos of 198 BC 
is equally difficult to say since he was back in Crete by this point. However, there was a 
general shift in the Achaian attitude towards Philip and Macedon, as is illustrated by a 
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passage from Plutarch in which Philopoimen and his troops were applauded at the 
Nemean Games of 205 BC (Plut. Phil. 11. 3):  
‘τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὸ παλαιὸν ἀξίωμα ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ἀναλαμβανόντων καὶ τοῦ τότε 
φρονήματος ἔγγιστα τῷ θαρρεῖν γινομένων’  
(‘in their hopes that the Greeks were recovering their ancient dignity, and by 
being courageous they were coming closer to the high spirit’).  
The passage clearly points to a growing Achaian fondness for Philopoimen and the 
Achaian army at the expense of Philip as the Nemean Games were organised in Argos, 
a polis usually loyal to Macedon and where Philip was honoured every year.
491
  
 While the relationship between Achaia and Macedon was detiorating, the tyrant 
Nabis grasped power in Sparta around 207 BC. He succeeded in reviving Sparta after 
its loss at Mantinea and increased the city’s influence in the Peloponnese and 
internationally, even if it was only for a short period. Additionally, he pursued another 
traditional aspect of Spartan politics in the Hellenistic period: regaining control over the 
Peloponnese at the expense of Megalopolis (and the Achaians).
492
 The first opportunity 
to accomplish this ambition came in 204 BC when a group of travellers from Boiotia 
had apparently succeeded in stealing Nabis’ best horse from his stables before fleeing to 
Megalopolis with several of his grooms (Pol. 13. 8). Since Megalopolis refused to give 
back the horse or hand over the Boiotians, Nabis carried out a raid on an Achaian 
farmhouse. The period of respite from Spartan attacks was clearly over. Over the next 
few years, there were several small clashes between the two states but the situation did 
not become serious until 201 BC when Nabis attacked Messene. This worried 
Philopoimen who immediately urged the Achaian strategos to take action (Plut. Phil. 
12). As a Megalopolitan, he obviously realised the danger of Messene falling into Spartan 
hands. Therefore, when the Achaian strategos Lysippos refused to help Messene, 
Philopoimen decided to take action by raising forces from Megalopolis and stop Nabis 
before he could complete his plan (Pol. 16. 13).
493
  It is not surprising that Philopoimen 
could raise a force from Megalopolis to aid Messene, since there was a long history of 
close cooperation between the two states, especially where Sparta was involved.
494
 It was 
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far easier to see the danger that Sparta posed from Megalopolis than from Aigion due 
to the polis’ geographical proximity to and its history with Sparta. Clearly, through the 
actions of Philopoimen and his fellow citizens – which in this case directly influenced 
the federal politics, Megalopolis was illustrating its own local concerns and explicitly 
acted against the wishes of the federal state.    
 Almost a quarter of century had now passed since Aratos had capitalised on the 
initial diplomatic contacts between Megalopolis and Macedon and a lot had changed for 
both Megalopolis and Achaia. After the War with Kleomenes, Achaia had been left in 
disarray and was forced to depend upon a foreign king to protect it from Sparta. 
Megalopolis had been destroyed by Kleomenes and the rebuilding of the polis would 
take years. The Achaian weakness was illustrated multiple times during the next two 
international conflicts until Philopoimen, a typical Megalopolitan, returned from Crete 
and started his reforms of the Achaian army, no doubt with the initial approval of Philip. 
When this new army had passed its first test and defeated the Spartans at Mantinea, it 
led to a renewal of Achaian confidence and desire for independence. This in turn was 
one of the factors responsible for the cooling down of Achaian relations with Macedon, 
which was further complicated by Philip’s refusal to give up his border castles, his failure 
to protect Achaia on several occasions and the emergence of a renewed Spartan threat 
to Megalopolis under Nabis. So, when Rome started to involve itself in these matters in 
200 BC, it proved to be the final straw for Achaian-Macedonian relations. 
1.2. Megalopolis, Aristainos and the Achaian synodos of 198 BC  
The growing estrangement divergence between Philip and the Achaians was responsible 
for the formation of the Achaian alliance with Rome. However, the decision taken at the 
synodos at Sikyon was not a unanimous one since several of the Achaian members 
vehemently opposed it. The Megalopolitans present, who were some of the more 
outspoken opponents of an alliance with Rome, left the meeting before the vote even 
took place. Considering the Megalopolitan ties to Macedon, their resistance is not 
surprising as it is in line with the traditional policy pursued by the polis. However, if we 
take a closer look at the individuals, especially Aristainos, at the centre of these events, 
there might have been more to Megalopolis’ involvement in the decision. In this next 
section, I will discuss the synodos of 198, Megalopolis’ attitude towards it and the origins 
of Aristainos to prove that, as a polis, Megalopolis was entirely explicitly against theis 
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decision. Yet through the actions of federal leaders that came from the city like 
Aristainos and Philopoimen, there is an indication that within the city there was a faction 
which could support the federal state and its decision.  
In 200 BC, the Roman Senate sent an embassy to Greece to announce Rome’s 
general willingness to protect the Greeks against the Macedonian king and tried to secure 
as much support for their cause as possible by reconfirming old friendships and creating 
new ones, preferably with Philip’s allies like the Achaians.  This was the starting point 
for a very decisive conflict, which profoundly changed the Hellenistic World, as Rome 
become actively involved in the Hellenistic East from this point onwards. Consequently, 
Philip never regained the power he had lost and Achaia finally succeeded in bringing 
the entire Peloponnese under its control (Pol. 2. 37).  Aside from the Roman embassy 
to the koinon after the First Illyrian War in 229-228 BC (Pol. 2. 12. 4.), the diplomatic 
mission of 200 BC was the one of the first formal contacts between Achaia and Rome. 
No doubt, the three Roman commissioners hoped to convince the federation to give up 
its support for Philip. Though their attempt was not immediately successful, the visit did 
have some desirable results. Philip was clearly concerned, since he personally attended 
an Achaian meeting later that year during which he promised Macedonian support 
against Nabis if the Achaians supplied him with troops to guard Corinth, Orchomenos 
and Chalkis. Yet,  
‘non fefellit Achaeos, quo spectasset tam benigna pollicitatio auxiliumque 
oblatum adversus Lacedaemonios: id quaeri, ut obsidem Achaeorum 
iuventutem educeret ex Peloponneso ad inligandam Romano bello gentem’  
(Livy 31. 25. 8: ‘the Achaians were not deceived as to the real meaning of so 
generous an offer and promise of aid against the Lacedaemonians: he said this 
to lead the Achaian youth as hostages from the Peloponnese to commit the 
people to war with Rome’).  
It may also have inspired some of the Achaians to reconsider their loyalty to Philip. After 
all, Philip may have been the better choice since he as well as the Romans had already 
shown that they were capable of acting as barbarians.
495
 Nonetheless, I would not go as 
far as Errington in stating that ‘the formation of a mildly pro-Roman group in Achaia, 
centred on Philipoemen and Aristaenus, seems likely to have taken its origin from the 
appearance of the Roman propaganda mission at Aigion in 200’.
496
 While it is true that 
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there was a political group in Achaia that centred around Philopoimen, Aristainos and 
Lykortas that was influential in Achaian politics, this was not a pro-Roman group but 
one that aspired for the koinon to function completely independent from any big power. 
As said before, for Philopoimen and Aristainos local matters were important and it may 
indeed be that the visit simply opened their minds up to the possibility of using Rome 
as an ally to achieve this goal.
497
  
 Nevertheless, in 200 the interests of the Achaian majority were still in line with 
Philip, as evidenced by the election of Kykliades, a federal statesman with known ties to 
Macedon and Philip in particular, in the year 200/199 BC (Livy 32. 19).
498
 Over the next 
two years, this position slowly shifted and the Achaians turned against Philip. The 
election of Aristainos as strategos of 199/198 and subsequent expulsion of Kykliades 
(Pol. 18. 1. 2) were the first major indicators of this shift as ‘Aristaenus, qui Romanis 
gentem iungi volebat, praetor erat’ (Livy 32. 19. 2: ‘Aristainos, who wanted to connect 
his people to the Romans, was strategos’).
 499
 Philip was aware of the situation in Achaia 
and tried to re-establish Achaian loyalty by finally withdrawing his garrisons from the 
Peloponnese, aside from the one at the Acrocorinth. Moreover, he even reinstated 
places that were under his control, such as Alipheira, returned to the Megalopolitans.
500
 
Even though this plan had the desired effect at first, by 198 BC the Achaians were ready 
to disband their alliance with him in favour of Rome. 
 In 198 BC, the Roman consul Titus Quinctius Flamininus thought it was time 
to send ambassadors to the Achaians and promise them control over Corinth (Livy 32. 
19. 4-5). In addition to the Romans, delegates from Attalos, Rhodes, Athens and Philip 
were at Sikyon for a three-day synodos. On the first day, each of the foreign delegates 
had the chance to speak. The Romans, Rhodians and Attalos requested help from the 
Achaians against Macedon (Livy 32. 21. 4). That the Achaians were extremely divided 
about the situation became clear on the second day of the synodos when the Achaian 
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magistrates themselves were to discuss the situation (Livy 32. 20-21). Obviously, there 
were multiple reasons for this division among the Achaians:  
‘terrebat Nabis Lacedaemonius, gravis et adsiduus hostis; horrebant Romana 
arma; Macedonum beneficiis et veteribus et recentibus obligati erant; regem 
ipsum suspectum habebant pro eius crudelitate perfidiaque, neque ex iis, quae 
tum ad tempus faceret, aestimantes graveriorem post bellum dominum futurum 
cernebant’  
(Livy 32. 19. 6-8: ‘Nabis the Lakedaimonian, a grave and arduous enemy, 
frightened them; the Roman army made them shudder; they were obliged to the 
Macedonians by old and new benefits; they regarded the king (Philip) himself 
with suspicion because of his cruelty and perfidy, and not judging by what he was 
doing at that time, to suit the occasion, they believed that he would be a harsher 
master after the war’).  
As no one else of the Achaian representatives was prepared to publicly voice an opinion 
on the matter out of fear for potential personal repercussions, this left Aristainos, obliged 
as he was in his position as strategos, to speak out on the matter - ‘forsitan ego quoque 
tacerem, si privatus essem’ (Livy 32. 21. 1: ‘maybe I would keep quiet as well if I were 
a private citizen’).   
 In his speech, Aristainos strongly championed the Roman cause while attacking 
Philip for his lack of support against Nabis as well as his abandonment of other allies in 
the war (Livy 32. 20-21). Moreover, the fact that Philip was absent on ins many ways was 
what aggravated Aristainos most and it is the primary reason why he urged the Achaians 
to accept the Roman offer.  He urged the Achaians:  
‘liberare vos a Philippo iam diu magis vultis quam audetis. Sine vestro labore 
et periculo qui vos in libertatem vindicaret, cum magnis classibus 
exercitibusque mare traiecerunt. Hi si socios aspernamini, vix mentis sanae 
estis; sed aut socios aut hostes habeatis oportet’  
(Livy 32. 21. 37: ‘for a long time, you have wished, but not dared to free 
yourselves from Philip. Now men have crossed the sea with mighty fleets and 
armies, to affirm your claims to liberty without trouble or danger on your part. 
If you reject them as allies, you are barely sane; but as either allies or enemies 
you will have them’). 
In short, Philip was an unreliable ally who was unable to protect them from or assist 
them against Nabis and the Romans. Rome was making successful advancements in the 
Second Macedonian War, and could become a potential problem for Achaia. If the 
Achaians wished to fulfil their most important desire – to unite the Peloponnese under 
their rule , they would have more success by choosing to fight on the Roman side. That 
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 I have already said that in general the Achaian representatives were unsure about 
the decision they had to make; therefore, it is not surprising that this speech caused a lot 
of commotion during the meeting. Many different opinions were expressed by the 
member delegations and the federal damiorgoi. Exactly how much this issue divided the 
koinon is best illustrated by two episodes. Pisias of Pellene, whose son Memnon was 
one of the federal damiorgoi, swore to kill Memnon if he did not change his mind since 
Pisias believed that clinging to Philip would result in ‘gentem universam perditum’ (Livy 
32. 22. 6-7: ‘the destruction of the entire people’). Eventually, Pisias convinced his son 
Memnon who became the deciding factor in favour of passing a motion to vote on the 
matter. While this episode is probably untrue, it is interesting to mention because it 
shows how deeply this decision must have affected the individual Achaian. The second 
example is of vital importance in this chapter as it deals with Megalopolis’ view on the 
matter.  Once it became clear that most of the Achaians were in favour of joining Rome, 
Livy tells us that  
‘Dymaei ac Megalopolitani et quidam Argivorum, priusqum decretum fieret, 
consurrexerunt ac relinquerunt consilium neque mirante ullo nec improbante’ 
(Livy 32. 22. 9-10: ‘the Dymaians, Megalopolitans and some (represtenatives) 
from Argos stood up and, before the decree was approved, left the meeting, no 
one being surprised or reproached’).  
There had long been a strong connection to Macedon in these cities, so they could not 
accept this decision and left the assembly before the vote could be taken. This reaction 
was predictable due to Megalopolis’ connections to Macedon dating back to the time of 
Philip II (and potentially Alexander) as seen by the lands granted to the polis and more 
importantly the building named after him.
502
 Moreover, these connections were the 
reason behind the establishment of the Achaian alliance with Macedon in the first place. 
Additionally, Dyme had a personal loyalty to Philip, as he was the one who had restored 
their homes and liberated them after they had been conquered and plundered by the 
Romans (Livy 32. 22. 10). Finally, Argos had longstanding personal ties to the kingdom 
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and even believed that the Macedonian kings were their descendants and had installed 
tyrants in their city.  
While this reaction could be expected, it is strange that these representatives left 
the meeting without speaking up and trying to convince the other Achaians of their point 
of view. However, it looks like most of the representatives were planning to vote for an 
alliance with Rome anyway. More importantly, it seems to me that the links of Dyme, 
Argos and Megalopolis to Philip had not at all ‘induced to them to break with the 
Confederacy over this matter.’
503
 On the contrary, these cities expressed their allegiance 
to the Achaian koinon as well as Macedon by leaving before any action was taken. In 
Megalopolis’ case a high regard for federalism in general and the Achaian koinon in 
particular had been ingrained in their collective identity from the beginning due to its 
foundation by the Arkadian koinon in 368 BC. As we have seen in chapters two and 
four, Megalopolis had been grateful for the Macedonian support during the 
Kleomenean War since they had only been able to return from their exile in 223/2 BC 
because of the Macedonian help. Choosing between their allegiance to Philip and 
Achaian membership instead of combining them as they had done before proved 
seemingly impossible. Leaving before they were forced to publicly declare an opinion 
would thus be much easier. After their departure, the remaining Achaian delegations 
voted in favour of an immediate alliance with Attalos and Rhodes. Yet, the Achaian 
alliance with Rome was to be ratified by the Senate whose approval was necessary for 
this type of bond.  
Of course, the Megalopolitans were happy with this outcome. Their decision to 
leave the assembly was not unexpected nor did any of the other members judge them 
for it. After all, Achaian member states enjoyed a high level of autonomy and 
Megalopolis’ connections to Macedon were well known. Nevertheless, I am convinced 
that this is only one side of the polis’ views on the matter. Subsequent Achaian politics 
clearly illustrate that different political ideologies were possible within the same city. For 
example, there is Polybius’ account of the Greek attitudes towards Perseus at the start 
of the Third Macedonian War. The author distinguishes three separate groups among 
the political leaders: those who privately agreed with Perseus, others who publicly 
showed their connection to Perseus and finally those who just wanted the dispute to be 
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settled (Pol. 30. 6. 5). Obviously, there were different political opinions on the matter 
within the same poleis and states and even among Philopoimen’s fellow politicians. By 
the start of the Third Macedonian War (172-168 BC), the Achaian alliance with Rome 
had – just like the one with Macedon - become increasingly complex and estranged due 
to Achaia’s growing need for independence and patriotism.
504
 The Achaians, along with 
the rest of the Greeks, were not very keen on fighting a war between Rome and Perseus. 
The Achaian contribution to the war was minimal and they did not get actively involved 
until 170 BC, after there had been a heated debate on the proper action to take (Pol. 
28. 6). During the debate, it became clear that within the group of political figures who 
were ideologically linked to Lykortas of Megalopolis, there were several prominent 
individuals: Polybius, Arkesilaos and Ariston of Megalopolis, Stratios of Tritaia, Xenon 
of Patrai and Apollonidas of Sikyon, all with different views on the Achaian involvement 
in the war. Lykortas wanted to remain neutral, whereas Stratios and Apollonidas agreed 
with him but believed those supporting Rome merely for personal gain should be dealt 
with. Contrarily, Archon, Polybius, Arkesilaos and Xenon thought it best to act as the 
circumstances would allow them (Pol. 28. 6. 7.). This passage proves that although two 
politicians came from the same city or even the same family, they did not always have to 
agree with one another. Interestingly, there seems to have been a divide between 
different generations on how to deal with Rome and achieve the goal of an independent 
Achaia. On the one hand, there was Lykortas’ and Philopoimen’s idealism which 
sometimes failed to grasp the complexity of dealing with Rome. This was opposed, on 
the other hand, by the realistic attitude of Archon and Polybius who were more aware 
of these problems. Another distinction can also be seen years earlier between Aristainos 
and Philopoimen who were divided on the Achaian attitude towards Rome, even though 
they agreed on the need for Achaian independence (Pol. 24. 11-13).
505
  
These different examples show that it was entirely possible for two people from 
the same city to have a different political perspective. I am convinced that this was also 
the case for Megalopolis in 198 BC. Neither Polybius nor Livy mention this, but 
Polybius’ narrative is fragmentary by this point and Livy may not have been aware of this 
aspect. Additionally, it is possible to say something more on the matter by looking at the 
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strategos: Aristainos. As we know from the Histories, Aristainos was a prominent figure 
in Achaian politics. He was closely associated with both Philopoimen (Plut. Phil. 13) 
and the Romans (Livy 32. 19. 5), but ultimately, he wanted to ensure that the Achaians 
could conduct their affairs independently.
506
  
Even though Polybius tells us a lot about Aristainos’ political career and his 
perception by other Achaians (Pol. 18. 13), he does not mention which city Aristainos 
came from which leaves us with a problem, since Plutarch and Pausanias indicate that 
he came from Megalopolis. If this is true, it would allow us to draw some interesting 
conclusions about the different political ideologies in connection to the Achaian foreign 
politics. Plutarch calls Aristainos: ‘δὲ τοῦ Μεγαλοπολίτου δυναμένου μὲν ἐν τοῖς 
Ἀχαιοῖς μέγιστον’ (Plut. Phil. 17. 3: ‘a powerful Megalopolitan who was the best out of 
the Achaians’); while Pausanias says the following about him: 
‘Ἀρισταίνου τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τοῦ Μεγαλοπολίτου παραινοῦντος ἐπαινεῖν τὰ 
Ῥωμαίοις ἀρέσκοντα ἐπὶ παντὶ μηδὲ ἀνθίστασθαί σφισιν ὑπὲρ μηδενό’  
(Paus. 8. 51. 4: ‘Aristainos of Megalopolis advised the Achaians to approve the 
wishes of the Romans in all respects, and to oppose them about nothing’).
 
  
Another Plutarchean passage is often cited in support of Aristainos as a Megalopolitan 
citizen in which the inhabitants of the polis wanted to banish Philopoimen after he had 
left for Crete (Plut. Phil. 13). To dissuade the Megalopolitans, the Achaians sent their 
strategos Aristainos to intervene on Philopoimen’s behalf. In addition to establishing a 
definite connection between the two men, this passage shows, according to James O’Neil 
that Aristainos himself was a Megalopolitan, since it seemed rather implausible that the 
Achaian general could not address the assembly of Megalopolis if he himself was not 
from Megalopolis.
507
 While I agree with O’Neil‘s general idea about Aristainos’ 
background, this passage does not necessarily verify the thesis as definitely as O’Neil 
believed. Surely, the federal strategos would have been able to address the assembly of 
one of its member poleis without any problems. Yet, if we look at Livy’s text again (Livy 
32. 19-22), the main motivation for the strategos’ actions at the synodos of 198 BC was 
a concern about both Rome and Sparta.
508
 The fact that Sparta was connected to his 
motivations is particularly interesting as it is a typical characteristic of the Megalopolitan 
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identity. Unlike citizens from Dyme, for example, Megalopolitans were generally much 
more aware of the danger Sparta posed to Achaia. One look at the federal measures 
taken in connection with Sparta prove this point, for someone from Megalopolis was 
always bound to be involved. For example, there was Philopoimen’s resolution to 
incorporate Sparta into the koinon in the 190’s as well the prominence it takes in 
Achaian politics after Lydiades became active in federal politics. Finally, as both O’Neil 
and Freeman have stated, there was a predominance of Megalopolitans in Achaian 




Even though Polybius remains silent on Aristainos’ origins, we should 
completely not discard him in this discussion. In his polemic against traitors, the author 
clearly believes that Aristainos is not one of those men who merit the term traitor since 
the actions of traitors are always guided by personal gain or a disagreement with the 
opposition (Pol. 18. 15. 1-4). Aristainos, on the other hand was one of those whose 
actions had resulted in the greatest benefit for all, 
‘εἰ γὰρ μὴ σὺν καιρῷ τότε μετέρριψε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς Ἀρίσταινος ἀπὸ τῆς 
Φιλίππου συμμαχίας πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαίων, φανερῶς ἄρδην ἀπολώλει τὸ ἔθνος. 
νῦν δὲ χωρὶς τῆς παρ᾽ αὐτὸν τὸν καιρὸν ἀσφαλείας ἑκάστοις περιγενομένης, 
αὐξήσεως τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ὁμολογουμένως ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ κἀκεῖνο τὸ 
διαβούλιον αἴτιος ἐδόκει γεγονέναι: διὸ καὶ πάντες αὐτὸν οὐχ ὡς προδότην, 
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς εὐεργέτην καὶ σωτῆρα τῆς χώρας ἐτίμων’  
(Pol. 18. 13. 8-10: ‘since if Aristainos had not then in good time made the 
Achaians throw off their alliance with Philip for one with Rome, the nation would 
evidently have suffered utter destruction. But now, apart from the temporary 
safety gained for all the members of the League, this man and that counsel were 
regarded as having beyond doubt contributed to the increase of Achaian power, 
so that all agreed in honouring him not as a traitor but as the benefactor and 
preserver of the land’). 
Polybius is clearly defending both Aristainos and his controversial actions at Sikyon, 
believing he acted correctly, as his ultimate goals was to increase Achaian power. 
However, not everyone shared this opinion, the Megalopolitans in particular. 
Undoubtedly, Aristainos and his actions would have been heavily criticised, something 
the author was most aware of.
 
 Then why would Polybius defend Aristainos? The only 
possible answer to this question is a connection that the historian saw with Aratos’ 
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actions during the Kleomenean War, which were guided by a feeling of ἀνάγκη. 510 
Likewise, his usage of the words εὐεργέτης and σωτῆρια create further links to a wider 
tradition of benefactors and moral superiority and illustrate Polybius’ judgement of 
Aristainos as a positive element of Achaian history. Finally, if Aristainos was in fact from 
Megalopolis, Polybius would have seen it as his duty to ensure that his readers would 
understand the reasoning behind Aristainos’ actions and uphold his positive image. 
According to the literary sources Aristainos was a Megalopolitan just like his 
political associates Philopoimen and Lykortas. In fact, Plutarch and Pausanias state this 
explicitely, while Polybius’ testimony is compatible with this assessment. Based solely on 
this evidence an attractive theory starts to emerge: Aristainos, the main voice in support 
of the Romans, proves that not all Megalopolitans were averse to the course the 
federation was taking. Megalopolis’ political convictions and identity were thus much 
more complex than the sources would like us to believe. This is because there were 
individuals such as Aristainos who still exemplified several of the traditional 
Megalopolitan values such as the awareness of the Spartan danger but had stepped away 
from another one, i.e. its long-standing link to Macedon, to do what was best for the 
Achaian federation, even if the Achaians themselves had not realised it at the time. It 
seems that this was primarily how Megalopolis would affect federal politics from 198 BC 
onwards, namely via the actions and convictions of powerful individuals such as 
Aristainos, Philopoimen, Lykortas, Polybius, Diaios and Diophanes. However, this does 
not mean that the city did not play any part in federal and institutional life, as is clear 
from its active participation in the federal institutions and the minting of federal coinage 
discussed in the previous chapters.  
The idea of Aristainos as a Megalopolitan is a very attractive one for the purposes 
of the present thesis, but it has usually been rejected by scholars who rather identify him 
as Aristainos of Dyme.
511
 This identification of Aristainos with the city of Dyme stems 
from an inscriptions found in Delphi dating to the beginning of the second century BC 
in which the Achaians dedicate a statue to ‘Ἀρίσταινον Τιμοκάδεος Δυμαῖον’ because 
of his ‘ἀρετᾶς (…) καὶ εὐνοίας τᾶς εἰς τὸ ἔθνος καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους 
Ἕλλανας’ (FD III, 3. 122: ‘excellence and benevolence to the people and the allies and 
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all of the other Greeks’). Rizakis cites an additional inscription from Corinth in which 
an Aristainos is honoured together with a Roman named Titus (Achaie I 629). While 
the inscription is rather fragmentary, as the majority of the text is missing, Rizakis has 
concluded that this Aristainos has to be same one mentioned in the other inscription 
from Delphi and the Roman known as Titus to be Titus Quinctius Flaminius.
512
 While 
this is possible, Rizakis’ theory cannot be proven with absolute certainty. Furthermore, 
a proxeny decree from Aptera from the same period mentions one ‘Ἀρίσταινος 
Δαμοκάδηος Ἀχαιὸς’ and in Polybius’ narrative there is an allusion to Aristainetos from 
Dyme who was the hipparch at the battle of Mantinea in 207 BC (Pol. 11. 11. 7). These 
additional sources make most historians doubt the veracity of Plutarch’s and Pausanias’ 
accounts.  
Thus, all of these attestations to an Aristain(et)os leave us with four possible and 
different men, which seems highly unlikely due to the fact that the name Aristainos is 
quite uncommon.
513
 A search of the Lexicon of Greek Personal Names demonstrates 
this fact, yielding only eight entries in total for the name Aristainos from the 
Peloponnese, all of which occurred across the very long span between 365 BC and the 
third century AD.
514
 However, six of them came from poleis within the Achaian 
federation such as Dyme, Hermione and Achaia in general. Aristainetos, in comparison, 
is a much more common name which occurs sixty-one times in inscriptions from all 
over the Mediterranean world but only three times in the Peloponnese.
 515
  Although the 
name Aristainos was indeed quite rare, it was used most frequently in the Peloponnese 
and more importantly within the Achaian koinon. This does retain the possibility open 
for the existence of at least two separate individuals called Aristainos in Achaian politics. 
In my opinion, Niccolini has sufficiently proven based on mistakes in other passages in 
the manuscripts of Polybius that the name Aristainetos could easily be an error and 
should be therefore Aristainos instead.
516
 This then makes easier to identify Aristainos 
of Dyme as the hipparch of the Achaians in 207 BC and the man who was honoured by 
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the Achaians for his ἀρετη and εὐνοία. Additionally, we cannot overlook the similarities 
between the patronymics Timokades and Damokades so it therefore seems plausible 
that this is also the same person.
517
  
The main problem we are left with then is the following: is this Aristainos of 
Dyme who seems to have enjoyed a prospering federal career the same man as the 
Aristainos of Megalopolis mentioned by Plutarch and Pausanias? Niccolini thinks that 
it is possible for Plutarch to have made a mistake and in fact the Aristainos of Dyme 
honoured in the inscriptions is the same individual mentioned in the other primary 
source.
518
 This view is echoed by Rizakis who altogether ignores Plutach’s comments on 
Aristainos and is sure that the Aristainos and Aristainetos mentioned by Polybius is the 
man that was honoured in the different inscriptions.
519
 Deininger, on the other hand, is 
convinced that Plutarch must have had access to the original text of Polybius’ narrative 
and would not make that kind of mistake, so he believes that Aristainos is from 
Megalopolis.
520
 For Errington everything depended on the reading of Aristain(et)os in 
the Histories. If this was indeed Aristainos, Plutarch was in fact mistaken and Polybius 
also says that Aristainos was a Dymaian. If this was Aristainetos then there were two 
Achaian statesmen, one called Aristainos and another called Aristainetos. However, this 
still leaves the problem of the Aristainos mentioned in the inscriptions.
 521
 In the end, it 
is impossible to come to a definite conclusion on the matter, but there is still room for 
some speculations.  
So, while the name Aristainos is rare, it is mostly found on inscriptions with a 
connection to the Achaian koinon, making it likely that two men with the same name 
could have been active within federal politics: one of them a federal hipparch and son 
of Timokades from Dyme honoured in several inscriptions and the other the federal 
strategos from Megalopolis.  
2. Megalopolis, Sparta and the Achaian-Roman relations after 198 BC 
The Achaian synodos of 198 BC and the political events leading up to it have been 
discussed in detail because they were, just like the events of the Kleomenean War, 
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decisive for Achaian politics and Megalopolis’ part in them. While the city played an 
active role in the creation of the Achaian alliance with Macedon in 225 BC, the situation 
was rather different in 198 BC. The city did not approve of the new direction in Achaian 
politics and left the assembly before a decision was taken. All of this was to be expected 
from a city with close connections to Macedon, but, if we assume that Aristainos was 
from Megalopolis, there is an indication that within Megalopolis a new group of 
individuals was being formed who had stepped away from the traditional loyalty to 
Macedon and replaced it with a vehement Achaian patriotism. Interestingly, it seems 
that over the course of the next five decades, this was a trait exhibited by most of the 
Megalopolitan leaders who dominated the Achaian political scene. The ensuing 
different generations of Megalopolitan statesmen - from Philopoimen and his 
compatriots to Kritolaos and consorts – shared a profound hatred for Sparta and a new 
found Achaian patriotism. These two characteristics shaped the Megalopolitan leaders’ 
political convictions and Achaian interactions with Rome. This is particularly clear 
whenever one of these men was leading the federation - several of them having done this 
more than once - which was frequently as between 198 and 169 BC eleven out of the 
nineteen strategoi that are known to us came from Megalopolis.
522
 Even though the 
source material gets worse after the end of the Third Macedonian War, this trend is 
again visible amongst the last six strategoi from the koinon with five of them coming 
from Megalopolis between 151 and 146 BC. 
 The last section of this thesis will examine the instances in the Achaian 
interactions with Rome during which Sparta caused issues in the relationship between 
the two states, something that was not made easier by the strategos of the time who 
almost always a Megalopolitan. And if the strategos was not a Megalopolitan, then there 
was bound to be a discussion within the federation about the proper course to take in 
which the Megalopolitan voice was undoubtedly heard. However, as previously 
discussed, even among the Megalopolitan statesmen there were different opinions on 
how to deal with Rome so as to achieve autonomous Achaian control over the 
Peloponnese. Moreover, some difficulties have to be mentioned before starting the 
discussion. For one, a complete overview of Achaian politics after the Third 
Macedonian War (172-168 BC) becomes rather limited to due to the fragmentary nature 
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of the sources. Additionally, the literary sources are dominated by individuals, thus 
giving the impression that the poleis themselves did not have any political importance 
within the Achaian koinon. Nonetheless, as stated before, the inscriptions and 
numismatic evidence from the period show that this was not the case and that the poleis 
were especially active within the Achaian koinon. For example, most of the federal and 
civic coinage from Megalopolis and the boundary disputes involving the city are dated 
to the 180s BC.
523
 Therefore, this last section will analyse the actions of the 
Megalopolitan politicians in the Achaian-Roman relationship and combine this with the 
knowledge provided to us by the material record. 
2.1. Philopoimen and his cohorts 
2.1.1. Nabis of Sparta 
Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, had come to power in 207 BC, first acting as a regent for the 
rightful heir to the throne Pelops after Machanidas’ death in the battle at Mantinea at 
the hands of Philopoimen. However, Nabis soon usurped the throne by killing Pelops 
and those he was certain of would stand in his way (Diod. 27. 1. 1). Within Sparta, Nabis 
continued the implementation of Kleomenes’ so-called social reforms which he saw as 
a reinstatement of the Sparta originally instated by Lykurgos. It is important to note that 
the literary sources are traditionally quite hostile when it comes to Nabis.
524
 On the one 
hand, Polybius, who undoubtedly served as the basis for this hostility, calls Nabis a tyrant 
and depicts him as a vicious man who had constructed a torturing device that he would 
use on anyone who had wronged him (Pol. 13. 6). On the other hand, it seems that 
Nabis saw himself more as another Spartan king with Hellenistic ambitions like his 
predecessor Areus I, something that can be seen from his coins on which he styles 
himself as basileus.
525
 However, Polybius’ hostility was to be expected since Nabis, as 
tyrant of Sparta, embodied everything the historian opposed as a Megalopolitan. So, one 
must keep in mind that when dealing with Sparta in the Histories, Polybius’ narrative 
has to be treated with the utmost care. Moreover, this antagonism was not limited to 
Polybius as is apparent from the events involving Nabis’ horse and his attack on Messene 
at the start of the Second Macedonian War, which have been discussed above and which 
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make it clear that both Spartans and Megalopolitans were still continuing the traditional 
feud between the two states.  
 During the first years of the war, Nabis was an ally of Philip and received control 
over Argos in return, as Philip’s commander Philokles succeeded in conquering the city, 
perhaps due to the fact that the Argive representatives were among those opposing the 
Achaian decision of 198 BC. However, when it became clear to Nabis that the Romans 
were going to win the war, the tyrant betrayed Philip and went over to the Romans. His 
negotiations with Flamininus resulted in a truce between Sparta and the Achaians which 
lasted for the remainder of the war (Livy 32. 25. 38-40.). Nevertheless, Nabis’ control 
over Argos continued to pose a problem for the Achaian koinon as it threatened their 
unity and ambitions in the Peloponnese.
526
 The Romans under their representative, 
Titus Quinctius Flamininus, called together a Panhellenic congress in 195 BC at Corinth 
to debate what course of action to take. Even though the war with Philip was over by this 
time, the Romans still had troops stationed in Greece to make sure that Philip stirred 
no more trouble. Moreover, this was the prefect chance for Flamininus and his troops 
to show to the Greeks that the Romans were serious about protecting them from any 
incursions against Greek Freedom, something that they had proclaimed that they would 
protect at the Isthmian Games of 196 BC.
527
 By getting the Greeks themselves to decide 
on the matter before going to the Senate for approval, Flamininus showed them that this 
was a Greek war fought with the support of Rome, since Nabis’ control of Argos was a 
violation of Rome’s new policy as the protector of Greek freedom (Livy 34. 22. 12). The 
subsequent war against Nabis was a short one that ended in a Spartan defeat and while 
he lost control of Argos, the tyrant was allowed to keep his throne (Plut. Flam. 13). 
 This decision did not sit well with the Achaians who had defeated the tyrant 
under the leadership of Philopoimen (Pol. 21. 9). Moreover, the troubles between Nabis 
and the Achaians persisted even after the Romans had left the Peloponnese in 194 BC. 
When the tyrant took possession of cities on the Lakonian coast like Gytheion which 
were under Achaian control, the koinon sent help to the city but was defeated. They did 
not dare to undertake further action until they had heard back from the Senate who 
advised them to appeal to Flamininus for advice. According to Livy, the general 
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consensus among the Achaians was to deal with Sparta as soon as possible, something 
that was not supported by Flamininus and Philopoimen who both thought that 
immediate action was not a solution but as the Achaian strategos for that year 
Philopoimen had to oblige with the wishes of the assembly (Livy 35. 25. 11). However, 
the relationship between Philopoimen and Flamininius was problematic at times 
because of the latter’s popularity among the Achaians as a result of his victories over 
Nabis such as the Achaian triumph in Tegea in 201 BC (Plut. Phil. 15; Plut. Flam. 13). 
Considering his previous role in Achaian battles against Sparta and Nabis in particular 
as well as his background as a Megalopolitan, it seems to me that Philopoimen supported 
the Achaian assembly wholeheartedly in its desire to undertake immediate action against 
Nabis. After all, Philopoimen was a Megalopolitan who had already seen the threat that 
Sparta could pose to the koinon and Megalopolis under strong leadership such as 
Kleomenes or Nabis, particularly since the war against these Spartans had primarily been 
outwaged near Megalopolis (Pol. 21. 9; Plut. Kleo. 6).
528
 Additionally, Philopoimen’s 
preference for resolving conflicts swiftly and, more importantly, without the involvement 
of Rome would manifest itself several more times during the next decade. The best 
example of this is his impromptu journey from Argos to Megalopolis to deal with the 
Messenian revolt in 183 BC, which, while resulting in his death, was solved without the 
help of Rome, as this was an internal Achaian matter and did not concern the Romans 
(Plut. Phil. 18. 7).  
After a disastrous naval battle in which Philopoimen led the Achaians on a very 
old ship against Nabis, the Arkadian was much more successful on land and the koinon 
managed to defeat Sparta (Livy 35. 26-30). Now forced to remain inside the city, Nabis 
was eventually killed by a group of Aitolians who had come to the city under the pretence 
of helping and plundered the city afterwards.
529
 Philopoimen took advantage of the chaos 
that ensued after Nabis’ murder and the Aitolian raid to make a speech to the Spartan 
people with which ‘societati Achaeorum Lacedaemonios adiunxit’ (Livy 35. 37. 2: ‘he 
connected the Lacedaemonian with the Achaian koinon’). Plutarch’s account mostly 
matches up with Livy’s, although he does say that Philopoimen came to Sparta with his 
troops and ‘τῶν μὲν ἀκόντων, τοὺς δὲ συμπείσας προσηγάγετο καὶ μετεκόμισεν εἰς 
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τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τὴν πόλιν’ (Plut. Phil. 15. 2: ‘with force as well as with persuasion he 
managed to convince the city of his intentions and brought it to the Achaians’). Because 
of Nabis’ unexpected death, the Spartan citizens may have panicked and therefore it is 
possible that some of them could have genuinely considered Philopoimen’s offer. 
However, the traditional and open hostility the two states had displayed against one 
another in the past – and which would continue during the next fifty years – makes it 
more likely that at least a part of the Spartans had to be forced into the koinon.  
It is not surprising that Philopoimen was the one who brought Sparta into the 
federation as he was by far the most influential and militarily skilled of the Achaian 
leaders at that time. Moreover, he seems to have been at the centre of a group of federal 
statesmen who were also Megalopolitans such as Diophanes, Aristainos and Lykortas. 
As argued in the introduction to this section, these individuals seem to have stepped 
away from their city’s loyalty to Macedon and were now concerned with the expansion 
of the Achaian koinon and ensuring its internal peace. This development is also echoed 
throughout Polybius’ narrative, proving that at least for the individual Megalopolitan who 
was active on the federal level, they were as much Achaian as they were Megalopolitan. 
2.1.2. Philopoimen at Compasion  
In the years after the Romans and their Greek allies defeated Antiochos and the 
Aitolians, there was an upsurge of Greek embassies to the Senate. Clearly, it had become 
transparent to the Greeks that after defeating two of the biggest powers in the Hellenistic 
World, contacts with Rome could be quite useful when pursuing one’s own local 
interests.
530
 This realisation also dawned on members of the Achaian koinon such as 
Sparta and Messene, resulting in a series of embassies to Rome whenever they were 
unhappy with the Achaians. Throughout the Hellenistic period, Sparta had been ruled 
by a series of kings and tyrants, all of whom had tried to leave their mark on the city. As 
a result, the Spartan state and its elite had undergone several reforms and changes which 
had created a big group of Spartan exiles.
531
 These exiles would pose a persistent 
problem in interactions between Sparta, the Achaian League and Rome, with 
representatives from as many as four different Spartan exile groups coming to Rome at 
the same time. In 189 BC, the Spartans succeeded in recapturing the coastal cities they 
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had lost to the koinon after the War against Nabis and officially seceded from the 
Achaian League. While the Achaians undoubtedly wanted to retaliate against Sparta as 
soon as possible, the Roman general Marcus Fulvius Nobilior convinced both the 
Achaians and the Spartans to send embassies to Rome. A year later however, when no 
action had been taken by the Senate to solve the problem, the Achaians under 
Philopoimen declared war on Sparta and marched against them. The conflict between 
Sparta and the koinon under Philopoimen ended with the brutal massacre in 188 at 
Compasion in which eighty Spartans were killed by the Achaians. Moreover, 
Philopoimen abolished Sparta’s ancient Lykurgean constitution, restored the many 
different exiles to the city and ordered the inhabitants to take down the city walls (Plut. 
Phil. 16. 3-5).  
 Philopoimen’s conduct at Compasion was severe and had several consequences, 
as it had done nothing to assuage Sparta’s reluctance to become a member of the 
Achaian koinon. Several embassies and delegations went back and forth in the last years 
of the 180s BC between Achaia, Sparta and Rome to address the problematic 
relationship between Sparta and a koinon primarily under the control of a group of 
Megalopolitans. These interactions were characterised by the restraint of the Senate and 
its delegates, the Spartan determination to complain to Rome about their treatment by 
the koinon and the restoration of their exiles, and the Achaian internal discord on how 
to deal with these matters. This last element is particularly evident in the sources, which 
frequently depict differences of opinion between the political compatriots of 
Philopoimen, most of whom came from Megalopolis. A good example of this is 
Aristainos’ silence when Metellus condemned the actions at Compasion during a 
meeting, which had been convened for a Roman delegation in Achaia in 185 BC (Pol. 
22. 10. 3). Even more striking was that Diophanes of Megalopolis used the opportunity 
to criticise Philopoimen’s actions at Compasion and apparently distanced himself from 
him (Pol. 22. 10).
 532
 To some, Aristainos’ silence meant that he agreed with the Roman 
critique, yet this may not have been the case as his silence was deliberate, designed to 
convey a united front to the Romans.
533
 Clearly, the situation with Sparta was even 
causing problems among this group of Megalopolitans since they quarrelled on how to 
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deal with the problem. Therefore, as we have seen before, personal convictions and 
beliefs also played a part in the actions and politics of the individual Megalopolitan. 
   Additionally, the Spartan exiles continued to pose a problem; Spartan envoys 
continued to appear in Rome on behalf of the exiles. Interestingly, in 184 BC, another 
Roman delegation under Appius Claudius Pulcher came to Achaia, which condemned 
Compasion and the harsh treatment of Sparta. While Lykortas tried to defend the 
Achaians’ conduct and the forced annexation of the polis, the threat of violence by the 
Roman delegates was enough for the assembly to see that some appeasing measures had 
to be taken and so they lifted the death sentence on Areus and Alkibiades (Livy 39. 36-
37). The fact that Rome managed to get the Achaians to obey to their wishes is quite an 
interesting development, as it seems to stand in direct contrast with previous actions. 
Other times the koinon did not care too much about the Roman delegates and their 
opinion on the Spartan problem. However, this did not have any lasting effect as the 
problem persisted: the Spartans sent four envoys, each of them representing a different 
group of exiles. All of this resulted in the Senate ultimately appointing three ‘experts’ to 
judge on the matter: Appius Pulcher, Metellus and Flamininus. This committee 
eventually judged that all of the exiles of 188 BC had to be reinstated, but Sparta had to 
remain a member of the koinon.  
2.2. Boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta 
Even though this boundary dispute has already been discussed in connection to the 
internal politics of the Achaian koinon and the relationship between Megalopolis and 
the federal government, it is also necessary to look at the implications of this boundary 
dispute in the context of the current chapter.
534
 The stele with the inscription was found 
in Olympia and mentions a conflict between Sparta and Megalopolis, with the federal 
state being involved as a litigant when Sparta refused to pay the fine imposed by the 
federation. Sparta’s refusal of the payment meant that the Achaians had to get involved 
as well and another arbitration had to take place which lies at the heart of this inscription. 
Its cause was the boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta about – once again 
– control over the regions Skiritis and Aigytis, which were situated between the two 
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 This had been a point of contention for a very long time and had started, at 
least according to Kaja Harter-Uibopuu, with the gift of the lands to Megalopolis by 
Philip II.
536
 Over the next decades these regions would be passed back and forth between 
Megalopolis and Sparta until this latest intervention in 164 BC: 
‘οἱ δικασταὶ ἔκριν]αν γ̣[ενέσθαι] [τὰν Σκιρ]ῖτ̣ιν καὶ τὰν Αἰγῦτιν Ἀρκ̣[άδων ἀπὸ] 
τοῦ τοὺς Ἡρακλείδας εἰς [Π]ε̣λοπόννασον κατελθεῖν’  
(l. 34-36: ‘the judges decided that Skirits and Aigytis were Arkadian ever since 
the Herakleidai returned to the Peloponnese’).  
The boundary dispute is most commonly dated after 164 BC because of passages in 
Polybius and Pausanias which date the conflict to the period after 164 BC (Pol. 31.1.6-
7; Paus. 7. 11. 1-2). As the previous discussion of the inscription has already proven, 
these passages – while very useful for the dating of the conflict – are a bit problematic, 
since Polybius talks about a conflict between Megalopolis and Sparta and Pausanias 
about Argos and Sparta. Although it is entirely possible that Pausanias is indeed 
describing another conflict, his general information does correspond with that of 
Polybius and the inscription, so it seems more plausible that Pausanias made a mistake 
and actually meant Megalopolis and not Argos.
537
 Nevertheless, the dating of the conflict 
to the period after 164 BC means that even after the Third Macedonian War and the 
expulsion of one thousand Achaian leaders to Rome, the antagonism between 
Megalopolis and Sparta still played an important role in Achaian politics. This is 
particularly clear from the fact that even though the boundary dispute is between 
Megalopolis and Sparta, the first parties mentioned in the inscription are the Achaians 
and the Lakedaimonians, indicating that the koinon personally intervened on behalf of 
the Megalopolitans (IvO 47 l. 2). Moreover, it also shows that Megalopolis as a city was 
still politically active even though the city itself more or less disappears from other 
sources in this period. Of course, this can be explained by the loss of the later books of 
Polybius’ narrative on the one hand and the tendency of the literary sources to focus on 
the important individuals when discussing historical events on the other hand. Because 
of this, a very subjective representation of the historical events is created by the ancient 
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historians that gives the impression that Megalopolis was only politically active through 
its many influential leaders. 
 Another interesting development in this boundary dispute between the Spartans 
and the Megalopolitans was the fact that the conflict was referred to Rome. As with 
plenty of other cases of interstate arbitration in the later Hellenistic world, Rome often 
acted as the neutral arbitrator in conflicts between different Greek poleis and Hellenistic 
states as was the case in the Roman arbitration of a boundary dispute between Mylasa 
and Stratonikeia around 188 BC (Ager 101; IMylasa 134).
538
 However, Rome also had 
the habit of referring these arbitrations and mediations to a third party and, more 
importantly, when it came to conflicts involving the Achaian koinon and its members, 
Roman representatives or the Senate would tend to give advice on the proper course of 
action before letting the Achaians deal with the matter. Rome had followed this pattern 
throughout its interactions with the federal state in the second century BC, and, 
according to Pausanias (Paus. 7. 11.  2), it was no different this time:  
‘αὐτὸς μέν σφισιν ὁ Γάλλος ἀπηξίωσε δικαστὴς καταστῆναι, Καλλικράτει δὲ 
ἁπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀνδρὶ ἀλάστορι ἐπιτρέπει τὴν κρίσιν’ 
 (‘(Gaius Sulpicius) Gallus claimed himself to be an unworthy judge on the 
matter, so he turned the judgement over to Kallikrates, the most wretched man 
in the whole of Greece’).  
While this is not mentioned by Polybius himself in the surviving text, Pausanias’ 
apparent negative comment about Kallikrates was obviously inspired by his source and 
it is therefore very plausible that Polybius discussed this boundary dispute in more detail 
in a section of his text that is now lost. Therefore, as already argued in the previous 
chapters, this negative picture of Kallikrates has to be taken with the proverbial pinch of 
salt, just as his supremacy of the Achaian political stage after the Third Macedonian War 
must be.
 
However, as an important Achaian political leader with ties to Rome, it would 
make sense that the Roman representatives would hand the arbitration about this dispute 
back to one of their own.
539
  
Roman involvement is also alluded to in the inscription:  
‘καὶ Ῥωμαίους τοὺς προεστακότας τᾶς τῶν Ἑλλάν[ων εὐνομίας καὶ ὁμο]νοίας, 
ὅκ[α π]αρεγενήθησαν ποθ’ αὐτοὺς Μεγ[αλοπολῖται καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπ]ὲρ 
ταύτας τᾶς χώρας διαφε[ρόμενοι’ 
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(IvO 47, l. 43-46: ‘and the Romans who have taken the lead over Greek good 
order and harmony, when the Megalopolitans and Lakedaimonians went to 
Rome about these disputed lands…’).  
However, due to the fragmentary nature of the Greek text, we cannot determine if the 
Roman involvement went deeper than these comments on eunomia and homonoia 
alluded to in the text. Yet it is unsurprising that Rome was implicated due to the parties 
involved in the conflict and the time when the boundary dispute took place. As we have 
seen in previous interactions between the Spartans and the primarily Megalopolitan 
leaders of the Achaian koinon, the Spartans had the tendency to run to Rome to 
complain about the Achaian treatment of their city, which could explain the Roman 
involvement in the first place. Moreover, the Romans were only involved in the 
boundary dispute between the two cities, and not the issues of the payment of the fine 
that was imposed on Sparta by the koinon and which the city refused to pay (IvO 47, l. 
1-8.). Obviously, the Roman involvement in this conflict was rather minimal and once 
again, the Roman impulse to stay out of internal Achaian affairs is quite apparent.
540
 
Sparta’s refusal to pay this fine or zamia is striking in another sense as it illustrates 
how even after spending several decades as a member of the Achaian koinon, Sparta 
was still not actively complying with the rules and procedures of the federal state. 
Moreover, the local tensions between Sparta and Megalopolis also persisted but due to 
the new political context created by the existence of the Achaian koinon and the Roman 
interest in the East, these local tensions had a much bigger impact than when it was just 
two poleis squabbling with one another. Thus, this boundary dispute proves that the 
general trends of the interactions between the koinon, Rome and Sparta which were set 
out in the previous decades, continued after the Third Macedonian War. 
2.3. Kritolaos and Diaios: Megalopolitans and the Achaian War of 146 BC 
Things only changed in the years leading up to the Achaian War of 146 BC. This short 
conflict lasted only a couple of months and ended in the Roman destruction of Corinth 
and the dismantlement of the koinon. Once again, the scarcity of the sources for this 
period makes it very difficult to determine what the precise causes for this war were.
541
 
Therefore, a lot of different theories have been offered by scholars. For example, 
                                                          
540
 Harter-Uibopuu (1998), 192. 
541
 Thornton (1998), 585-634. 
199 
 
Sviatoslav Dmitriev sees this war as the result of the conflicting terminology used by the 
Greeks and Rome in their interactions with one another.
542
 As a result of this, the 
relationship between Achaia and Rome deteriorated, with the Achaians believing that 
they were a full and independent ally of Rome, while Rome considered the opposite to 
be true. On the other hand, Deininger saw this as a sign of a class struggle, in which the 
lower classes started resisting the new system set up by the Romans.
543
 Ideas of a class 
struggle across Greece are also echoed by John Briscoe, yet he saw the origins of the war 
in the personal conflicts among a new type of Achaian leaders (most notably the 
Megalopolitan Kritolaos and the Spartan Menalkidas), who were only driven by their 
own personal ambitions and incited the common populace against Rome.
544
 However, 
others argue that the Romans were actively trying to provoke and lure the koinon into a 
state of war to get rid of the only Greek federal state with any influence left.
545
  
While there is merit to each of these theories, the information provided by the 
sources clearly indicate that the problems between Sparta and a new generation of 
Megalopolitans were once more in part responsible for this war. Contrastingly, shortly 
before the troubles started, Sparta was actively participating in federal Achaian life as in 
151/0 BC Menalkidas was the first strategos to hail from Sparta (Paus. 7. 11. 7). 
Moreover, the relationship between the Greeks and Rome had gained a new dimension 
after the Third Macedonian War and the massive exile of a thousand Achaians to Italy, 
presumably due to the lack of support the Romans had received from the federation in 
the early years of the war and the fact that all over Greece there were those who had a 
certain degree of sympathy for Perseus (Pol. 30. 6). After many years of political 
inaction, Rome acted against these men by supporting their political opponents and for 
a while at least, it may have shown the Greeks that the Senate was a force to be reckoned 
with. Additionally, the relationship between Rome and the federation was put under 
extra strain by the repeated Achaian embassies to the Senate to get these exiles back, 
which incidentally were led multiple times by Polybius’ brother Thearidas (Pol. 30. 30. 
1; 33. 1. 3-8; 33. 3. 14). Undoubtedly, the matter of the exiles formed an important part 
of the Achaian polity until their return in 150 BC, but the koinon was also preoccupied 
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with other matters such as ensuring that conflicts between its members were resolved as 
quickly as possible, as is evidenced from the limited Roman involvement in the 
boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta and the ensuing conflict about the 
payment of the fine between Sparta and the federation. 
According to Pausanias, the Athenian attack on Oropos in 150 BC was what 
initially sparked the problems between Menalkidas and other leaders of the federal state, 
as he had promised the Oropians to persuade the koinon to intervene on their behalf 
so they did not have to pay the massive fine imposed upon them first by Sikyon and later 
by the Senate.
546
 To do this, the Spartan enlisted the help of Kallikrates, but eventually 
nothing happened and Menalkidas still collected the money promised to him by the 
Oropians, which displeased Kallikrates (Paus. 7. 12. 2):  
‘πρεσβεῦσαί τε γὰρ Ἀχαιῶν ἐναντία ἔφασκεν αὐτὸν ἐς Ῥώμην καὶ ἐς τὰ 
μάλιστα γενέσθαι πρόθυμον ἐξελέσθαι τὴν Σπάρτην συνεδρίου τοῦ Ἀχαιῶν’ 
(‘he had spoken against the Achaians during an embassy to Rome and had 
become very eager to take out Sparta from the Achaian koinon’).  
Of course, as already pointed out, Pausanias was extremely negative about the leaders 
of the federation such as Kallikrates of Leontion, Menalkidas of Sparta and Diaios of 
Megalopolis, whom he calls out for their blatant corruption, a notion that Pausanias 
obviously borrowed from Polybius’ original text. Even though the truthfulness of these 
accounts can be doubted, it seems as though the time of Sparta’s active and willing 
membership of the koinon was over since Menalkidas and the Spartans again sent 
several embassies to Rome in 150 and 149 BC, yet the serious problems did not begin 
until several Megalopolitans acquired control over the Achaian koinon.  
Diaios, Damokritos and Kritolaos were all part of the Megalopolitan elite, and 
their families (at least that of Diaios) had been active in Achaian politics for several 
generations.
547
 Just like their predecessors, these men were driven in their political 
actions by their hatred for Sparta, as well as their need to keep that polis in the Achaian 
koinon, even if it meant declaring war on Rome as is clear from the following words said 
to have been uttered by Kritolaos at the famous Achaian synodos of 146 BC in Corinth:  
‘φάσκων βούλεσθαι μέν ‘Ρωμαίων φίλος ὑπάρχειν, δεσπότας δ’ οὑκ ἂν 
εὑδοκῆσαι κτησάμενος’  
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(Pol. 38. 12. 8: ‘he said he wanted to remain a Roman friend, but he was not 
prepared to submit himself to despots’).  
This echoed criticism uttered by Polybius’ father Lykortas, who refused to let Rome 
treat Achaia like a master would her slaves, especially considering the freedom 
declaration made by the Romans in 196 BC (Livy 39. 37). Clearly, the tradition of 
denying Rome the control over internal Achaian affairs had persisted as well amongst 
the Megalopolitans. However, while the generation of Lykortas and Philopoimen acted 
in the name of the federation, in the sources this latest generation of Megalopolitans 
seems to have been concerned with personal gain instead. It was rather unlikely that this 
was actually the case, since Polybius and other historians who used his work as a source 
like Pausanias were quite hostile towards these men. Moreover, they seemed to have 
lost all realisation what exactly the dire result from going to war with Rome would entail, 
as their actions preceding the war would indicate, and especially since the Senate was 
getting tired of dealing with the Spartan problem.
548
  
The determination of both the Achaians and the Lakedaimonians to continue 
their open hostility led to mutual attacks such as the Achaian mission in Laconia by 
Damokritos early on in 147 BC. Moreover, the apparent mistreatment of Roman 
officials that came to Greece did nothing to improve matters as it provoked statements 
from these men – who seemed rather easily offended – that not only Sparta had to 
secede from the koinon, but also Corinth, Argos, HeraKleia and Orchomenos (Paus. 7. 
14. 1). Yet, the Achaian War was very much the result of the actions and wishes of a few 
individuals, most importantly Kritolaos and Diaios. After all, it was Kritolaos who misled 
the Romans into thinking that they would meet an entire assembly, started preparations 
for a war and led the synodos of 147 BC in Corinth where the ‘commoners’ approved 
an Achaian War against Sparta (Pol. 38. 12).
549
 His compatriot Diaios was equally 
committed to this cause as after the disappearance of Kritolaos, he went to extreme 
lengths to ensure that the Achaians – and other Greeks, for the war proved to have many 
supporters amongst the other states – could continue their war: he recruited twelve 
thousand slaves to fight, created a war fund, released those in debt and made plans to 
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defend Corinth before it was destroyed and he was defeated by Lucius Mummius in 146 
BC. It seems as though the wish of these Megalopolitans to keep Sparta in the Achaian 
koinon without Roman involvement, while perfectly in line with the attitude of their 
predecessors who are also known to have taken action against Roman wishes, was the 
main cause for the Achaians to have continued this policy. Nonetheless, it seems as 
though this last generation of Megalopolitans did not share the common sense of their 
predecessor when it came to Roman involvement in the East, which is striking since they 
had seen first-hand during the Third Macedonian War what this could mean for the 
Greeks. 
* * * * * 
The Megalopolitan impact on Achaian foreign policy changed a lot between the 
establishment of the Achaian-Macedonian alliance during the Kleomenean War and the 
start of the second century BC. As the start of this chapter has shown, the relationship 
between the Achaians and Philip of Macedon deteriorated due to Philip’s lack for 
support of the Achaians against Spartan attacks during the Social War. When 
Philopoimen started his successful career with the support of Philip by reforming the 
Achaian army, the federation became less and less dependent on the Macedonian king 
for help against their enemies. Moreover, the rise of Philopoimen to the federal political 
stage was the beginning for a group of Megalopolitans at the top of the Achaian koinon, 
whose local ideals and interests shaped their political actions and those of the federation 
when it was under their command. However, even within this group of Megalopolitans 
there were differences of opinion mostly concerning the Achaian relationship with 
Rome, as has become clear in the discussion of the famous Achaian syonodos of 198 
BC. If Aristainos is indeed from Megalopolis, as argued, then his support indicates that 
there were Megalopolitans who thought that the Achaians made the right decision; and 
this despite the official position of the Megalopolitan representatives being against the 
creation of the Roman-Achaian alliance.  
Clearly, this shift carried on after 198 BC, because all of the traces of the 
Megalopolitan loyalty to Macedon disappear from the actions of the Achaian political 
leaders who hailed from Megalopolis. One can argue that this might have manifested 
itself again in Lykortas and others when the Achaian assembly was trying to figure out 
how to act during the Third Macedonian War. Yet, eventually Lykortas was overruled 
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by his own son and it seems rather farfetched to try to see a resurgence of the 
Megalopolitan-Macedonian connection. It is more likely that this had in fact entirely 
been replaced by a newfound patriotism for the Achaian koinon. In fact, the different 
generations of Megalopolitan statesmen were concerned about two things: incorporating 
Sparta into the koinon and keeping it there, and making sure that the federal state was 
able to deal with its matters as independently as possible. This is evident from the many 
attacks on Sparta (and vice versa) carried out under the supervision of a Megalopolitan 
strategos and Philopoimen’s determination to force Sparta into the koinon. On the other 
hand, throughout the second century BC Sparta did not cease its opposition to 
Megalopolis and later the federal state, as the traditional antagonism between the two 
poleis had bigger consequences than before. The interactions between Achaia and 
Rome were heavily dominated by this local conflict; this is evident from the plethora of 
Spartan envoys to Rome concerning Achaian conduct and the Roman intervention in 
the boundary dispute between the two states. Furthermore, any big problems between 
the two states seems to have been connected to this Spartan problem, including the 
Achaian War and the subsequent abolition of the koinon, which was caused by the greed 
of the new generation of Megalopolitans who had lost the realism displayed by their 
predecessors during the Third Macedonian War.  
 While the Megalopolitan influence on the Achaian koinon underwent a 
significant change in the second century BC, it is clear that the Megalopolitans were 
never a unity, even within their own city which means that we end with different political 
factions and ideologies. This has not been addressed in previous research and shows 
that political division can be identified even for cities that have not been widely studied 
before. However, it has to be acknowledged that the discussions and conclusions of this 
chapter heavily rely on Polybius’ narrative and his particular views of the individuals 
discussed in this chapter. If other accounts had survived on the history of the Achaian 
koinon and the decades leading up to the Achaian War, the analysis in this last chapter 











The relationship between federal states and their member states can take many shapes: 
from local individuals taking up federal magistracies, representatives taking part in the 
federal institutions or the division of responsibilities between the federal and the local 
level. Moreover, this relationship is reciprocal as through these interactions both parties 
will undoubtedly influence one another. After all, the most basic definition of a federal 
state is a form of government in which the power is divided over two or more 
governments. That this definition is still applicable to both the koina of Antiquity and 
modern federal states such as Belgium, Germany or even the European Union, shows 
that there are certain ideas of continutity between federalism in Antiquity and today. The 
aim of this thesis has been to show the influence of the local level on that of the federal 
state is one of those recurring connections and themes. By examining the specific 
relationship between city of Megalopolis and the Achaian koinon, I wanted to show that 
the same tension between the local and federal level that can be detected in the five 
governments of Belgium, already existed two thousand years ago in Greece. 
 As a first major theme of this thesis, I have established that Megalopolis was a 
Greek polis with its own local identity, as well as local interests and ambitions. The 
formation of this local identity was the result of a process influenced by several historical 
factors that transformed and constructed the Megalopolitan identity. Subsequently, 
throughout all five chapters, the evolution of the Megalopolitan identity in response to 
these events can clearly be seen. This shows that being a Megalopolitan at the foundation 
of the polis around 368 BC was very different than at the demise of the Achaian koinon 
in 146 BC. Despite the changing and complex nature of the Megalopolitan identity, 
there were several core elements that shaped its interactions with the wider federal 
framework. For one, as a result of the foundation of the polis by the Arkadian koinon, 
Megalopolis very early on developed a good understanding of the advantages of being 
part of something bigger than the traditional Greek political structure that was the polis. 
Of course, this foundation also imbued the Megalopolitans with a few additional traits 
that were shared by the other cities in the region as they were typically Arkadian. The 
most important of these was the antagonism of the Megalopolitans against Sparta, which 
seemed to be ever present among its citizens both before and after the city became a 
part of the Achaian federation. This is clear in Demosthenes’ impassioned speech on 
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behalf of the Megalopolitans in front of the Athenian assembly in 352 BC, when Sparta 
was threatening the polis. 
These two elements continuously guided the actions and political course of both 
Megalopolis as a polis and its individuals and therefore form a red thread throughout 
this thesis. For example, as chapter two has shown, these were the reasons why 
Megalopolis joined the Achaian koinon in the first place. Furthermore, this decision had 
wide-ranging consequences for the internal status quo of the federal state. After all, the 
fact that Megalopolis had a good sense of the benefits and mechanics of federalism, 
allowed it to rise quickly to a prominent position within the Achaian koinon. As we have 
seen, this is also evidenced by the boundary disputes discussed in chapter three which 
clearly illustrated how Megalopolis used the federal magistrates and the koinon more 
than other member states that were involved in boundary disputes with one another.  
Obviously, the other important result that Megalopolis’ Achaian membership 
had was the antagonism towards Sparta it brought into the Achaian politics. Whereas 
the city had previously been at the periphery of the Achaian attention, the 
Megalopolitans brought with them an increased focus on Sparta. This is apparent 
throughout Megalopolis’ membership, as is evidenced from Lydiades’ actions during his 
brief federal career, Philopoimen’s induction of the city into the federal state in 192 BC 
and the strong Achaian reaction against the Spartans under the Megalopolitan strategoi 
Kritolaos and Diaios in 146 BC. What is more, as the last section of chapter five of this 
thesis has shown, the relationship between Achaia and Rome was also influenced by this 
local antagonism between the two cities. The Spartan tendency to involve Rome 
whenever they were unhappy with Achaian conduct, created problems within the federal 
state and saw the Megalopolitans in particular trying to take action without too much 
Roman involvement. Of course, as we have seen, there was a difference of opinion even 
among the Megalopolitans. However, it remains striking that there was always some kind 
of Megalopolitan involvement when it came to the Spartan troubles with the Achaian 
federal leaders. 
 In addition to these core elements, this thesis has identified a third element of 
the Megalopolitan identity which played an important role in the city’s interactions and 
relationships, particularly in the fourth and third centuries BC. As we have seen this 
connection was apparent from the city’s political actions, since the city chose to stay on 
the Macedonian side in all of the major conflicts during the period such as the battle of 
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Chaironea and the Chremonidean War. However, as the analysis in chapter four has 
shown, this was also apparent from the archaeology of the city with the construction of 
the Stoa of Philip and the so-called house of Alexander. The Stoa in particular is a 
significant marker of the connection between the city and the Macedonian kings, as the 
Megalopolitans built it themselves but named it after Alexander’s father. Moreover, this 
connection to Macedon remained part of the Megalopolitan ethos even after the polis 
became a part of the Achaian koinon, as it was the basis for the Achaian alliance with 
the Macedonian king Antigonos – and his successor Philip V – during the Kleomenean 
War. Even when the Achaian assembly chose to abandon this alliance with Philip in 
favour of Rome at the synodos in 198 BC, the Megalopolitan representatives were the 
only ones together with the ones from Dyme and Argos who actively opposed the 
decision and left the assembly in protest.  
 Nevertheless, as the analysis of Polybius’ views on Megalopolis, Arkadia and 
Achaia in chapter two has shown, by the middle of the second century BC, the 
Megalopolitan had acquired an Achaian element in their identity. This is further 
confirmed by the discussion of the civic and federal coinage produced by Megalopolis. 
The civic silver coinage shows a connection to Megalopolis’ Arkadian heritage via the 
iconography with its depiction of Pan, Zeus Lykaios and – on earlier versions - the 
Arkadian monogram. However, the fact that Megalopolis was actively involved in the 
production and establishment of the bronze federal coinage does prove that the city was 
an active and avid part of the Achaian koinon. Interestingly, after the decision of 198 
BC, the connections of Megalopolis to the Macedonian kings disappear from the 
sources and was soon replaced by the loyalty to the Achaian koinon that is clearly 
expressed by all of the Megalopolitan leaders in the second century BC. Strikingly, 
Aristainos - who I believe to be from Megalopolis and not Dyme as is often believed – 
is a good example of this change as his support for an alliance with Rome suggests the 
presence of a group in Megalopolis that were stepping away from their traditional 
Macedonian connections. For even if they did not always agree with one another on the 
way that the federal state should involve Rome in its internal conflicts with Sparta, it is 
clear that all of them considered it crucial that the federal state should be able to govern 
its own matters when it needed to.  
 Aside from establishing the most important elements of the Megalopolitan 
identity, a second important theme addressed in this thesis was the specific relationship 
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of Megalopolis and the Achaian koinon. As already mentioned, Megalopolis quickly 
became an important member of the federal state not only due to is ability to manipulate 
and utilise the Achaian federal procedures to its advantage, as has become apparent 
from the boundary disputes, but also because the polis was one of the biggest cities in 
the federation. This is visible from the fact that the city was one of the only two poleis to 
get assigned three representatives in the nomographoi list at Aigion because of its size, 
while the medium and smaller cities had two and one representatives respectively. 
Moreover, the discussion of this list and the one found in Epidauros has shown that 
Megalopolis was an active member of the Achaian koinon since the polis chose to 
participate in the voluntary meeting of the nomographoi at Epidauros. This image of 
Megalopolis as an active member of the Achaian federation is also supported by the vast 
amount of Achaian coins produced by Megalopolis and the high number of federal 
politicians coming from the polis in the period between 235 and 146 BC.  
 However, chapter three has shown that Megalopolis was an important city whose 
local identity had a significant influence on Achaian foreign policy. However, within the 
federal state, Megalopolis was a member just like any other city and shared the same 
obligations and responsibilities. This is even supported by the boundary disputes and 
particularly by the one involving Messene and Megalopolis. The inscription detailing the 
dispute between the two poleis demonstrates that the federal state would allow 
Megalopolis to exploit federal procedures as long as it did not change the status quo 
within the federation. In this instance, the Megalopolitan desires to obtain the regions 
Akreiatis, Bipeiatis, Endania and Pylania were undoubtedly fuelled by the historical 
background, i.e. the tensions created between the two cities by the Messenian revolt and 
the death of Philopoimen as a result. After Lykortas knocked down the rebellion, the 
officials of the koinon condemned his treatment and to prevent future secession 
attempts from Messene did not impose harsh penalties on the city. Therefore, 
Megalopolis’ active pursuits of the regions formed a problem as it threatened the fragile 
equilibrium that the officials wanted to restore, which is why in this case the Messenians 
were victorious as it was important that the democratic nature of the Achaian federation 
remained intact and was not dominated by one individual city. The nomographoi lists 
also emphasise this in the fact that they were organised according to proportional 
representation – which I believe has to be applied to the composition of other Achaian 
institutions as well. Interestingly, the prevention of one polis dominating the Achaian 
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koinon like Thebes in the Boiotian one explains Philopoimen’s proposition of 188 BC 
to rotate the meetings of the assembly among all of the member cities of the koinon and 
not just keep it in the sanctuary of Zeus Homarios at Aigion. In all probability, this was 
done to break the traditional position of power that Aigion enjoyed within the federation 
through the sanctuary in favour of cities like Megalopolis. So, even though Megalopolis 
was an important Achaian member city, both the other members as well as the federal 
state would not allow it to misuse the federal institutions and procedure to such an extent 
that it would damage the mechanics of the Achaian federal state.  
 On the other hand, there is a large Megalopolitan influence detectable in the 
foreign politics of the Achaian koinon, which of course expressed itself most notably in 
the establishment of the Achaian-Macedonian alliance of the 220s BC. Another 
important conclusion made in chapter four is that this alliance was not the result of 
Aratos’ scheming and planning, but only came about after a first Megalopolitan embassy 
to Antigonos Gonatas in 227 BC. This was sent to the Macedonin king on behalf of the 
polis but with the approval of the federal state, on account of their inability to shield 
Megalopolis from the Spartan attacks and the city’s previous connections to the 
Macedonian kings. Contrary to what Polybius and subsequent other sources report, 
Aratos was thus not the mastermind behind this alliance but did use the initial contacts 
between Megalopolis and Antigonos as the basis for his own polity later on. Of course, 
this is also apparent from the focus on Sparta that occupies a big part of the Achaian 
interactions with Rome.  
 A third major theme in the thesis is connected to Polybius. His narrative is one 
of the integral sources of this thesis because of his personal connection to the topic and 
wider themes of this thesis. As a Megalopolitan and an Achaian federal leader in the 
second century BC, Polybius is an excellent embodiment of the interaction between the 
local and federal identity. After all, his comments on Megalopolis, Achaia and Arkadia 
clearly prove the general tendency illustrated by the coinage of Megalopolis’ combined 
Achaian and Arkadian layered identity. Another important Megalopolitan characteristic 
exhibited by Polybius is the vehement hatred for almost anything connected to Sparta, 
as has become very clear from his depcition of important Spartan figures such as 
Kleomenes and Nabis as well as his criticisms of the pro-Spartan historian Phylarchos.  
 Moreover, these portrayals have also highlighted some of the problems and 
benefits with using Polybius as a source. For one, his tendency to focus on the big 
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individuals such as Aratos and his personal hero Philopoimen obscures the more 
nuanced picture provided to us by the other sources such as the inscriptions. 
Consequently, Polybius’ narrative and account of Achaian history is one of individuals 
with the cities and their roles as political actors disappearing to the background or 
neglected altogether. Additionally, Polybius’ personality and emotions do also 
compromise the view that we have of certain of these individuals such as the Spartans, 
Phylarchus or even some of his fellow Achaians. For example, his overt praise of 
Philopoimen and especially Aratos are important factors in the way in which the author 
describes the events in which they are involved such as the Kleomenean War and the 
subsequent Social War. Moreover, this positive portrayal of Aratos was an intrinsic part 
of Polybius’ idealised account of the Achaian koinon in his first few books. At the other 
end of the spectrum was the negative representation of his political opponent Kallikrates 
of Leontion, which was undoubtedly because this man was the main reason why Polybius 
was banished to Rome. Of course, all of the sources used in this thesis have their own 
problems, but due to the prominence of both Polybius’ work and his personal views, it 
is important to mention these problems here. 
 Moreover, to support these general conclusions, the thesis was divided into three 
parts and five chapters, which also had a few of their own interesting and more specific 
conclusions that I wish to bring up here. First of all, chapter one has argued that 
Megalopolis was founded by the Arkadian koinon as a stronghold against Sparta and not 
as its capital. Furthermore, the cults and sanctuaries of the city show that the pantheon 
of the city was created as a deliberate attempt to unite the different population groups of 
the new city after the synoecism. Finally, this chapter showed the links between 
Megalopolis and Messene which were founded in similar circumstances and at the same 
time, but despite their complicated relationship ended up on very different sides of the 
Achaian koinon. Chapter two further builds on the establishment of the Megalopolitan 
identity, this time in the context of Megalopolis' decision to join the Achaians. In 
addition to Polybius' views on being a Megalopolitan, this chapter also analysed the 
motives of the tyrant Lydiades in bringing in the city, which was much more personally 
motivated than the idealised sources would like us to believe. The citizens of 
Megalopolis, on the other hand, gladly joined the federation because of the additional 
benefits it could bring in connection to their feud with Sparta. 
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While chapter three analysed Megalopolis' position within the federal state and 
its interactions with the federal government and other members, a few comments on the 
wider internal mechanics of the koinon were also made. For one, the Achaian federation 
was rather different from other Greek koina as it combined poleis from different ethnic 
groups, much more like the European Union today. Moreover, just as the countries that 
are part of the European Union today, the member states of the Achaian koinon enjoyed 
a high degree of autonomy and could organise local matters very much according to 
their own wishes. That is as long as this pertained to the internal affairs of the federation, 
since the federal state was responsible for all external interactions. Secondly, the 
arbitration process of the koinon did not follow a set pattern, but the federal damiorgoi 
had the power to intervene and fine members which did not comply with the arbitration's 
ruling. Moreover, all conflicts between an incoming and existing member had to be 
settled before any polis could join the federation.  
In addition to arguing that Megalopolis' was the party responsible for the creation 
of the Achaian-Macedonian alliance, chapter four also discussed the problems of the 
sources connected to the Kleomenean War. Even though Polybius is overtly positive 
about Aratos, the historian was aware of his flaws as a leader and a historical source, and 
despite his criticism of Phylarchus and his methods of writing history, Polybius did not 
shy away from using Phylarchus’ writings. Additionally, this chapter also draws a bit more 
attention to the federal career of Lydiades, who is all but ignored in Polybius’ narrative. 
In Plutarch’s lives, which are also echoed by an inscription dedicated to him by the 
Megalopolitans, the former tyrant became an influential Achaian statesman who could 
rival Aratos. Finally, chapter five not only shows the exact Megalopolitan-Spartan 
dynamic of the Achaian-Roman relations in the second century, but also that the 
individual Megalopolitan leaders shaped the important conflicts involving the koinon, 
Rome and Sparta in different ways. While the core of the problem remained the same 
as the attitude of these Megalopolitan men towards Sparta did not change, the later 
generation did lose sight of the danger that Rome could pose for the federation, which 
was what eventually led to the Achaian War. Moreover, this chapter highlights yet 
another problem with the sources, which become rather scarce at the time of the Third 
Macedonian War. This can sometimes give the impression that once again the polis as 
a political actor was less important than it had been before, which seems to be the case 
for Megalopolis as it seems to fade to the background in the literary sources. However, 
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the boundary dispute between Megalopolis (and the Achaian koinon) and Sparta of 164 
BC, proves that the city was still actively pursuing its anti-Spartan rhetoric at this time, 
even though the majority of its influential individuals such as Polybius had been sent to 
Rome.  
The goal of this thesis was not to provide a complete history of Megalopolis, but 
rather identify the different components of the Megalopolitan identity and their 
influence on the politics of the Achaian koinon. Moreover, it also wanted to argue that 
the formation of its identity as a continuing and complex process which underwent 
several profound changes. This process started with the foundation of entirely new city 
by the Arkadians in the 360s BC and was shaped throughout the polis’ membership of 
the Arkadian and Achaian koina. With the creation of Megalopolis a new step was taken 
in the approach of Greek cities to their own ethnic identity as – unlike Messene - 
Megalopolis looked for a broader way of uniting these different communities that were 
now part of this brand new polis. Since this new attitude was more in line with the open 
and federal attitude of the koina and poleis in the Hellenistic period, Megalopolis was 
looking forward and can be seen as an early example of a typical Hellenistic polis, 
something that is also seen in the archaeology of the polis. The open outlook of the city 
was undoubtedly the result of Megalopolis’ early connections and experiences with 
federalism; it was what made polis unique and what allowed it to flourish as well as it did 
in the federal framework of the Achaian koinon after 235 BC.  
So, when Pausanais says ‘ἡ δὲ Μεγάλη πόλις νεωτάτη πόλεών ἐστιν οὐ τῶν 
Ἀρκαδικῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἕλλησι’ (Paus. 8. 27. 1: ‘Megalopolis was the 
youngest city not only in Arkadia, but in the whole of Greece’), he is certainly right. 
However, by writing this thesis I hope to have shown that not only was Megalopolis the 
youngest city of Greece, it was also a new kind of city and one that definitely merits more 






APPENDIX: THE EPIGRAPHICAL SOURCES 
1. Orchomenos joins the Achaian koinon (shortly after 235 BC) 
IPArk 16 – IG V,2.344 
— — — 
1 {²(§1)}² ․․․․․․ παρ̣αβαίνη̣ι̣ — — — 
μ̣ον πέμπηι εἴτε ἄρχω[ν — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — εἰ]- 
π̣έοι εἴτε ἰδ̣ιώτας ψαφοφορ̣έοι [— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — ὀφλέτω] 
τριάκοντα̣ τάλαντα ἱερὰ τοῦ Δι̣ὸ[ς τοῦ Ἁμαρίου, καὶ ἐξέστω τῶι στραταγῶι δίκαν] 
5 [θ]ανάτου εἰσάγειν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τ[ῶν Ἀχαιῶν. v {²(§2)}² κατὰ τάδε ὀμνυόντων τὸν ὅρκον 
τὸν] 
α̣ὐ̣τὸν οἱ Ὀρχομένιοι καὶ οἱ Ἀχαιοί, ἐμ μὲ̣[ν Αἰγίωι οἱ δαμιοργοὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ ὁ στρα]- 
[τ]αγὸς καὶ ἵππαρχος καὶ ναύαρχος, ἐν δ̣ὲ̣ [Ὀρχομενῶι οἱ ἄρχοντες τῶν Ὀρχομενί]- 
[ων]· ὀ[̣μ]νύω Δία Ἁμάριον, Ἀθάναν Ἁμαρίαν, Ἀφρ̣[οδ]ίτ̣α̣[ν καὶ τοὺ]ς θ[εοὺς πάντας, ἦ μὴν 
ἐν] 
π̣ᾶσι̣ν ̣ἐμμε[ν]ε̣ῖν ἐν τᾶι στάλαι καὶ τᾶι ὁμολογίαι καὶ τῶι ψαφίσματι [τῶι γεγονότι τῶι] 
10 [κοι]ν[ῶι] τῶι τ[ῶ]ν Ἀχαιῶν, καὶ εἴ τίς κα μὴ ἐμμένηι, οὐκ ἐπιτρέψω εἰς δύναμ̣[ιν, καὶ εὐορ]- 
[κέ]οντι μέν μοι εἴη τἀγαθά, ἐπιορκέοντι δὲ τἀναντία. v {²(§3)}² τῶν δὲ λαβόντων ἐν Ὀρ[χο]- 
[μενῶι] κλᾶρον ἢ οἰκίαν, ἀφ’ οὗ Ἀχαιοὶ ἐγένοντο, μὴ ἐξέστω μηθενὶ ἀπαλλοτριῶ- 
[σα]ι ἐτέων εἴκο̣σι. v {²(§4)}² εἰ δέ τι ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθε χρόνων ἢ οἱ Ὀρχομένιοι Ἀχαιοὶ ἐγέ- 
[νον]το Νεάρχ[ω]ι ἔγκλημα γέγονεν ἢ τοῖς υἱοῖς, ὑπότομα εἶμεν πάντα, καὶ μ[ὴ] 
15 [δικαζέ]σθ̣ω μήτ̣ε̣ Νεάρχωι μηθεὶς μήτε τοῖς υἱοῖς αὐτοῦ μηδὲ Νέαρχος μηδὲ [τῶν] 
[υἱ]ῶ̣ν ̣α̣ὐ̣τοῦ μηθε̣ὶς̣ περὶ τῶμ πρότερον ἐγκλημάτων ἢ οἱ Ὀρχομένιοι Ἀχαιοὶ ἐγ[έ]- 
[νο]ν[̣τ]ο̣· [ὃς δ]ὲ̣ δικάζοιτο, ὀφλέτω χιλίας δραχμάς, καὶ ἁ δίκα ἀτελὴς ἔστω. V {²(§5)}² 
περ[ὶ] 
[δὲ τᾶς Νί]κ̣α̣ς̣ τ̣ᾶς χρυσέ[α]ς τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀπλοσμίου, ἃγ καταθέντες ἐνέχυρα οἱ Μεθυ[δρι] 
[εῖς οἱ μετοική]σα̣ντες ε[ἰ]ς Ὀρχομενὸν διείλοντο τὸ ἀργύριον καί τινες αὐτῶν ἀπήν[εγ]- 
20 [καν εἰς Μεθύδρ]ι[ο]ν, ἐὰμ μὴ ἀποδιδῶντι τὸ ἀργύριον τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις, καθὼς ἐξ[ε]- 
[χώρησεν ἁ πό]λις τῶν Ὀρχομενίων, ὑποδίκους εἶμεν τοὺς μὴ ποιοῦντας τὰ δίκαια. 
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2. Boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Helisson (182-167 BC)  
IPArk 31 
A1 — — — — — — — — —ΡΑΣ̣— — — — — 
[— — — — — — — — σ]υντελ̣[— — — — —] 
— — — — — οἱ περὶ Ἀρι]στομέ[ν]η καὶ ἁ̣ π̣[όλις τῶν] 
— — — — — — — —διων ἐπὶ τᾶς ζαμία[ς ․․] 
5 [— — — — — — — — τ]οῦ Διὸς τοῦ Λυκαίου vv 
[— — — — — — — ἐναν]τίον τοῦ ψιλοῦ λόφου v 
[— — — — — — — — ἱ]ερὸν ε̣ἰς τὸ τῶ Διὸς vvv 
[— — — — — — — ποτ’] ἄρκτον, τουτῶ δὲ εἰς τὰν 
[— — — — — — τὸν ποτα]μὸν τὸν Ἑλίσοντα vvvvv 
10 [— — — — — — — — τ]ῶ ἱερῶ τῶ Ἀπόλλωνος vvv 
— — — — — — — — τᾶι ὁδῶι τᾶι ἀρχαίαι vv 
— — — — — — — — —ΝΕΓ̣ΡΙ̣ΟΥ, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ vvv 
[— — — — — — — — ἀπὸ] δὲ τοῦ λευροῦ τοῦ vv 
[— — — — — — — τὸν βω]μ̣ὸν τᾶς Ἀρτέμιτος v 
15 [— — — — — — — — το]υτῶ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ τῶ vvvv 
[— — — — — — — — — Πο]σείδαιαν, τουτῶ δὲ v 
[— — — — — — — — — ἐ]ν ἄκρωι τῶι ὄρει ․․ 
— — — — — — — — — —ωι ἐπὶ τ̣α̣ῦ̣[τα σ]υ̣ν%⁸⁰%⁸⁰- 
— — — — — — — — — —#⁷Σ̣#⁷․ι̣νησι vvvvv 
20 — — — — — — — — — —ω̣ν κοινοὶ vvvv 
— — — — — — — — — —ταις ὑπὲρ τᾶς vvv 
— — — — — — — — — —μ̣εν ὅρους τᾶς Αι%⁸⁰- 
— — — — — — — — — —ται καὶ περὶ vvv 
[— — — — — — ἀπὸ δὲ τᾶς Φαλάκ]ρι̣ο̣ς ἐπ’ εὐθείας 
25 [εἰς τὰν περιβολὰν τὰν — —, ἀπὸ δὲ τᾶς π]εριβολᾶς ἐπ’ εὐ- 
[θείας — — — — — — εἰς τὸ τοῦ] Διὸς τοῦ Λυκαί- 
[ου — — — — — — — — — — —] τῶι ποτ’ ἄρ%⁸⁰%⁸⁰%⁸⁰- 
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[κτον, — — — — ἐπ’ εὐθείας εἰς τὸ το]ῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὁρί- 
[ου — — — — — — — — — — — —] καὶ τᾶι Ἀχρα̣- 
30 — — — — — — — — — — — Ἑλισφασίαν v 
[— — — — — — — — — — — τ]ὸμ ποταμὸν vv 
[τὸν Ἑλισόντα — — — — — — — τ]ὸν Ἑλισόντα v 
[— — — — — — — — — — — ἐ]π’ εὐθείας vvv 
[— — — — — — — — — — — τᾶς Ἀρτέ]μ̣ιτος τᾶς Ιροας 
35 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — ἐπὶ τὸ Παμι- 
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —ρ̣ωι ἐφ’ ο̣ὗ ̣
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —χω- 
[ρα— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —] 
38a — — — 
 
B.1 — — — — —Ι̣— — — — — — — — 
— — — — —Σ— — — — — — — — — 
— — — —Υ̣ΤΑΙ̣․․Λ— — — — — — — — 
[τ]οῖς Μεγαλοπολίτ[αις — — — — — — — — —] 
5 ὁδοῦ ἇι ἁ διάβασις ἁ κατὰ [— — — — τᾶι ὁδῶι τᾶι ἀρ]- 
χαίαι, ἇι εἰς τὸ δ̣ιατείχι[σμα — — — — — ἀπὸ δὲ τῶ] 
[Φ]ορβαίω εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τῶ Λ̣— — — — — — — — 
ἐπὶ κοιλᾶι δέραι ἐπὶ τὰ[ν Φάλακριν — — — — —] 
v Εὐφάμωι̣ ὅρους ἀπέδ̣[ωκαν — — — — — Μεγαλοπολι(?)]- 
10 %⁸⁰τᾶν τοῖς δαμιοργοῖς [— — — — — — — ἀπὸ δὲ] 
τᾶς Φαλάκριος ἐ[π’ ε]ὐθε[ίας εἰς τὰν περιβολὰν τὰν — —], 
ἀπὸ δὲ τᾶς περιβολᾶς [ἐπ’ εὐθείας — — — — — τοῦ] 
λόφου εἰς τὸ τοῦ Δ[ιὸς τοῦ Λυκαίου ἱερὸν ἐναντίον τοῦ] 
πευκώδεος λόφου [— — — — — — — — — ἐπ’ εὐ]- 
15 θείας εἰς τὸ τοῦ Δ[ιὸς τοῦ Ὁρίου — — — — — — —] 
ὑ̣φ’ ἇι ἐστὶ ὁ λάκκος — — — — — — — — — 
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․Ε․․․․․․Σ αὐτόθ̣[εν — — — — — — — — Ἑλι]- 
σφασίαν Α․․ΤΕ̣[— — — — — — τὸμ ποταμὸν τὸν] 
Ἑλισόντα, ἀπ̣[ὸ δὲ — — — — — — — — — —] 
20 τὸν Ἑλισόντα — — — — — — — — — — — 
ἐπ’ εὐθείας ․ΠΑ— — — — — — — — — — — 
τᾶς Ἀρτέμιδος [τᾶς Ιροας — — — — — — — — τρί(?)]- 
γωνον ἐξαγου[σ— — — — — — — — — — —] 
ἐπ’ εὐθείας εἰς — — — — — — — — — — 
25 ἐφ’ οὗ καὶ ὁ βω[μὸς — — — — — — — — εἰς τὸ] 
ἱερὸν τοῦ Π— — — — — — — — — — — 
μένων κατε— — — — — — — — — — — 
νέα πέρ̣ατα [— — — — — — — — — Ἑλισφα(?)]- 
σίων οἱ παρ̣[αγενόμενοι — — — — — — — —] 
30 Ἀχαιῶν δαμ[ιοργ— — — — — — — — — —] 
τετράμηνος̣ — — — — — — — — — — — — 
Μεγαλοπολ[ιτ— — — — — — — — — — ἀπε]- 
σταλκυι̣[— — — — — — — — — — — τᾶς] 
χώρας — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
35 ΑΠ— — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
— — — 
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3. Boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Thouria (182-167 BC) 
IPArk 31 
II.A — — — 
1 [— — — — — Μεγαλο]π̣ολι[τ— — — — — — — — — —] 
[— — — — — — —] ἐπ’ εὐθε[ίας — — — — — — — —] 
[— — — — — — Παρ]θενίαι εὐθέ[ως — — — — — — — —] 
․․․․․․․․Λ̣εστις καὶ Θο[υρι(?)․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․] 
5 ․․․․․․․ακα τὸν̣ [πο]ταμὸ[ν․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․]ν v 
[εὐδόκ]ησαν α̣ἰ̣ε̣ί̣ τε Μεσσα̣[νι․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ καὶ ἀ]πὸ v 
․․․α․νος τοῦ ․․Λ̣Μ ̣       ΙΟΥ Ε[․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․ ὁρισμ(?)]ὸς v 
τᾶς χώρας τᾶς ὑπὲρ τὸ ἐν ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․Ν vvv 
εἶμεν [δὲ κα]ὶ [ἐ]πὶ ἐκκλησί[αν ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ κατ(?)]ὰ̣ vvvv 
10 πόλιμ Με[σ]σ̣ανί[ω]ν προ․Κ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ΩΝ vvv 
ὑπερβάντ[ε]ς τὸ ․․ΑΙΕΙ̣․ΝΕ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․εχω vv 
τατον ὡς ΕΙ̣Λ̣Ι̣Τ̣․․ΑΤΕ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․θέω%⁸⁰%⁸⁰- 
μεν κατὰ τὸν νόμον ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․Ι̣ κα[ὶ(?)] 
Με[σσανίων πό]λ̣ις ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․ΚΑΙ̣․․․․․ 
15 οἱ Μεσσάνιοι τα․Τ̣Α̣․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․σα̣ν κατ[ὰ v] 
τὸ γραπτὸν ὃ ἔθε[σαν οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․ ἐ]ν τᾶι ἐν [Σι]- 
κυῶνι συνόδω[ι, Μεγαλοπολιτᾶν εἶμεν τὰν χώρα]μ πλὰν̣ [vv] 
τὰν Δωρίδα [․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․ ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ το]ῦ̣ Ἀνάπου [τ]ο[ῦ] 
ἐξ Αἰγυνέ[ας ῥέοντος ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․] τᾶς χώρας 
20 τᾶς Μεσσ[ανίων ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․]Σ̣[․ κ]αὶ ποτὶ 
τὰν ὁδὸν τ[ὰν ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․]․Α̣ πό[τ]εστιν v 
τᾶς Δωρίδ[ος ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․]․․․Γ̣․ΕΓ̣ΟΝ v 
[․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․]Λ̣Π̣Ε̣ΗΙ̣․Ι̣․․․ 
[․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․]․․․․․ ․․ΠΕΝ v 
25 [․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․]․․․ΚΑ․․․․․․ 
[․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․]Ε․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․ 
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[․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․]․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․ 
[․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․]․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․ 
           {vacat} 
B.1 ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․․ ἀπε[γρ]α̣[ψάμεθα ․․․․․․] 
[τ]ῶν̣ [․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ἐν οἷς γ]εγράφαμεν ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․ 
γράμ̣[μασι κατὰ τὸ ὑπ’ Ἀριστομέ]νεος γραπτὸν̣ [․․․․․․․․․] 
τοῖς μ̣[ὲν ἥκουσιν ἀπὸ τᾶς πόλιο]ς τῶμ Μεγαλο[πολιτᾶν vv 
5 Διοφάν[ει Διαίου, ․․․․․․․․․ Λί]χα, Δαμέαι Θε[αρίδα(?), vvvv] 
Θεαρίδα[ι Λυκόρτα, ․․․․․․․․]ένεος, Πολυβίω[ι Λυκόρτα, v 
Ποσειδίπ[πωι ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․]ι Πασίππου, Κ[αλ]λιφίλω̣[ι] 
Δαμαίνου, [τοῖς δὲ παραγενομ]ένοις ἀπὸ τᾶ[ς] π̣όλιος vvvv 
τῶν Θουρ[ιέων ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․] Σ̣ωκράτει Ἀ[γ]αθία, {vac.7} 
10 Τρ[․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․ περὶ τᾶς χ]ώρας τᾶς ἀμφιλλεγομέ- 
νας [․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․ κα(?)]ιρῶ ἃν εὐ̣δώκησαν οἱ vvvv 
Θο[υρ]ι̣έες [․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․ τ]ὰν χώ[ρα]ν κατά τε τὰν vvv 
[κ]ρ̣ίσιν ἃν [․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ἔδω]κ̣αν̣ [οἱ] περὶ {vac. 9} 
Ἀριστομέ̣νη [․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․ ἔδ]ωκαν οἱ Μεγαλο- 
15 πολῖτα[ι] ἀπ̣ο̣δε[․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ οἱ Μεγ]αλοπολῖται vv 
ἀποστ․․․ν Κ̣ΑΙ̣[․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․ τῶ]ν χρόνων vvvvv 
ἐκ [ταῦτ]α̣ς τᾶς χῶ̣[ρας ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․] καὶ τοὺς ὅρους 
οὓς [ἀπ]έ[δ]ωκαν Ε̣Κ[․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․]αι πόλεις vv 
εκ․․․․Λ̣ΕΙΣΑΜΑ̣[․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ἐ]νιαυτῶι vvv 
20 ὤ[ιον]το δεῖν ΟΥΝ̣[․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․] τὴν γεγενη- 
μέ̣νην αὐτοῖς διά̣[κρισιν ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․ γι]ν̣ώσκετε [vvvv] 
[καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπ̣ικ̣εκρ̣[ικέναι ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․]ε̣σ̣[․]ν [ὁμολο]- 
[γίαν τὴμ πὸς αὐτὸς [․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․․ ․․․․] 




4. Boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Messene (shortly after 182 BC) 
SEG 58.370 
Ψάφι[σμ]α 
ἐπειδὴ κατασ[χόν]των τῶν Ἀχvac.αιῶν 
Ἐνδανίαν καὶ [Πυλ]άναν, τᾶς δὲ πόλε- 
4 ος ἀποκατασ[ταθείσ]ας εἰς τὰν συνπολι- 
τείαν τῶ[ν Ἀχαιῶν], τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠθέλη- 
σαν Μεγ[αλοπολῖτ]αι διὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἀφελέ- 
[σθαι ἁμῖν τά]ς τε πόλεις καὶ τὰν χώραν τὰν 
8 [Ἐνδανίκαν κ]αὶ Πυλανίκαν πᾶσαν αἴτηνα 
[- - -10- - -]ο τοὺς Ἀχαιούς, τῶν δὲ Ἀχαι- 
[ῶν α]ὐτοῖς π[ρο]ειπάντων μή κα περιθέμεν 
Μεγαλοπολίταις τὰν Μεσσανίων· πάλιν 
12 [---]φαν ἐν τᾶι ἐν Ἄλει συνόδωι θέλειν κριθῆ- 
[μεν μ]vὲν ποθ’ ἁμέ, περί τε τᾶς πρότερον χώρας 
ἀ̣ντελέγοσαν ἁμῖν καὶ περὶ τᾶς Ἐνδανίκας 
καὶ Πυλανίκας καὶ ἁμῶν συνελομένων κρι- 
16 τήριον ποτ’ αὐτοὺς ὃ καὶ αὐτοὶ συνευδόκη- 
σαν τοὺς ἁγεμόνας, Ἀπολλωνίδαν Ἐτε- 
άρχου, Ἀλέξανδρον Ἀλεξάνδρου, Κλέαν- 
δρον Κλεάνδρου Σικυωνίους, Ἄρχωνα Φιλο- 
20 κλέος, Ἐξαίνετον Ἐξαινέτου Αἰγιράτας, Φά- 
λακρον Φαινολάου, Λαφείδη Ξενοκλέος, 
Στιάπυρον Στιαπύρου, Δαμόξενον Κλεο- 
ξένου, Ἄντανδρον Δαμοξένου Αἰγιεῖς, Ἄν- 
24 τανδρον Ὑπερβίου Δυμαvac.ῖον, Ἐπικράτη Καμ- 
ψία, Γοργίδαν Νικίδα, Ἀρκαδίωνα Λέ- 
οντος Φαραιεῖς, Καλλικράτη Θεοξέ- 
νου Λεοντήσιον, Νικόδρομον Φιλιστίδα, 
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28 Φίλωνα Σατύρου Ἁλείους, καὶ περὶ τούτων 
ἐνστάλου γενομένου ἁμῖν, ἀποδόν- 
τες oἱ Μεγαλοπολῖται ὅρους Ἀπολλωνί- 
δαι τῶι στραταγῶι τᾶς τε Ἐνδανίκας 
32 καὶ Πυλανίκας καὶ τᾶς Ἀκρειάτιος καὶ 
Βιπειάτιος· καὶ ἁμῶν ἀποδόντων τοὺς 
περιέχοντας ὅρους ἀπὸ Νέδας ἄχρι Κλε- 
ολαίας, καθώς ἐστι ἁμῖν ἁ χώρα, παρα- 
36 γενομένων τῶν δικαστᾶν εἰς τὸ Καρ- 
νειάσιον καὶ ἀποδειξάντων ἁμῶν ἑ- 
κατέρων τὰν χώραν καθὼς καὶ τοὺς ὅ- 
[ρο]υς ἀπεδώκαμες, καὶ γενομένας 
40 [ἐν] τῶι Καρνειασίωι δικαιολογίας ἐπὶ 
[τρεῖς ἁ]μέρας μεθ’ ὕδατος, ἀπὸ μὲν τᾶς 
[Ἀκρειά]τιος καὶ Βιπειάτιος ἀποστάντων 
[τῶν Με]γαλοπολιτᾶν, τοὺς δὲ Καλιά- 
44 [τας οὐ πα]υσάντων ἀντιποιήσασθαι 
[ἁμῖν καὶ] ἄλλο κριτήριον μεταλα- 
[βόντων τῶν Κ]αλιατᾶν πάλιν κρίνωνται 
[--- 9 ---]ν ποθ’ ἁμέ, ἁμῶν δὲ συ- 
48 [--- 9 ---]σιν ποτί τε Καλιάτας 
[καὶ Μεγαλοπολίτ]ας περὶ τᾶς Ἀκρειάτιος 
[καὶ Βιπειάτιος συ]νελομένων δικασ- 
[τήριον τὰν πόλιν τῶ]ν Αἰγιέων καὶ δικαι- 
52 [ολογίας γενομένας] Μεγαλοπολιτᾶν 
[--- 15 --- ὅτι] Ἀκρειᾶτις vacat 
καὶ Βιπειᾶτις Ἀρκαδία ε[ἴη καὶ] Με- 
γαλοπολῖτις, ἁμῶν δὲ δι[δ]ασκόν- 
56 των ὅτι Μεσσανία εἴη, ὄντων ἑκατὸν 
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τεσσαράκοντα ἑπτὰ τῶν κρινόντων 
καὶ ταυτᾶν μεταλαβόντων Καλια- 
τᾶν καὶ Μεγαλοπολιτᾶν ψάφους 
60 ἑπτὰ, ἁμῶν δὲ ἑκατὸν τεσσαρά- 
κοντα, κρινάντων Μεσσανίαν εἶ- 
μεν τὰν χώραν τὰν Ἀκρειᾶτιν καὶ 
Βιπειᾶτιν κατὰ τοὺς ὅρους οὓς ἀπε- 
64 δώκαμες τοῖς κοινοῖς δαμιοργοῖς, 
ὕστερον, ἐπεὶ ὑπεγραψάμεθα περὶ 
τῶν καρπῶν τῶν ἐκ ταύτας τᾶς χώ- 
ρας τᾶι πόλει τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτᾶν 
68 ταλάντου διπλασίου, ἐπεὶ λαβοῦ- 
σα μεσοκοίνους τοὺς καρποὺς οὐ- 
κ ἀπεδίδου, καὶ κεκριμένων ἁμῶν 
περὶ τᾶς χώρας πάλιν ἁμὲ προεκα- 
72 λέσατο ἁ πόλις τῶν Μεγαλοπο- 
λιτᾶν περὶ τᾶς Ἀκρειάτιος χώρας 
ὡς κριτήριον συνελώμεθα ὡς οὐ 
κεκριμένων ποθ’ ἁμέ, τῶν δὲ κοι- 
76 νῶν δαμιοργῶν ἐπακολουθησάν- 
των αὐτᾶι καὶ ζαμίαν ἁμῖν ἐπι- 
βαλόντων ὅτι οὐ συναιρούμεθα 
κριτήριον καὶ εἰσαγαγόντων εἰς τὸ 
80 δικαστήριον τῶν Μιλησίων ἐνικά- 
σαμεν πάσαις ταῖς ψάφοις καθότι 
εἴημεν κεκριμένοι περί τε ταύτας 
τᾶς χώρας vac. καὶ τᾶς Βιπειάτιος πο- 
84 τὶ Μεγαλοπολίτας. ὅπως οὖν ὑπό- 
μναμα εἶ καὶ εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον 
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ὅτι περί τε τᾶς Ἀκρειάτιος καὶ Βιπειά- 
τιος κρίμασιν ἐνικάσαμες τοὺς Με- 
88 γαλοπολίτας καὶ περί τε τᾶς ζαμίας 
ἇς ἐζαμίωσαν ἁμὲ οἱ δαμιοργοὶ ἐ- 
νικάσαμεςvac. δεδόχθαι τῶι δάμωι 
ἀναγράψαι εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τᾶς Μεσ- 
92 σάνας εἰς τὸ βάθρον τὸ παρὰ τὸ Βου- 
λεῖον ἧι οἱ ἱππεῖς ἐντὶ τάν τε πρόκλη- 
σιν τὰν γενομέναν ὑπὸ τῶν Μεγα- 
λοπολιτᾶν καὶ τὰν ζαμίαν τὰν 
96 ἀπὸ τῶν δαμιορvac.γῶν γενομέναν 
ἐπὶ Αἰνητίδα καὶ τὰν κρίσιν τὰν γε- 
νομέναν ὑπὸ τοῦ δικαστηρίου τῶν 
Μιλησίων Βίωνος, Βάβωνος, Αἴσχρου, 
100 Ἡραγόρα, Φιλίσκου, Ἀρτέμωνος, ὁμοί- 




5. Boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta (after 164 BC) 
 
ἀπόφασις δικαστᾶν π̣[ερὶ χώρας ἀμφιλλεγομένας, τῶν αἱρεθέντων] 
δικάσαι τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς κ[αὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, — — — — — — — —] 
τοῦ Ἐπιγόνου, Ἀριστάρχου [τοῦ — — — — —, — — — — — τοῦ — —άν]- 
δρου, Πολυκράτευς τοῦ Πολυ[— — — —, — — — — — τοῦ — — — —, 
καὶ] 
5 περὶ τᾶς ζαμίας ἇς ἐζαμίωσα[ν — — — — — — — — τὸν δᾶμον τὸν Λα]- 
κεδαιμονίων, ὅτι ἀντιπο<ε>ῖτ[αι — — — — — — — — — τῷ δάμῳ τῷ] 
Μεγαλοπολιτᾶν ταύτας τᾶς χ̣[ώρας — — — — — — — — — λόγων δὲ] 
πλειόνων ῥηθέντων, ἐπεὶ πολ[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — —] 
τας διὰ τῶν συνδίκων, καὶ τὰμ [μὲν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου] 
10 διαφορὰν ταῖς πόλεσι δι’ [ὅλ]ο[υ — — — — διαλῦσαι ἐπειρασάμεθα], 
προθυμίας καὶ σπουδᾶς οὐθὲν [ἐλλείποντες]· Α̣․․․․․Λ ̣[οὐκ ἀ]- 
πηνέγκαμεν ἐπιγραφὰν διὰ πο[λλοῦ], ἕνεκεν τοῦ χρόνον ἱκα[νὸν] 
δοθῆ̣μεν εἰς σύλλυσιν τοῖς δια[φερ]ομέ[ν]οις· ἐπε[ὶ] δὲ ἀναγκαῖόν [τε] 
καὶ ἀκόλουθ[ον τῷ ὅρ]κωι ὃν <ὠ>μ[όσα]μεν καὶ τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς τῶν Ἀ- 
15 χαιῶν̣ σ[υ]ντελ̣ε[ῖ]ν τὰν κρίσιν, [<ὣστ’> εἰς] τὰ γράμματα τὰ δαμόσια 
ἀπενεγχθ̣ῆ̣- 
μεν, ἕνεκεν τοῦ μήτε τὰ ποτιδε[ό]μενα κρίσιος ἄκριτα γίνεσθαι μή- 
τε τὰ κεκριμένα ἄκυρα, ὅπως δα[μ]οκρατούμενοι καὶ τὰ ποθ’ αὑτοὺς 
ὁμονοοῦντες οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ διατε[λ]ῶντι εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ὄντες ἐν εἰ- 
ράναι καὶ εὐνομίαι, αἵ τ’ ἐν τοῖς̣ Ἕλλασιν καὶ συμμάχοις γεγενημέ- 
20 ναι πρότερον κ̣ρ[ί]σεις βέβαια[ι] καὶ ἀκήρατοι δ[ι]αμένωντι εἰς τὸν̣ 
ἀεὶ χρόνον κα[ὶ] αἱ στᾶλαι καὶ τ[ὰ ὅρι]α τὰ τεθέ̣[ντα] ὑπὲρ τᾶν κρισ̣[ί]- 
ωμ μένῃ κύρια δι’ ὅλου καὶ μηθὲ[ν αὐτῶν ᾖ] ἰσχυ[ρότ]ερον, γεγεν[ημέ]- 
νας καὶ πρότε[ρ]ον κρίσιος Μεγ[αλοπολίταις καὶ Λακεδ]αιμον[ίοις] 
[ὑπὲ]ρ ταύτα̣[ς τᾶ]ς χώρας, ὑπὲρ ἇς [νῦν διαφέρονται, — —]․․[— —] 




[— — — — — — —]στα κατακολουθ[— — — — — — — — — — — — 
— —] 
[— — — — — — ἐ]ν̣ Μεγάλαι πόλει ἐ[ν τῷ — — — — — — — — — — 
—] 
[— — — — — — — ἐ]ν τῶι ἀσύλ[ω]ι κ[αὶ — — — — — — — — — — 
— —] 
[— — — — — — —μ]έναις εὖ ὑ[πὸ] Μ̣ε[γαλοπολιτᾶν(?) — — — — — —
] 
30 [— — — — ὑπὸ τῶ]ν συμμάχων αἱρε[θέντες — — — — — — κρ]ιτα[ὶ — 
—] 
[— — — — — ἀμφοτ]έρ̣ων ἐπιτρε[ψάντων, εἰ δοκεῖ τὰ]ν Σκιρῖ[τιν κατεσ]- 
[χῆσθαι ὑπὸ Μεγαλοπο]λιτᾶν —— ἐν ἇι κ[αὶ ἁ Αἰγῦτι]ς χώρα —— ἢ ὑπ̣[ὸ 
Λακεδαι]- 
[μονίων, καὶ ὁρισ]μὸς τᾶς χώρας ἀπ[ογεγραμμένο]ς, καὶ ὅτι ὤμοσ[αν 
αἱρήσε]- 
[σθαι ἐκ πά]<ν>των ἀριστίνδαν, κ[αὶ ὅτι ἔκριν]αν οἱ δικασταὶ γ̣[ενέσθαι] 
35 [τὰν Σκιρ]ῖτ̣ιν καὶ τὰν Αἰγῦτιν Ἀρκ̣[άδων ἀπὸ] τοῦ τοὺς Ἡρακλείδας εἰς 
[Π]ε̣λοπόννασον κατελθεῖν, καὶ [ὁ ὅρκο]ς̣ τὸν <ὀ>μόσαντες οἱ δικασταὶ ἐ- 
[δ]ίκασαν, καὶ τῶν δικασάντων τὰ [ὀνό]ματα, οἳ ἦσαν τῶι πλήθει ἑκατὸν 
[κα]ὶ εἷς, καὶ οἱ παρόντες Λακεδα[ιμ]ονίων ἐπὶ τοῦ ὅρκου. κρίνοντες 
[οὖν ο]ὕτ̣ω κα μάλιστα μένειν [τὰ ποθ’] αὑτοὺς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ὁμονοοῦν- 
40 [τας, εἰ] τὰ κριθέντα παρ’ αὐτοῖς μηκέτι γίνοιτο ἄκυρα δι’ ἑτέρων ἐγ- 
[κλημά]των, ἀλλ’ ὅρον ἔχοι τᾶς ποθ’ αὑτοὺς διαφορᾶς κρίσιν δικ[αστ]η- 
[ρίου, ἐ]γνωκότες δὲ ἐκ τ[ῶ]ν παρατεθέ̣ντων ἁμῖν παρ’ ἀμφοτέρ[ων γραμ]- 
[μάτων] καὶ Ῥωμαίους τοὺς προεστακότας τᾶς τῶν Ἑλλάν[ων εὐνομί]- 
[ας καὶ ὁμο]νοίας, ὅκ[α π]αρεγενήθησαν̣ ποθ’ αὑτοὺς Μεγ[αλοπολῖται] 
45 [καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑ]π̣ὲρ ταύτας τᾶς χώρας διαφε[ρόμενοι, ταύταν] 
[ἀποφάνασθαι τὰν γνώμα]ν, διότι δεῖ τὰ [κεκριμένα εἶμεν κύρια — —] 
[— — — — — — — — — — —]αι[— — — — — — — — — — — — 
— — —] 
[— — — — — κρ]ίσ̣ιν κα[ὶ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
— — —] 
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[— — — — —μ]ένας πόλιο[ς — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
— —] 
50 [— — — — —] κ̣ρίσεις πα[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
— —] 
[— — τὰν ζα]μίαν ἃν ἐζα̣[μίωσαν — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
—] 
[— — — ὑπό]δικον εἶμε[ν — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 
— —] 
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